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Albania: Serreqi Criticized Over Talks With Christopher

AU1005180796 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 10 May 96 p 1

[Commentary by G.L.: "Elections Obscure the Problem of Kosovo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The news of the visit of Foreign Minister Serreqi to Washington and his meeting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher has aroused special interest in Albanian political circles, despite the feverish atmosphere at home caused by the coming elections.

It was clear that the only subject expected to be discussed in Washington was the issue of Kosovo, which is now at a delicate stage.

The official media have not enlarged on the part of the meeting that had to do with Kosovo, but, as expected, attempted to exploit the visit for electoral benefit, citing Christopher's statements in support of the development of democracy in Albania and his best wishes for the victory of those he called "the forces of democracy," which the Democratic Party's [PD] propaganda likes to identify with the PD.

The fact that the only quotation regarding Kosovo has been the U.S. secretary of state's standard statement that "we will commit ourselves to a fair solution of the question of Kosovo," as always without specifying what a "fair" solution means, shows that Mr. Serreqi was either put in a difficult position faced with the idea of not detaching Kosovo from Serbia, which various U.S. officials themselves have talked about, or that he did not even mention the familiar thesis of "an independent Kosovo open to both Serbia and Albania." The announcements by the official media in connection with the Christopher-Serreqi meeting do not even mention the routine statements by the senior Albanian officials calling for international pressure to oblige Belgrade to talk to the Albanians in the presence of a third party, or to link sanctions to Albanian rights, except for the statement by President Berisha, who has become an open supporter of the autonomy theory. This leads one to believe that Mr. Serreqi was under instructions "not to pester" our U.S. friend, lest the latter not be disposed to utter those three or four lines that official propaganda was waiting to hear.

Albania: Berisha, Serreqi, Meksi Receive Austria's Schuessel

AU1005184796 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Wolfgang Schuessel, Austrian vice chancellor and minister of foreign affairs, arrived in our country on an official visit today. Mr. Schuessel was received at Rinas airport by his counterpart, Alfred Serreqi, and other high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials.

After a tete-a-tete that lasted for approximately 30 minutes, Serreqi and Schuessel continued talks at the head of their respective delegations.

Minister Serreqi considered this visit very important not only within the framework of strengthening the old friendship between our two countries, but also as an assessment of the achievements of the Meksi government.

Schuessel, Austrian vice chancellor and foreign minister, stressed that his visit expresses the high level of bilateral relations. Schuessel underlined that Albania is playing a key role in the Balkans at a time when the region is characterized by certain hotbeds of crisis. Mr. Schuessel stressed that Austria, as a member of the European Community, will assist in gaining agreement for Albania's associate membership in the EU.

At a meeting with Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, Schuessel pointed out that the political dialogue between Austria and Albania is excellent. He demonstrated interest in Albania's relations with Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Greece, the situation in Kosova, etc.

President Berisha received Wolfgang Schuessel at the Presidency today. Berisha thanked Mr. Schuessel for this very important visit, which comes as a message of friendship between our two countries, and expressed his gratitude to Austrian President Klestil, Chancellor Vranitzky, and Austrian institutions and taxpayers for the greatest assistance per capita rendered to Albania, as well as for Albania's determination to expand this cooperation in all fields.

President Berisha put forward as a special request to Mr. Schuessel that the Austrian Government support the companies taking over the Banje hydropower station, the construction of which is of great importance to us. He also told Mr. Schuessel that the election campaign is among the most civilized that have ever been held in our country. We have invited observers from all the country's institutions, be they from the left or right of center.

Berisha then told Schuessel that the Genocide Law was aimed at closing up the files; it is a human and humane law that aims to stop the State Sigurimi game played on ordinary people. Some 1,000 files have been opened, and an equal number may be opened, but they will once and for all be closed for ordinary people.

After wishing President Berisha success in the 26 May elections, Schuessel stated that Austria wished that he might continue on the road down which he has already started and expressed his conviction that the friendship and cooperation between our two countries would continue without cease. He guaranteed President Berisha that the Austrian Government would support the companies dealing with the Banje hydropower station, and would expand cooperation in all fields.

A special place at the meeting was given to the region, and in particular to the situation in Kosova. President Berisha said that Serbia's integration into the international community should be conditional on the Kosova issue and that the establishment of a dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade in the presence of a third party is necessary.

Mr. Schuessel fully agreed and stated that Austria and the EU are very concerned over the situation in Kosova and that there will be no question of the federation's integration without resolving the Kosova issue.

Albania: Meksi, Austria's Schuessel Note 'Excellent' Relations

AU1105134796 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 10 May 96

[Report by Bujar Muharremi]

[FBIS Translated Text] Wolfgang Schuessel, Austrian vice chancellor and foreign minister, also held a meeting with Prime Minister Meksi, during which they summarized the achievements of the reform in Albania, Albania's role in the Balkans, the grave situation in Kosovo, bilateral relations, etc.

Your visit, Mr. Meksi stressed, is made at an important moment, on the eve of the general elections, upon which the course of the reform and its success will depend. We have demonstrated that we know how to govern. We have scored important achievements and enjoy the support of Western democracies. Within this framework, Meksi availed himself of the opportunity to thank the Austrian friend for Austria's aid and support to the democratic processes in Albania.

Albanian-Austrian relations are at an excellent level, Mr. Schuessel stressed for his part. Austria attentively follows and supports the road you have started. The changes that you have achieved are really colossal. The Albanian Government, supported by the governments of the friendly countries including Austria, has performed an extraordinary work. I wish that you continue the road you have started.

The talks later focused on the grave situation in Kosovo. Meksi submitted Albania's known stance and the danger the situation in Kosovo presents to the stability in the Balkans and the peaceful solution to the problem through Prishtina-Belgrade talks in the presence of a third party. Meksi stated that Serbia's admittance into international organizations and its democratization should be conditional on the solution to the issue of Albanians there.

For his part, Mr. Schuessel expressed his views on the situation in Kosovo and the necessity of an expeditious peaceful solution. I raised the Kosovo issue in all the meetings, Mr. Schuessel stressed.

The meeting also focused on concrete issues of cooperation between the two countries, such as the tourist village near Tirana, and Austrian investments in facilities on the Drin River.

Albania: Defense Minister Heads Delegation Visiting France

AU1105195896 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A spokesman for the Defense Ministry reported that Albanian Defense Minister Safet Zhulali departed for France today at the head of a high-ranking delegation.

Along with other activities, Albanian Defense Minister Zhulali will be received at a special meeting and will hold talks with French Defense Minister Charles Millon. Meanwhile, both defense ministers will sign a bilateral cooperation agreement in the military field between Albania and France. Within the framework of the intensive process of consolidating democracy and reforming and modernizing the army, this act will influence the increase and further expansion of cooperation and relations between the NATO member countries, as well as supporting Albania's integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

During his stay in France, Zhulali is to meet the chief of the French Army General Staff, General Dowin, and will visit French Army units and institutions.

Albania: PD Resorts to 'Feeble Electoral Ploy' of 'Free Shows'

AU1005191596 Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian 10 May 96 p 3

[Commentary by Mehill Tanushi: "Berisha Competes With the Showmen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Berisha, who in violation of the duties of his position has put himself entirely at the service of the Democratic Party [PD], has discovered a new propaganda method during this election campaign. He long ago gave up the rallies with banners, the imported crowds, and the family visits that were so prominent during the referendum campaign and has headed for the sports stadiums. Of course, he has not chosen stadiums because of a shortage of public squares, or in order to create sufficient room for people to go freely to meet their president, because if there is anywhere where people cannot conduct a conversation together, it is a stadium. These stadiums have in fact been chosen in a feeble electoral ploy precisely in order not to meet and talk with people. In a stadium you can watch a sports match and root for your team, or perhaps watch some mass spectacle, but there is no way that a stadium can be used for dry election propaganda for the program of a party, or to assess a candidate's worth and his promises. Why do the PD and the president shirk meetings and confrontations with people at close quarters?

The PD and Berisha, in contrast to the other parties, have a moral duty to render an account to the electorate of their four years in government. If they meet people face to face in indoor halls, there is no way they can escape this accountability. A section of the electorate wants to know what became of the promises of 1992. Why have employment and opportunities for businesses not been created in the regions and the countryside? Why have the members of the government not replied publicly to the charges of corruption leveled against them? Why has this government's administration either closed its doors to ordinary people, or been corrupt? Why have the founders of the December [1990] movement been attacked? Why have some of them been denied the right to be elected? All these and other questions require a reply from the PD, but it is not easy to provide answers—so, let us remain at arm's length. That is one of the reasons why the PD prefers "meetings" in stadiums.

Second, the PD and the president, although in charge of everything, including the police, the National Intelligence Service [ShIK], the halls of institutions, and people's salaries, are still not entirely sure that they will find people to gather around them. Their meetings might turn out to be not entirely suitable for the television cameras that are "obliged by law" to devote one-half of their film to the PD. Halls might remain empty, as in the case of the prime minister's meeting in Tirana. This is a stubborn fact of an electoral campaign for a ruling party. It is therefore not for nothing that the idea has been found of free shows, at which people go to hear Ardit Gjebrea, Aleksander Gjoka, and Manjola Nallbani [popular singers], and where it does no harm if they also listen to the president or Tritan Shehu for five minutes.

Third, the president and the PD not only have nothing to promise the people in a frank face-to-face talk, but have become irritating with their slogans that nobody believes. For instance, what is the effect of fairy tales about "communists and members of the National Front," and how can one base the right to govern only on the weapon of the communist past? We know about the past, and we can refer to it whenever we want to, but now, after six years, people want to know what their future will be. Neither the PD nor the president can tell them this, and so it is better to have shows and "pass the time singing" than to meet the people directly.

Albania: Report Views Fairness of Albanian Polls

MS1305103196 London INDEPENDENT in English 13 May 96 p 10

[Report by Andrew Gumbel: "Albania Poll Tests Limits of Freedom and Fairness"; all names as published]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana—"The important thing about the Albanian elections," observed one urbane European diplomat, "is that they should be free, fair and well-contested." Important indeed, but as the country gears up for its third post-Communist general election starting on 26 May, fairness looks like a relative term at best.

The leader of the opposition Socialist Party, Fatos Nano, is in jail on charges that have been denounced as spurious by international human rights organisations. Several other Socialists have been harassed by a judiciary steadily purged of nearly all independent or antigovernment voices. Some 70 politicians, all but three of them from opposition parties, have been banned by a government-appointed commission from running for office.

Meanwhile, the ruling Democratic Party, led by President Sali Berisha, has a stranglehold on the broadcast media, which pumps out propaganda on its behalf. It has kept up steady pressure on opposition newspapers, with the help of a press law that has been used to penalise criticism of government and public officials in violation of Albania's own constitution.

The infringements of human rights have been so frequent and, often, so blatant, that even the U.S. State Department, once one of President Berisha's most energetic champions, has issued a statement denouncing abuses by the security services undue pressure on the judiciary and restrictions on the rights to assembly and free speech.

Perhaps more than any other eastern European country in the post-Communist era Albania is struggling to accept notions of pluralism and an open society. Partly this is the legacy of 50 years of extreme repression, isolationism and deep poverty. No doubt some of the present corruption and racketeering is inevitable. But part of the blame must also go to President Berisha.

"He is building up a system of absolute state control," said Gramoz Pashko, a former minister now running for parliament with the Democratic Alliance a rival centre-right party. "Instead of using his victory four years ago as a way of creating a healthy parliamentary democracy, he has become more and more authoritarian."

Despite—and perhaps because of—the advantages the Democratic Party has awarded itself, there is a strong chance that the Socialists will end up winning the election. Voter disillusionment with President Berisha is widespread, and most Albanians seem convinced that the Socialists—reformed heirs to Enver Hoxha's Party of Labour—will follow the example set by other former Communists in eastern Europe.

The political climate is thus racked by tension, and the fear among opposition groups and foreign diplomats is that the election could become invalidated through fraud, or even just the perception that fraud has taken place. That in turn could seriously destabilise a part of the Balkans that the international community has worked hard to keep out of the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

Although mindful of this fear, the ruling party has sent a number of disturbing signals. The government has redrawn constituency boundaries, to at least some advantage for the Democratic Party, and altered the electoral system to penalise smaller parties. Earlier this week, the central commission disqualified 20 candidates on the grounds, contested by their parties, that some of the signatures of their sponsors had been forged. Many of the 20 were opposition figures running in sensitive constituencies.

According to Paskal Milo, a historian running with the centre- left Social Democrats, opposition members of electoral commissions are receiving threats amid indications that ruling party loyalists are planning to stuff ballot boxes with extra voting slips. Foreign observers share some misgivings, although there seems to be a consensus that electoral fraud, if it takes place, can only be limited. Foreign diplomats say there are definitely people in the Democratic Party willing to cheat, but that Mr Berisha is discouraging them, if only because he needs the result to look authentic for his own credibility. Moreover, the country will be flooded with international observers.

But the issue could flare up if the results from the first round of the elections indicate a close race for the run-off on 2 June. Many observers are planning to go home after the first round, and the Democratic Party may feel emboldened by the fact that most European countries have expressed at least tacit support for President Berisha's government.

"We could face a very dangerous situation," said Mr Pashko. "If people feel they have been cheated, we will have civil unrest on the streets. That could destabilise not only Albania, but also Kosovo and Macedonia."

Bulgaria: Totomirov on Military Cooperation With FRY

AU1305124996 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 9 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Colonel General Tsvetan Totomirov, chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, by an unidentified correspondent in Sofia on 8 May: "Military Cooperation With Yugoslavia Has Roots and Future"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [BULGARSKA ARMIYA] What is the state of cooperation between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] at the present stage?

[Totomirov] Military cooperation between the Republic of Bulgaria and the FRY has ancient historical roots. As you know, the Bulgarian and Serbian peoples established lasting relations in the military sphere already at the beginning of the previous century. [passage omitted]

In a more recent period, and especially after the changes that began in our two countries, preconditions emerged for giving an impetus to military cooperation with FRY. As you know, we are developing dynamic contacts with the armies of all neighboring countries, and it would not be normal if we do not establish such cooperation also with the FRY.

I will not dwell on the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict, but, as a result of this conflict, an embargo was imposed and, because of it, contacts in the military sphere were postponed until it was lifted. After the Dayton agreement, both sides expressed willingness to establish broader military relations, as those we are maintaining with all our neighbors.

My present visit marks the beginning of mutually beneficial cooperation, and I am convinced that, after my visit, contacts with the FRY will rapidly reach the level of our contacts with all our Balkan neighbors. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Videnov Explains Replacing Nachev With Dobrev

AU1305131496 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 11 May 96 p 4

[Interview with Prime Minister Zhan Videnov by Irena Marinova; place and date not given: "Nachev Assumed Responsibility for Society's Mistrust of Ministry of Internal Affairs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Marinova] Why did you propose to vote simultaneously on Nachev's resignation and Dobrev's appointment? Were you afraid that the proposals would not be adopted if voted on separately?

[Videnov] This is the only constitutional way. The rest is parliamentary business. You must turn to the deputies and their understanding of procedure in the National Assembly.

[Marinova] Who will assume the post of Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] organizational secretary after Dobrev becomes minister?

[Videnov] That is an issue that will be resolved later.

[Marinova] Why did you select Dobrev as minister of the interior?

[Videnov] He is a suitable candidate. He has proven able to resolve issues legislatively and exercise control over the executive, something he did last year as chairman of the National Assembly Commission on National Security.

[Marinova] Are you not confronting Dobrev with an accomplished fact?

[Videnov] No. Why should I? We had the necessary degree of coordination with him. As far as what his position is, you should consult him.

[Videnov] How did Minister Nachev explain his resignation?

[Videnov] I mentioned this. He assumes responsibility for the fact that our society does not trust the Ministry of Internal Affairs to be able to cope with the situation, despite the great efforts of Interior Ministry employees.

[Marinova] Has Nachev resigned in the past, but with your refusing to accept his resignation?

[Videnov] No. I think a resignation becomes a fact when publicly announced, and when positions on it are taken.

[Marinova] Will there be other personnel changes in the cabinet?

[Videnov] For the time being, this is the only one I am proposing.

Bulgaria: Party, State Power of Dobrev Assessed

AU1305140596 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 12 May 96 p 5

[Commentary by Margarita Vurbanova: "Nikolay Dobrev Becomes Number-Two in the BSP Cabinet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Especially jealous in anything related to his organizational activity within the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], Nikolay Dobrev sees no reason to part with his post in the BSP Executive Bureau. This is so especially as Lyubomir Kolarov, Doncho Konakchiev, and the prime minister himself are combining party and state posts.

Nikolay Dobrev accepted the post of minister of internal affairs after several conversations with Zhan Videnov and another conversation with the parliamentary faction members. He received a carte blanche to effect organizational changes in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, provided that everything is completed within two to three months.

As chairman of the National Assembly Commission on National Security and BSP organizational secretary, Dobrev has the reputation of an efficient organizer.

Replacing the minister of interior proves to be a well chosen move, made with good timing. Prior to announcing the name of the BSP presidential candidate, Videnov decided to test the changes in the social climate.

With his selection, Videnov has actually made Dobrev the second most powerful man after himself in the party and the government. With a strong minister of interior, Videnov can survive the presidential elections.

The success of the Democratic Left in the presidential campaign depends to a large degree on the minister of interior. The BSP will be trying to enter this campaign with a new face and to demonstrate that it has tamed crime, something like a velvet glove dictatorship. It will be fully in Minister Dobrev's powers to guarantee a main report on television every evening on the arrest of two or three criminals. Society will applaud because it has had enough and would like to see the death penalty restored, more prisons, and more arrests. Let Chief Prosecutor Tatarchev then continue to release the criminals.

Nikolay Dobrev does not have Videnov's provincial complexes. Unlike him, he enters the executive with 10 years of organizational experience and without problems with contacts with the media. He is suspected of having personal files on people and not only those who belong to the left. The inevitable clash with Videnov's cantankerous character is already behind Dobrev. It took place before the municipal elections. Then (in February 1995) he did not accept the assessment of his party chief, who described his work as unproductive. Afterward, for the sake of a public show, he agreed that Videnov was "absolutely right and his criticism was justified. The BSP still cannot get rid of the habit of sending tasks from the top to the bottom."

The BSP majority would like General Lyuben Petrov [former commander of the Bulgarian Army General Staff] to become chairman of the Commission on National Security. At the same time, it appears that the political career of former Interior Minister Nachev is over.

How did his career begin? Nachev became a BSP member at the end of the 36th National Assembly, which he joined as an extremely left-wing independent. At the 37th National Assembly, the expert criminologist was launched as a member of the Commission on National Security.

Before moving from the legislature to the executive, Nachev did much mileage in the corridors and spent a lot of time in conversations with Krasimir Premyanov [chairman of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction]. The former interior minister used to say at cocktail parties: "I have a 12-year-old daughter and so far I have been warned three times that, if I make a wrong move, she will be kidnapped."

It was an irony of fate that he was forced to resign precisely when a child was kidnapped.

Bulgaria: Proceedings at BSP Sofia Conference Reported

AU1305104096 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 13 May 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Tanya Geneva: "Nikola Koychev Heads BSP Sofia Organization"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The accountability elections conference of the Sofia Socialists has elected Nikolay Koychev the new chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Sofia City Organization. The results of the secret vote did not become known until 0300 on Sunday morning. Koychev won with 183 votes, against 117 for Aleksandur Marinov, who has been chairman of the BSP Sofia organization until now. Some 10 ballots were invalid, and some 331 delegates participated in the secret vote. On the other hand, Marinov received 155 votes for the post of City Council member. [passage omitted]

In his report, Aleksandur Marinov outlined three directions for strengthening the BSP's influence in Sofia: maintaining an efficient presence in sociopolitical life, actively participating in the municipal authority, and achieving success in the presidential elections.

According to well-informed sources, the report was significantly milder than its previous version. Marinov linked achieving success in 1996—the most difficult and decisive year for the Democratic Left—to achieving close harmony between the style of ruling and the implementation of preelection commitments. The former chairman of the BSP Sofia City Organization assumed entire responsibility for the policy that had been conducted during the period reviewed at the accountability election conference, and pointed out insufficient control as his weakness.

During the second part of the forum, the delegates demanded Marinov's resignation, and accused him of behaving as a "permanent and eternal opposition" to the official line.

Marinov said that he had noticed energetic efforts in the last months to replace the leadership of the BSP Sofia Organization, but he has heard no fundamental criticism or arguments. Still chairman, he asked the delegates why they were demonstrating such zeal in personal struggles, and appealed to them to make their choice. Many participants and journalists noted that until almost the last moment, the preferences in the hall wavered between the two candidates, and journalists did not fail to miss the one-on-one persuasion that was going on in the corridors.

Nikolay Kamov urged rallying around the important issues of the policy that is conducted, rather than focusing on "cutting off this or that head." He again developed his thesis that the BSP Executive Bureau must clearly determine the spheres of its members' activities, and that new people unburdened by parliamentarian and executive posts must join the Executive Bureau. Already three ministers are members of the Executive Bureau, Kamov said, and stressed that he does not want to suggest that the BSP chairman must be replaced. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Marinov Ouster Seen as Videnov Victory

AU1305123796 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 13 May 96 p 3

[Commentary by Katya Ivanova: "Videnov Conquers Sofia BSP Organization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialists say that whoever controls the Sofia Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] organization controls the party. Yesterday, Zhan Videnov placed his hand over this almost independent and crucial red structure. This is something the BSP leader had been trying to do from the moment he was elected BSP chairman.

The replacement of Aleksandur Marinov had been in preparation since the 41st BSP Congress, and especially since Aleksandur Lilov began to regroup his forces against Videnov. A pupil of the strategist [Lilov] and one of the leading opposition figures in the party, Marinov had long been a threat to Videnov. It proved impossible to remove him before the fiasco of the municipal elections, because Marinov had created a significant lobby to support himself, and against Videnov. People at No. 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters] are saying that Marinov's replacement by Koychev was prepared brilliantly and represents a classic example of the apparatus games within the BSP. The new chief, Nikola Koychev, accepted the post last Tuesday, while Videnov's envoys made the rounds of the BSP lower organizations and interest clubs to persuade the members to support the change.

Ostensibly, Koychev's views often differ from Videnov's, especially on economic issues. However, he is actually one of Videnov's most loyal men. He is one of the few people to whom the prime minister listens. Yesterday's plenum on structural reform was the last example in this respect. After a series of meetings of the Executive Bureau, and scandals between the prime minister and the chief of the Economic Commission in parliament, Videnov eventually accepted Koychev's position.

Until recently, Aleksandur Marinov was considered one of the party players. However, on Saturday night he lost his nerve for the first time and started speaking about secret collusions to remove him and dirty [illegible] behind his back. He was beside himself with rage [illegible] rostrum, and finally, did not even wait for the election results. He preferred to hide and did not congratulate his opponent. In his person, Lilov has lost a strategic position in the party war against Videnov—the BSP Sofia City Organization.

On the other hand, Marinov's replacement by Koychev is an indication of the fact that the BSP leadership does not forgive defeats. After the municipal elections, Aleksandur Marinov demanded and obtained a vote of confidence. Immediately afterward, people in the BSP began to say that the entire cycle of accountability election conferences is being conducted precisely in order to remove the chiefs of those organizations where the Socialists lost the municipal power. The replacement of the red leader in Varna took place almost unnoticed, while in Plovdiv Videnov preserved his man, Plamen Chervenyakov. However, the change in Sofia was intended to serve as an example.

Bulgaria: Koychev Views Goals as BSP Sofia Chief

AU1305111496 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 13 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Nikola Koychev, leader of the BSP Sofia City Organization, by Petya Ilieva in Sofia on 12 May: "We Will Strengthen the Interest Clubs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ilieva] Mr. Koychev, will your belonging to the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] supreme leadership act as the bridge over the precipice that exists between No. 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters] and the BSP Sofia City Organization?

[Koychev] According to various subjective and journalist interpretations, it almost appears as if the entire

BSP Sofia City Organization is in opposition to the BSP Supreme Council. However, it is true that in becoming the leader of the organization I bring the dowry of being a member of the Executive Bureau. I continue to think that the 41st BSP Congress made a mistake in not electing Aleksandur Marinov a member of the BSP Supreme Council because of the emotional contradictions between Sofia and the provinces.

[Ilieva] What changes do you intend to make in the BSP Sofia City Organization?

[Koychev] There will not be any radical changes. However, as I claim to be familiar in detail with Sofia's administrative-production structure, I will naturally direct my attention toward the work of the scientific institutes, the ministries, and so on. As in every other political party, we will try to assert and expand the support we have.

[Ilieva] Through the interest clubs?

[Koychev] Yes, naturally, without violating the Law on Political Parties. The clubs are functioning, but I do not think that they are sufficiently active.

[Ilieva] Will you keep your post as chairman of the Economic Commission?

[Koychev] Yes, I think that I am needed there as one of the people with the broadest outlook over our national economy.

[Ilieva] How do you assess the differences between you and Zhan Videnov on the structural reform concept?

[Koychev] I assess them as differences in position, and not as contradictions.

[Ilieva] When will the BSP Sofia City Organization express its opinion on the BSP presidential candidate?

[Koychev] The name of the BSP candidate will be determined in this building (No. 20 Positano Street), but only after all BSP organizations have expressed their opinion. Both in Sofia and throughout the country, the people are expressing preference for the same names, in the following order: Pirinski, Lilov, Sendov, Kamov.

[Ilieva] What is your opinion about combining party and executive state posts?

[Koychev] We must not be concerned, because this is the civilized practice in many countries.

Bulgaria: BSP's Koychev Discusses Structural Reform

AU0905160996 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 9 May 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Nikolay Koychev, BSP Deputy and Chairman of the Parliamentary Economics Commission: 'BSP Plenum Will Not Deal With Cabinet Changes'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 7 May, the Executive Bureau of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council reviewed the concept on the most urgent steps in the structural reform as composed by Zhan Videnov. Tension increased as a result of the cruel but necessary steps related to decisions such as closing down failing enterprises. I admit that I was one of the main critics, my thesis being that the painful steps related to enterprises threatened by bankruptcy must be adopted only if there is a clear concept regarding the structural reform. The situation and prospects of the enterprises must be assessed on the basis of many criteria, and only then a decision to act must be adopted. I do not evade the grave responsibility regarding closing down enterprises, and I support explaining to the public why is this being done, but I also adhere to minimizing the mistakes that are made while closing enterprises down.

I would like to explain that the plenum is not prompted by the current situation and the need to close down enterprise. It was planned a long time ago. The question could be asked whether the plenum is not too late in convening, but, in Bulgaria, in principle, everything takes place too late. It is important to know that the BSP was first to assume the commitment to explain its view of the structural reform concept. The plenum's decisions will be, by definition, political recommendations to the other centers of political power and government.

It is my personal position that we were right to relinquish the concept of planning. However, Bulgaria must have a strategic assessment of the state of the economy on the basis of an objective evaluation, the resources we have today—both as material basis and raw materials—and the cadres we have. The structural reform includes 10 to 12 mutually related concepts, which must be analyzed as such. We must have a broader outlook and not only focus on the debts of this or that enterprise.

Contrary to everything that was printed in the press, the plenum will not pose the issue of other ministers' resignations. It will be a plenum that will deal with concepts, despite the fact that some of my colleagues says that it will deal with the operational situation. We want to mark short- and medium-range tasks and actions, and through them touch upon topics such as closing down enterprises, the attitude toward the banks, the stabilization, and other necessary steps—but everything on the basis of a strategy. The Executive Bureau has been told that we must deal only with the topical subject—the bankruptcies. While this is an important issue, I think that the plenum must also deal with other issues.

As far as banking is concerned, I do not know how many banks think that they are unshakable. The discrepancy between the drop in the real economic development and the ascending development of the banking sector at present will soon become intolerable, and the banks will have to pay the price of their inadequate economic activity. Grave decisions regarding their internal debts must be adopted.

Bulgaria: BSP 'Closed' Plenum Debates Structural Reform

AU1205144496 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A plenum of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council and the Democratic Left parliamentary faction opened at 1000 [0700 GMT] this morning. The political concept on the national economy's structural reform is being discussed. Lili Yancheva reports live from No. 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters]:

[Yancheva] Two reports are being read at the plenum. The first is by Zhan Videnov, in which the need to effect measures related to economic and structural changes is being explained. The second report is being read at this very moment by Nikola Koychev.

This report dwells on the need to introduce a strategy aimed at progressing toward tactical decisions and measures, from the point of view that our country must have an idea regarding its economic future in anything related to the macroeconomic structure, a structure of branches, markets, activities, and the social structure of our society. This is what Mr. Koychev said prior to beginning his report.

The economic reform, he said, began not in 1989, but in February 1991. In addition, according to him, and this is his categorical opinion, the list of plants which are to be closed down contains the names of enterprises which could be saved.

Prior to the plenum, Mr. Andrey Lukanov said that it is stupid to continue the existence of losing enterprises. He expects the plenum to end with an expression of support for the cabinet's policy. However, this support must be based on various criteria and conditions, such as protecting the working people and the collectives, and the national economic interest.

No personnel changes will be demanded precisely today, Mr. Lukanov said, despite the fact that such changes nevertheless are expected.

This is what I can say for the time being from the information I obtained before the plenum, because the plenum itself is closed. However, there will be a news conference at 1300 [1000 GMT] and then we will have a more detailed information.

Bulgaria: BSP Sofia Chief Koychev on Economic Reform

AU1205150396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today Nikola Koychev was elected chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Sofia City Organization by the Sixth Accountability Election Conference of the Sofia Socialists. A short while ago, our colleague Lili Yancheva reported on his first interview as the newly elected chairman of the BSP Sofia City Organization, and I can add a few more details.

Nikola Koychev described as the practice of combining several posts in the hands of the same party leaders as civilized because the ministers also are politicians in principle. As far as the structural reform is concerned, Mr. Koychev said that the differences are only in the attitudes to the reform. We must take into consideration the international financial institutions, but we must also conduct a national policy, he said. The enterprises proposed to be closed down will be assessed on the basis of 10-12 criteria. The damage from closing down the enterprises will be minimal because enough means for compensations have been envisaged.

Asked when the list of those enterprises will be published, Nikola Koychev said that this depends on the dialogue with the leading organs of the relevant companies.

The city conference of the BSP Sofia City Organization will continue on Thursday.

Bulgaria: Plenum: SDS Not To Blame for Economic Crisis

AU1205153996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The closed plenum of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council and the Democratic Left parliamentary faction is continuing.

The political concept on the national economy's structural reform is being discussed. The plenum is closed to journalists.

In the main report read at the plenum Zhan Videnov, BSP leader, explained the necessity of effecting measures related to our economy's structural reform. In the second report read at the plenum Nikola Koychev, member of the BSP Executive Bureau, spoke about the tactical decisions based on the strategy outlined in Zhan Videnov's report.

At his first news conference, Mr. Koychev said that, for the first time, both reports of a political party do not include the word guilt, and do not point at the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] as the culprit for the country's economic situation. We knew about the grave economic situation when we assumed power, and we must improve it, Mr. Koychev said.

Klara Marinova, BSP spokesperson, announced at the news conference that the plenum will also discuss the Democratic Left position on the country's coat of arms. The plenum continues with statements from the floor.

Bulgaria: Plenum Said Ready To Make 'Difficult Decisions'

AU1205164796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Lili Yancheva reports live from No. 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters] on the closed plenum of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council and the Democratic Left parliamentary faction:

[Yancheva] As you said, the plenum is continuing. Two reports were read at the plenum—by Zhan Videnov and Nikola Koychev. [passage omitted]

An unpopular topic appears to dominate the discussion. It is related to adopting very difficult decisions, which, naturally, our public will not greet with applause. However, a party which has assumed power must follow the economic imperatives and act in accordance with them, assuming the responsibility both for the difficult measures and their consequences, Krasimir Premyanov [Democratic Left parliamentary faction chief] said.

The plenum is continuing. A political decision is to be expected. After the plenum there will be a news conference with the participation of Zhan Videnov.

What I could also say is that at present the participants are discussing the national coat of arms.

Bulgaria: Stoilov Outlines Draft BSP Plenum Resolution

AU1305134596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], the leadership of the parliamentary group, and ministers are holding a joint session to draft the resolution adopted yesterday on the structural reform of the national economy and immediate measures to stabilize the finances of the real production and the banking sectors.

Yanaki Stoilov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council, who chairs the commission charged with drafting the resolution, explained at a news conference today the main features of the resolution. A necessary means for implementing the structural reform, he said, is to undertake a series of actions proposed in the report presented by Zhan Videnov, chairman of the BSP Supreme Council and prime minister. These actions may grouped under three headings: restructuring of the real production sector and financial rehabilitation of the economy; development of the mass and cash privatization; and stabilization of the banking system.

Bulgaria: BSP Council Backs 'Painful' Reform Measures

AU1305100496 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 13 May 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Dora Chichkova: "Supreme Council Supports Political Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] politically supported the painful and unpopular measures of the structural reform announced by the cabinet. Accelerating privatization, the bankruptcies and consolidations of state and private banks, and closing down losing enterprises—those are the three directions of the Council of Ministers' urgent actions.

About 60 enterprises will be closed down. Some 29,000 workers and employees will lose their jobs, and, together with those who will remain without a job as a result of improving the efficiency of other enterprises, a total of 40,000 workers will become unemployed. They will be compensated with about 3.630 billion leva [about $300 million]. This sum will be provided by the World Bank.

This approach will cut the losses in economy and will facilitate a production revival, which, after 1 to 1.5 years, will provide jobs for some of those who will become unemployed. Not implementing the measures would mean over 1 million unemployed within four to five years, the prime minister thinks. He rejected some of the alternatives to the policy selected by the cabinet that were published in various newspapers.

We are assuming a great political risk for ourselves, but we are doing so in order to save the country, the prime minister said in his speech.

The measures cannot wait for the adoption of a comprehensive structural strategy. It will be formed in motion, it became clear at the plenum. The long-range strategy under the headline "Developing Bulgarian Economy Until the Year 2010 in the Context of Integration Into the EU" is in an advanced state. It is being composed by a collective of 75 economists, Videnov told the plenum.

The necessity of adopting the long-range strategy was the main topic in the second report at the plenum, read by Nikolay Koychev. He noted that without a national strategy, the strategies of the separate branches become a "leap into the unknown." Koychev recommends to attract not only scientists to the work of composing the strategy, but also a broad circle of people engaged in practical activity. Koychev drew the attention of the correspondents the fact that, for the first time, the plenum is not trying to blame the opposition for the situation.

I support the report of Zhan Videnov without any reservations, but we should have heard it one year ago, Andrey Lukanov said. "What we know about the economy today, we already knew then. Now we are forced to act with rather exhausted resources." Other speakers also shared the opinion that the measures are late and that now they will be implemented at a higher social and economic cost.

According to Professor Stefan Stoilov, certain ministries and advisers are responsible for the delay. They have expressed hesitation and a negative attitude to the recommendation of the international financial institutions. In such cases, resignations are normal, Prof. Stoilov hinted.

The criteria according to which the enterprises will be closed down was another topic that focused the attention of the speakers. Ivan Kalfin, Andrey Lukanov, and Yanaki Stoilov stressed that the financial results in 1995 must not be the determining criteria. Kalfin defended the Zebra plant in Sofia, and Lukanov defended Pleven's Plama. According to the former prime minister, the decision to eliminate the Plama refinery from the Bulgarian economy has been adopted too hastily, and Shell will now move to take its place. Lukanov accused the finance minister of effecting a weak customs control, and said that Plama failed because of the import of oils. The possibilities of saving Plama have not been exhausted, and they have not been discussed yet with the local organs or at least with the local deputies.

Yanaki Stoilov recommended discussing the list with the leaderships of the trade associations, and not under the present conditions of semisecrecy. He proposed discussion on a long list of measures that include: creating an agency on collecting payments to the state, determining the scope of the foreign currency free floating, and so on. Stoilov said that the liabilities of the leftist government include the lack of a real structural policy and the lack of modern rules on administering the state property. Dimitur Doychinov and Ivelin Nikolov also said that the list of companies that will be closed down must be revised seriously.

Tosho Mukhtanov proposed two urgent measures related to the military-industrial complex to the cabinet: Submitting to the National Assembly by June a list of enterprises that will be taken out of the military-industrial complex and then liquidated or privatized, and creating a state coordinating organ in this sphere.

Prof. Chavdar Kyuranov thinks that our difficulties stem from the policy rather than from the economy. He appealed for a change of the tactic toward other political forces in order to expand the political basis of the unpopular measures. "We must attract them, but recently, with every speech, we have turned them against us." The professor pointed out, however, that this does not mean that the Alliance for Social Democracy wants a coalition government.

Prof. Velko Vulkanov spoke about the style of work and closing the party within a narrow circle.

Kosta Andreev recommended effecting changes in the Council of Ministers and the BSP Executive Bureau and activating the Supreme Council and BSP oblast organizations. According to him, the circle of people on whom the government relies is becoming ever narrower. Those people demonstrate a lack of confidence in the Democratic Left parliamentary faction, the party has turned into a pale shadow of the Council of Ministers, the Executive Bureau is acting as a politburo, and the ministers are too sensitive to criticism. I do not support the position that the cabinet must be supported rather than criticized, the deputy said.

The plenum was attended by the socialist deputies, almost all ministers, oblast administrators, economic advisers, and the leaders of the Chamber of Accounting and the Mass Privatization Center. In the early morning hours, the painful issues regarding closing down enterprises were discussed by the BSP Supreme Council Organizational Commission, and the mayors took part in the discussion.

Bulgaria: Videnov Seen 'Ahead' at BSP Plenum

AU1305083696 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 13 May 96 p 4

[Commentary by Rumyana Strugarova: "End of Illusions?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If one could judge by the country's economic situation, the prime minister's degree in economy does not do him a lot of good, however, he appears to be a talented player in the mysterious field of apparatus games. At the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] plenum on structural reform, which was decisive for the party, Videnov appeared to be two moves ahead of anyone else. With the late, but effectively implemented change of the minister of internal affairs, he appears to have relieved the cabinet of attacks, at least for the time being. He also drew the BSP Sofia organization to his side by replacing Aleksandur Marinov, one of his main opponents, with Nikola Koychev one day before the plenum at the BSP city conference.

Obviously, the government will head along the road of liquidating losing enterprises because the prime minister also no longer harbors illusions that we could cope without external financing. The problem is sufficiently serious, and thus it pacified party emotions and postponed the demonstration of overt dissatisfaction with Videnov's style. Furthermore, both the main reports read at the plenum did not claim that the government of the Union of Democratic Forces or anyone else is responsible for the financial and economic fiasco. This shows that, at least for the time being, Videnov has a strong position.

The BSP's internal consolidation could last until the presidential elections. If there is a change toward seeking openness and a public dialogue, including with the opponents of the leftist forces, it would be an indication of the fact that the party leadership has understood that the governmental arrogance is suicidal for the BSP. Therefore, one should not be surprised that the dispute about the national coat of arms was resumed precisely now. The moment has been selected deliberately, and the whole thing serves two purposes—it appears to be an act of social consensus and, simultaneously, it is a reverse gradation of the problems.

Bulgaria: BSP Activists Criticize 'Leadership Elite'

AU1305081996 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 13 May 96 p 2

[Article by Svetlana Belousova: "Kamov Wants New Faces in BSP Executive Bureau"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy Nikolay Kamov said at the conference of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Sofia City Organization that new faces are needed in the membership of the BSP Executive Bureau, who should not have other posts as deputies or members of the executive.

The BSP leadership elite has isolated itself and ceased to be interested in the opinions of the party's local activists, a significant number of the delegates to the conference said. Aleksandur Dimitrov from Poduyane Municipality said that it is abnormal to have so many deputies as members of the BSP leading organs. On behalf of the interest clubs, Ognyan Ivanov said that the feeling exists that the BSP is no longer ruling—no one is interested in the problems and thoughts of the rank-and-file Socialists. Professor Boris Mitov from Lozenets read a letter to Videnov in which he reproached him for becoming "unreachable" and a man with whom it is almost impossible to meet. The professor reminded the prime minister that he, as the BSP leader, is responsible for the blunders that have accumulated.

We must oppose the thinking that we are victorious when we defeat each other, Kamov said. According to him, the deputies from the Democratic Left are in a confrontation with each other, and that the situation would have been different had Aleksandur Marinov been elected leader of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction.

We must win in the presidential elections, and not in some party infighting, Videnov said. According to him, no one has the right to jeopardize this victory because of personal or innerparty interests. The Socialist leader said that the BSP should no longer tolerate the "heralds of the calculated coups" and the people of 1990 who are utilizing the party newspapers to further their own goals. Videnov also said that he is prepared to take into consideration the opinion of the party members on the issue of the presidential candidate, but he also wants the party members to take his opinion into consideration.

Czech Republic: Prague Declaration of Atlantic Principles Signed

LD1205125496 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The final declaration of the New Atlantic Initiative was signed at the Cernin Palace in Prague today. Milan Friedrich reports:

[Friedrich] The document signed by, among others, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, and U.S. Senator Jon Kyl is called the Prague Declaration of Atlantic Principles [Prazska deklarace atlantickych zasad].

The fundamental idea of the declaration is to strengthen the unity of the North Atlantic Alliance in both the economic and the security sense. The declaration says that the United States and European countries are from a political, cultural, and economic point of view one civilization, to which Central Europe also belongs since the fall of the Iron Curtain. We are pleased to announce and welcome the fact that there is no doubt that the Central European countries belong to the family of the Atlantic states. The people of this region have thus, after many difficult years of totalitarianism, rejoined the open Euro-American civilization.

The document devotes a special section to Russia, which, according to the signatories of the declaration, should be treated in a friendly and constructive way, while at the same time making clear what the priorities and values of the Europeans are.

At the same time, Europe should never forget that the United States is the leading force of Europe in the sphere of world security, the declaration says.

On behalf of the Czech Republic, the declaration was signed by the eminent theologian and philosopher Tomas Halik.

Czech Republic: Klaus Calls For U.S. To Stay in Europe

LD1105142796 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus today delivered an address at the start of the second day of the New Atlantic Initiative conference. The initiative is to contribute toward preserving a close relationship between the United States and European countries. Commenting on his speech, Prime Minister Klaus told Czech Radio:

[Begin Klaus recording] I am deeply convinced that, if America quits Europe, it will be a horrible mistake. Security on the continent is not the only reason. The other reason is that the flow of healthy self-confidence, a healthy tradition of individualism, and a healthy market economy is coming to us more powerfully from America than from some European countries, which have become so stained with semisocialism and the welfare state that some of them could do with a Velvet Revolution. [end recording]

Czech Republic: Havel Notes Growing Isolationism in U.S.

LD1205170296 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1215 GMT 12 May 96

[Regular Sunday interview with Czech President Vaclav Havel by Eva Hulkova; "Conversations at Lany"—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Hulkova] Mr. President, on Friday you opened the Prague conference of the New Atlantic Initiative, attended over the weekend by some 150 political and public figures from all over the world. What is the significance of this event, and why are we, the Czechs, investing so much hope in it?

[Havel] The initiative is aimed at strengthening Euro-American ties, and its declaration calls on the West to show greater broad-mindedness and devote more energy to building the new order and protecting Euro-American values. One of its chapters concentrates on Central Europe, on the need to rapidly expand the Western world to include the Central European countries. [passage omitted]

[Hulkova] The congress is aimed at counterbalancing isolationism, which seems to be growing.

[Havel] Isolationism is indeed growing somewhat in America, as I experienced many times during debates at various forums in America, as if it has the idea that because America and the West won the Cold War, everything is now fine and they can concentrate exclusively on themselves. This is a big errork, and, on the contrary, all of us, the whole world is facing the fundamental tasks of finding a new order for the 21st century that would be capable of standing up to the dangers threatening our civilization. The challenge of the end of the century is still ahead of us.

There have always been waves of isolationism in American politics, every so often. One of these waves has now flooded America once again. I think that one of the aims of the above-mentioned initiative is to stand up to this and stress the historic significance of our times and the long-term and fundamental significance of the tasks we are facing, and to call on European and American politicians to look beyond their particular temporary interests and assume their historic responsibility. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Havel's Life Threatened Over B-H Stand

AU1005153596 Prague PRAVO in Czech 10 May 96 p 1

[Article by "los": "President Havel Was Threatened With Assassination in a Letter Last Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Castle protection service intercepted a letter from people claiming membership in the Jihad organization in mid-September of last year, which threatened President Vaclav Havel with assassination for his stance regarding the conflict in Bosnia. The CT [Czech Television] evening newscast carried this report yesterday.

According to Interior Ministry press spokesman Jan Subert, the police have been investigating people of Arab background and firms with Arab participation for some time. Namely, these firms organize the settlement of Algerians in the Czech Republic, many of whom, according to Subert, could be members of fundamentalist organizations. According to CT, some obtained Czech citizenship and others used to operate here in the past as agents and collaborators of the StB [State Security]. The police have not interfered so far, according to Subert, because the terrorists consider the Czech Republic a "peaceful" country and do not want to disturb this peace.

Czech Republic: Zieleniec Discusses NATO, EU Entry Issues

AU1005170896 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 9 May 96 pp 3, 5

[Interview with Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec by Tomas Chalupa and Vaclav Musilek in Prague; date not given: "Rejecting Entry Into the EU Would Be a Fateful Defeat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [DENNI TELEGRAF] Mr. Minister, there has been an almost steady stream of people coming to the Foreign Ministry recently. At the same time, a great many of these visits have been made by officials from NATO countries. What is the reason for this?

[Zieleniec] This is a manifestation of the intense, uncompromising, and focused Czech foreign policy that, in short, is bearing fruit. The Czech Republic is perceived as a reliable country that occupies a leading position in the pack of countries applying for membership in the key Western integrative structures—that is, the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. Not only are the political commentators saying this, but this is also the officially expressed political opinion of the absolute majority of these organizations' member countries. The frequency of the meetings you have referred to is also associated directly with this. And, at the same time, the public is only aware of the meetings at the highest level.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Has there been any shift in the issue of NATO enlargement? [Zieleniec] This is associated directly with the development of East-West dialogue, which has undoubtedly registered certain new elements recently. On the one hand, we have encountered the more candidly formulated resolve in Western countries to enlarge the alliance, and, on the other, Russia's stance has also started to become much more open. A simple no is no longer the only thing that is heard from Russia. Various options for dealing with this issue are already being discussed there. Scope for discussing a Pan-European security arrangement is being created along with this development.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] You mentioned various options for enlargement. Is the compromise option proposed by Russia—that is, a kind of political but not military enlargement—acceptable to the Czech Republic?

[Zieleniec] The Czech Republic has said many times that it wants to become a member of the alliance, with all of the rights and obligations that arise from this. It is inconceivable to us that we would set the preliminary conditions in the event of our admission into the alliance. This is definitely not something we intend to discuss with third countries. Undoubtedly, however, the modalities of our membership will be the subject of a legitimate discussion between ourselves and our future allies, and they may also be the subject of political consideration on the Czech political scene.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Can you imagine that the Czech Republic could do more in its domestic policy, something that would simplify the future talks on bringing entry, first and foremost into NATO, closer?

[Zieleniec] Foreign policy is always a result of domestic policy. To think that it is possible to achieve something merely by diplomatic means without there being an economic, social, or political background for it at home is a naive and false notion. The prestige of our country abroad, the respect we enjoy, and the status of the Czech Republic are given, first and foremost, by what we have done at home and what we have achieved in transforming our economy, in creating a Western-type standard democratic system, in political stability and political culture, and so on. From this point of view, we have done almost the maximum for our admission. We are a leading candidate for membership not because we have been banging loudly on NATO's doors, but because of the work we have done at home. So, we must carry on; we must not cast doubt on our resolve, on the unequivocal nature of our development. I think it is also important that the main opposition force, the social democrats, is not casting doubt on our foreign policy orientation in these fundamental matters. All of this is an element of our state's credibility.

It goes without saying that we are now concentrating on specific negotiations with the North Atlantic Alliance, especially on improving political and military cooperation. For example, the current contacts between our Army and the NATO armies—especially the U.S. Army—are very intense and very businesslike. The fact that our battalion in Yugoslavia has slotted into the NATO structure so easily and well is a very good testimonial to what has already happened. Operating within the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance is now no longer a problem for our troops. The fact that we are a part of IFOR [Implementation Force] forces within the framework of the NATO units in Yugoslavia has, apart from this technical context, a very important political context. In recent years, the Czech Republic has always been an element of the key international operations along with other Western states; at the time of the federation, we took part in the operation in the Persian Gulf and then in UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] activities on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Our participation was always significant and also successful. The culmination of this activity is the current incorporation of our battalion into the IFOR forces. In this context, it is necessary to state that we did not try to shirk anything, we did not attempt to send an auxiliary or logistical unit. No, this is indeed a Czech Army combat battalion. If you add to this the activity of our military observers in various parts of the world and our work in the Security Council in dealing with conflicts, you will get a picture of a country that is reliable, whose policy is based on clearly defined values, just like the values and policy of the NATO members.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Warren Christopher also referred to many of these points in his lecture during his visit to Prague. He declared here, in the Cernin Palace, that the time for decisions will be in December. What does this mean?

[Zieleniec] Secretary of State Christopher did not say that the decision on who will be admitted and when will be made in December. His speech merely suggested that the NATO Council of Ministers will convene in December, and, obviously, a decision will be made that, from this point of view, will be important. This does not mean, however, that the decision will be final. It is quite possible that in December the North Atlantic Alliance will "merely" agree to convene a summit in 1997 that will decide on these matters. Nevertheless, it is extremely significant that a time frame of two years, when the final and unequivocal decision should be made, is now being discussed.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Do you think that, after what Secretary of State Christopher said here, the contours of our admission into NATO are becoming clearer—as far as time is concerned—than our entry into the EU?

[Zieleniec] I would say that we have entered into the final phase with both of these institutions. The European Union agreed at the summit in Madrid—I was there with Prime Minister Klaus—that the preparation of the studies on the readiness of the countries applying for membership has to begin now. The European Union Commission is to take care of this so that it is possible to commence the negotiations within six months of the completion of the intergovernment conference; we expect it to be completed sometime at the end of 1997. So here, too, we find ourselves in some kind of final phase. This is a major shift compared with the beginning in 1992 or 1993.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] You have referred to the unified stances of both the governing coalition and the opposition parties as far as our incorporation into the European structures is concerned. Despite this, Milos Zeman said recently that, from the point of view of our foreign orientation, he prefers entry into the EU, because it is capable, via the Western European Union [WEU], of giving us the same security guarantees. What is the difference between the WEU and NATO?

[Zieleniec] I do not think we should pay so much attention to the niceties in Mr. Zeman's speeches because they are often dictated by the need to comment ad hoc on this or that event. Mr. Zeman emphasized quite recently the importance of the U.S. presence in this region; he referred very approvingly to the fact that the Czech Republic had been the host for the meeting between the region's foreign ministers and Secretary of State Christopher. This suggests that he is aware of the significance of the transatlantic connection. So I think that, at the moment, it does not make sense to try and put together a logical whole from the fragments we hear in the campaign speeches of this or that opposition politician.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] According to the public opinion polls conducted among the citizens of the countries applying to join the EU, Czech citizens are the most skeptical compared with their neighbors. How do you account for this?

[Zieleniec] I would not like to simplify the issue too much; I do not know the deeper structure of these polls. On the other hand, it is a fact that, for us and our citizens, entry into these institutions is an immediate reality. And, if you decide on something that will happen tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, you weigh the pros and cons far more carefully than in a situation in which the simple declaration of entry into European structures is a mere ideological slogan intended to indicate overall foreign political orientation in a given society. You know, most of the countries that are applying are in the situation where, as opposed to the Czech Republic, there is simply no risk of immediate entry into these institutions.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] According to these polls, there was, admittedly, a huge difference between the answers of the Czechs and the Albanians; on the other hand, the Poles, who are standing beside us in front of NATO's gates, also have more accommodating attitudes toward the Union.

[Zieleniec] I would say that we are more practical. We try to see very specific problems behind every such issue. Perhaps this is also connected with a slight difference in our mentalities.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] The issue of a referendum plays a major role in the discussions surrounding our entry into the European organizations. What is your view?

[Zieleniec] I generally feel that a referendum, though we have it in the Constitution, is not an integral part of the logic of a parliamentary system, which we have in our country. It goes without saying that, in the case of a decision that reduces fundamentally a state's sovereignty and transfers sovereignty to another unit—and this applies with entry into the EU—the demand for a referendum is legitimate. But otherwise I feel that, as with many other very important issues, we manage with our standard parliamentary system.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] In connection with this skepticism and practicality of Czech citizens, the possibility is often referred to in the foreign press that our citizens, like the Norwegians, could in the end say no. I have even come across the view that such an eventuality could suit certain Czech politicians— for example, Prime Minister Klaus.

[Zieleniec] A negative outcome would be a historical defeat for the Czech state. I am convinced that the EU is not only a means for economic cooperation, but also a far-reaching historical program, whose aim is peace and stability for the European Continent. It was established after World War II as an attempt by the West European states to overcome the constantly recurring pattern of national wars in Europe with Germany in the middle, and to overcome it by means of intense cooperation. I have to say that the 50 years of the existence of this process are proof of its success. Given such a perspective, it is logical that we, too, Germany's eastern neighbors, should be a part of this major historical program. I consider the Czech Republic's integration into the EU to be a historic chance. Go and take a look at Denmark or the Netherlands, Belgium or Luxembourg. These are countries that have a similarly eventful history, including a similarly eventful history of relations with Germany. In these countries, too, the process of integration is perceived as a chance for the smaller nations. I feel that the EU is not only an opportunity for us, but also that without us the integrative endeavor is incomplete. Of course, Europe will develop; the EU will discuss its future development. But we are and will be a part of this discussion.

We also have to realize that we are no longer experiencing only European issues, that global issues are also an element of our lives, that centers of very dynamic civilizations—Islamic, Asian, Pacific—are evolving, and that this development tells us Europeans to be more aware of what unites us than what divides us.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Do you think the coming EU intergovernmental conference will manage, among other things, to find an optimum level of integration to make sure that some of the too ambitious federalist plans do not forestall the entire integrative endeavor because there is concern in certain countries that they do not want to and cannot go that far?

[Zieleniec] This is a subject of the current discussions in Europe. This is a very important criterion that the current debate is also considering. It is indubitable that the ideas of the 1950's and 1960's about establishing a united European state are part of the past. The more we cooperate, the more we understand the mechanisms that influence this cooperation, and thus we find a more practical solution. I do not believe it is possible to characterize the future of Europe by means of a single word like federal or nonfederal. Namely, the integration process is so unique that it is impossible to generalize it in any way. And this is a path that demands a great deal of work and very intensive political communication. It is also a path that requires an armful of mutual understanding, so that the large understand the small and the small understand the large and, first and foremost, so that we bear in mind that we are building something that is worth this effort.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] When the EU is discussed, it is maintained that entry into it is impossible not only if the applicant country is not sufficiently prepared, but also if the Union itself is not ready. Is the EU in a position to accept new members?

[Zieleniec] Although the recently commenced intergovernmental conference is not dealing with expansion formally, or not primarily, in principle, everything it is doing is associated with the Union's preparations for the admission of new members. It goes without saying that the Union has to expand and that this is in the interest of the whole of Europe. Therefore, the discussion on the European Union's decisive mechanisms will proceed in such a way that the whole institution, even if it has 20 members, will be functional and effective. So the EU will have to think about the whole system of redistribution, especially in agriculture, which consumes massive resources. There are many of these issues and, if you look at the agenda of the intergovernmental conference, although you will come across the word "expansion" hardly anywhere there, you will see that each item on the agenda is actually associated with it.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] It is often claimed in the West that the tragedy of the former states of the Soviet bloc is that they cannot cooperate effectively together and that, if they do, it is not done explicitly, but so-called covertly, behind the scenes. Do you think this criticism is warranted?

[Zieleniec] In my opinion, these views have already subsided. The West is beginning to realize that the readiness of these countries is, first and foremost, a matter of their domestic changes, of their political, economic, and social stabilization, and that this cannot be replaced by any foreign political activities. I believe our partners from the region are also aware of this. Notice that the discussion on regional cooperation has entered into far more rational dimensions than in the years 1990 and 1991; an example of this is the very specific, very successful cooperation within the Central European free trade zone, an organization beneficial to all of its members and to the whole region. Look at the development of our trade with Poland. It has exploded by tens of percentage points per annum. And, of course, it brings many other things in its wake—from cross-border cooperation and the openness of overall relations to intense political cooperation. It proves that the path on which we insisted is really the most effective. Our region is cooperating in an exemplary fashion. There are many kinds of regional cooperation in the world, but they mostly serve to ensure that the presidents meet somewhere once a year, give one another assurances on this or that, and depart again. But, if you look at the concrete results, you will see that these states often turn their backs on one another, trade mostly with someone else, and maintain political contacts more on the outside than the inside. CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Associaation] is, also from a global point of view, exceedingly unique, given its intensifying cooperation. A comparison of CEFTA and the other kinds of regional cooperation throughout the world shows that it is one of the most dynamic—if not the most dynamic—examples of regional economic cooperation.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Cooperation with Poland, perhaps most from our point of view, can be assessed within the framework of CEFTA. There is even talk about a kind of alliance between these two states, whose motto is: Entry into the EU and NATO.

[Zieleniec] I would definitely not use the word alliance. This is not an alternative for us to membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. The fact is, the two countries are getting ready for this politically and militarily. We have similar problems—for example, reequipping the Army. You probably know that reequipping the Air Force is being discussed in our country, and, by coincidence, such a discussion is also taking place in Poland. Very similar criteria are being taken into consideration; similar arguments are being used. It is good that the Armies are communicating with one another about this issue. We are also discussing political issues together. Communication in military and security issues has been so active for more than a year that we considered it important to start a tradition with our Polish colleagues of very unusual meetings involving four ministers—the two defense and foreign ministers will always meet and discuss a whole range of foreign policy and security issues.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] The opposition criticizes, with particular relish, our relations with Slovakia, which apparently are not as intense as they could be. The social democrats claim that, following the breakup of the Federation, it was agreed that our foreign policy would be coordinated and that the Czech and Slovak foreign ministers would meet every six months. How intense are our mutual relations, and is it possible, and also appropriate, to coordinate our foreign policy?

[Zieleniec] I do not think this opposition criticism is somehow fundamental. It is undoubtedly good that it airs its views on foreign policy. If, however, we are talking about foreign relations, the issue of tasks and resolutions depends not only on one side, but on the two of them; this is not only a task for the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, I say that relations with Slovakia are terribly intense. Their intensity, however, does not only depend on the frequency of meetings between politicians. We have a customs union that, thank God, functions relatively well, and many businesses cooperate traditionally. Look at how much is written or broadcast in our country about Slovakia and, vice versa, in

Slovakia about the Czech Republic. But our relations at an intergovernmental level are also intense. There is no other state for us where the ministers from all sectors meet so often. Look at how many times the interior minister has met his counterpart; the economic, justice, and other ministers also meet often. So whoever says our relations are not intense is not seeing the whole picture. He could, of course, point out that the prime ministers have not met as often, but this has a slightly different context. The overall dynamism of mutual relations is, in my opinion, satisfactory.

Czech Republic: President Appoints Two New Generals

AU1005095196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 9 May 96 p 2

[CTK report: "Havel Named Two New Generals at Castle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Yesterday at Prague Castle, President Vaclav Havel granted to Jiri Sedivy and Jiri Martinek the rank of brigadier general. Sedivy, who was largely responsible for building the rapid deployment brigade, has since January been in command of the Czech contingent in the IFOR [Implementation Force] international mission in Bosnia. Martinek is Deputy Chief of Staff for operational matters.

Slovakia: HZDS Daily Continues To Criticize Holbrooke

AU1005130696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 8 May 96 p 9

[Commentary by Rudolf Audy: "Holbrooke's Tarnished Reputation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. assistant secretary of state and present adviser of President Clinton and vice president of the investment bank CS First Boston Corporation, visited Slovakia recently for talks with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. He stressed several times that he had met with the Slovak prime minister as a private individual.

The man who negotiated with Vladimir Meciar at the behest of the U.S. President and said that, in the talks, he stressed the need to continue the democratization process in Slovakia, does not have a good reputation in the U.S. media at present. Many cannot forget that, besides being the architect of Clinton's policy, he also was one of the spiritual fathers of U.S. military policy in Vietnam, which is associated with another U.S. President—Lyndon Johnson.

Clinton is at present Clinton's assistant for European and Canadian affairs [as published] with partial successes in the Balkan peace negotiations, but the U.S. public still cannot forgive him Vietnam. The U.S. newspaper CONSERVATIVE CHRONICLE claims in this context: "Johnson's Vietnam policy was a catastrophe. We expect Clinton's policy in Bosnia to meet with the same unsuccessful end. It is more than certain that Holbrooke knows as much about Bosnia as he knew about Vietnam. It seems that his predictions about what will happen in Bosnia are about as accurate as the Johnson administration's wrong assumptions in Vietnam. The parallels are remarkable and frightening. An expert on Vietnam is becoming an expert on Bosnia."

Critical mass media in the United States claim that, just as in the war in Vietnam, U.S. national interests are absent in the Balkans, in which precisely Richard Holbrooke reportedly has his fingers.

The parallels do not end there, however. Just as American soldiers used to be sent to Vietnam without sufficient support from the people and Congress, the same is being repeated in the case of Bosnia. The U.S. media claim that the Johnson administration was lying about the situation in Vietnam, and the Clinton administration is doing the same when it speaks about the situation in Bosnia. Writing in the CONSERVATIVE CHRONICLE, Charlie Reese even says: "We would have to be naive to believe that the American officers who were training the Croatian Army were not in touch with the CIA."

What conclusions can be drawn from this information and from these circumstances? The most obvious one is that U.S. soldiers operating in the Balkans are not viewed by Serbs as impartial peacekeepers, but as allies of their enemies—the Croats and Muslims. This image of U.S. interests in the Balkans definitely does not positively influence the speedy settlement of the Yugoslav crisis, and it increases Russian-U.S. tensions over NATO's eastward expansion.

Slovakia: U.S.-Mediated Minority Talks in Bratislava Fail

LD1205122096 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The weekend coordination talks in Bratislava between representatives of the Slovak Government and the Hungarian minority have again been unsuccessful. These were held for the second time with U.S. mediation. Ildiko Nagy reports from Bratislava.

[Nagy] The failure to resolve ethnic issues could complicate the relationship between Slovakia and the United States. For this reason, any possible tension must be averted as soon as possible. The possibility of preserving awareness of one's identity must be ensured, based on positive European models. Loyalty to the state cannot be forced, but it can be acquired by means of a good minority policy. This was the position expressed by representatives of the United States, the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament.

The Project for Ethnic Relations supported by the U.S. Government—or as it is better known, PER—has been working for a long time on preventing ethnic tension in Central and East Europe.

As it emerged in Bratislava this weekend, however, Slovak governing party politicians are willing to continue a dialogue only after acceptance of the conditions they have set.

These include, for example, a pledge of loyalty by the Hungarian Coalition, acceptance of alternative education [as heard], and abandoning the demand for territorial autonomy, and the representatives of the Slovak Hungarians therefore consider these unacceptable.

As regards the ethnic Hungarians' proposals, the government coalition considers adoption of a constitutional law on minorities [kisebbsegroel szolo

Slovakia: Commentary Fears Coup Organized by UN, NATO

AU1005155696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 10 May 96 p 3

[Commentary by Roman Hofbauer: "Concerns of Slovaks in Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It certainly is an extreme dimension of a political stand if a prominent politician on an official visit to another country states that the prime minister and the government of the host country should be overthrown and replaced by representatives of another political spectrum. Any developed democratic country would ask such a "guest" to leave within 24 hours. Nevertheless, the situation is different in Slovakia.

At the 4th Congress of the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left]—a party that after November 1989 changed overnight from the Marxist-Leninist communist party to a socialist party advocating plurality and market economy—Jean Francois Vallin, secretary general of the Party of European Socialists and member of the European Parliament, declared that Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar represents the greatest obstacle to Slovakia's entry into the European Union. This political impertinence was seconded by another guest, Herbert Bosch, chairman of the Joint Committee of the European and the Slovak Parliaments, who keeps coming to "question" us on the floor of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. No one in Slovakia moved a muscle, nobody called for anyone to leave the country, and no record has or will be made about any undesirable persons. Why should they?

In this country, Austrian activists, for instance, are free to enter the area and facilities of the Mochovce nuclear power plant, scream and holler as they like, and leave scot free. The U.S. Hungarian Bela Liptak can organize in peace his bus trips for Hungarians to Gabcikovo to protesters against the hydroelectric project and run through the machine rooms of the power plant. Any organization, institution, association, or government can throw mud, lies, or accusations at Slovakia and the Slovaks, and the best we can do in response is to print a few temporary lamentations in the single Slovak daily that is not antigovernment-oriented. Thus, we can hardly be surprised if a certain ambassador of a country visits parliamentary committee chairmen and passes instructions on to them on the floor of parliament on which laws the parliament is not to pass, and if it does, then Slovakia will see! Our citizens are justified in their asking why we have established our own state if we do not protect it with a quite determination as others do. They ask how it is possible that laws are being breached in Slovakia by the dissemination of irredentist ideas, desinformation, and lies about Slovakia, and why nothing is done to defend our truth! They ask what are the Slovak diplomats both abroad and at home good for if they do not act quickly and decisively on behalf of our nation and our state. They ask how it is possible that anyone can come to Slovakia at any time and spew his anti-Slovak hate, anti-Slovak lies, and anti-Slovak racism as much as he likes in the name of a fictitious cosmopolitanism and Pan-Europeanism. They ask what good do all these supranational and suprastate institutions and associations bring to Slovakia. They ask whether anyone noticed that the present global anti-Slovak barrage is reminiscent of just the first stage of an anti-Slovak final operation based on lies fabricated to order, and that the second stage may consist of an international intervention against Slovakia under the auspices of the United Nations, the Security Council, NATO, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], Council of Europe, or IFOR [Implementation Force], and that the final solution may be the liquidation of the current political representation, and installment of a collaborating puppet government of vassals in Slovakia.

These are most pressing questions. Despite our apparent Slovak carelessness, there does not seem to be much time left to answer them.

Slovakia: Prime Minister Meciar Gives Weekly Interview

LD1005222396 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1638 GMT 10 May 96

[Regular Friday interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Peter Toman—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Toman] [Passage omitted]

Prime Minister, how can we weaken the influence political extremism has on the building of standard neighborly relations between Slovakia and Hungary?

[Meciar] Slovak-Hungarian relations are determined by the proximity of our territories and by our shared aims, as both the Hungarian and Slovak Republics wish to be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures and the EU, as well as by our shared interests in building a democratic system. There are also shared interests in economic, political, and cultural cooperation.

If developments take a different turn, these interests will be affected. This is why any expression of extremism opposing these basic trends of development are more or less damaging to both the Hungarian and Slovak Republics. So far as integration efforts are concerned, relations with neighbors need to be settled, otherwise the efforts of both the Slovak and Hungarian Republics will be hindered.

As regards extremism, its most frequent expression is nationalism which, in Slovakia in the case of Slovaks of Hungarian origin of those extremist groups, assumes the form of striving to raise the issue of territorial autonomy and, consequently, the right of self-determination. International law recognizes the right of self-determination for nations but not for ethnic minorities.

The first precondition for good coexistence between the majority and minority in the population is loyalty towards the state and its recognition.

Today's extremism, partly promoted by the media and partly by certain political groups, is a political fact with which we in Slovakia have to come to terms. When, during their talks with me, [ethnic] Hungarian parties tabled the issue of autonomy, I told them: I consider this an unacceptable issue even for discussion. In the past there were such trends and both the Slovaks and the Hungarians paid very dearly for them. This is why the orphans of the old ways of thinking should not obstruct the new ways of ours.

[Toman] At a meeting with foreign journalists [8 May] you took a stance, among other things, on the delay in the privatization of four major banking institutions in Slovakia [General Credit Bank, the Slovak Savings Bank, the Bank for Investment and Development, and the Slovak Insurance Company] which was originally scheduled to take place in February. You said that the delay had resulted in a complex reevaluation of the privatization project. On what principles is the new blueprint based and when, in your opinion, will the process be concluded?

[Meciar] The privatization of banking institutions, not only of the four major banks, represents a certain transformation of the primary and secondary money circulation.

The prepared and approved proposal to privatize the banks by the end of February assumed that the ownership relations would be resolved first and that structural changes affecting the capital structure, the specialization of individual banks and the links between the capital of individual institutions would follow immediately, after the end of February.

As a result of the delay in dealing with the ownership question and the definition of who the owners should be, certain steps concerning the capital structure within individual banks had to be taken. This is demonstrated by various phenomena in the liquidity of their assets as well as in other related aspects.

The second thing to be tackled, and we are working on this currently, is the issue of the relations between these four and all the other banks because the four banks have some shares in all the other banks in Slovakia. The volume and pattern of these shareholdings vary. [passage omitted]

That is why we are working on these three changes simultaneously.

We have to admit that beside these positive steps there have also appeared certain competitive interests which are not always honest and which are being pushed through by either certain lobbies or groups of people who think that now is the time to seize banks and so control the capital market. There is no way we can allow this to happen.

It was all these facts put together, and not merely one single fact, which resulted in the delay to the privatization of the banks when compared with the original timetable.

[Toman] And what about the date when the issue will be resolved?

[Meciar] I am not going to mention any particular date as it has acquired a substantially new meaning. However, the struggle with those interest groups which are not interested in creating a market but only pursuing their interest in seizing control of the market is being waged silently but in a very intensive way. [passage omitted]

[Toman] In connection with the ever more frequent demonstrations of terrorism in our country the government several times rejected all forms of violence and any violation of legal norms. [passage omitted]

How can this increasing political aggressiveness be replaced by mutual trust and respect between rival political parties?

[Meciar] In a democracy we cannot expect that a [united] national front will be formed in which all will be working under one single baton. That is precisely what is beautiful about democracy—everybody develops autonomously and independently. [passage omitted]

On the other hand, every democracy requires that political entities bear responsibility for their acts and for the consequences of their behaviour. It also requires a certain level of refinement in relations [Slovak: Kultura vztahov] that is missing in Slovakia.

As regards violence, we reject any form of violence. However, we also refuse to start implementing and acknowledging the [new] practice under which particular unresolved crimes are represented as acts of political terror or violence.

In this respect, I consider the statement made by the Christian Democrats [the opposition Christian Democratic Movement, KDH, has alleged that the death of former policeman Robert Remias, who acted as a witness in the case of Michal Kovac Jr, was a political murder] to be irresponsible. It is a statement which should serve as a signal to foreign countries, rather than to the domestic public, as it is an attempt to create an impression that Slovakia is an absolutely unstable country.

Confidence in the security forces and the inevitability of these forces acting in line with the law, as well as the mechanism which is in place to ensure the objectivity of investigation, should not be doubted. It is therefore irresponsible to cast doubt on the result [of the investigation] before we know the causal relationships and before we have the evidence. In my view, anyone who casts doubt on democracy, the observance of the law and the activity of the state administration or the government in such a way [as the KDH], is demonstrating gross political ignorance, lack of refinement, and bad intentions. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: Meciar, Polish Prime Minister Discuss Cooperation

LD1105132996 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar met the chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, in Stary Smokovec this morning. Pavol Sveton reports:

[Sveton] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar welcomed Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz at the Lysa Polana border crossing at 0830 this morning in the presence of Marian Servatka, Slovak ambassador to Poland, and Jerzy Korolec, Polish ambassador to Slovakia.

The two prime ministers went for a short walk, and, in the garden of the Kamzik recreational center in Stary Smokovec, they briefed each other on current economic and social problems in Slovakia and the Polish Republic. The two prime ministers stressed that Slovak-Polish cooperation was developing on the basis of good-neighborly relations. Throughout their history, the two countries have kept traditional links, and they are now sharing similar problems as their transformation processes progress and as they strive to integrate into the European structures. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: President Publicly Accuses Slovak TV of Bias

LD1205172996 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Michal Kovac has sent TASR an open letter addressed to the Slovak Television Council.

The president says in his letter that it is inadmissible for the leadership of Slovak Television to try to censor the president or to try to impose on him any conditions in advance. He recalls that as early as five years ago Vladimir Meciar, the present and the then prime minister, protested against such censorship.

It is inadmissible for the Slovak Television leadership to misuse the screen and to attach some kind of peculiar conditions to the president's appearances on television, to assess willfully and without any opportunity for defense the president's activity, to do so repeatedly, and to indirectly indicate that invectives are part of his public appearances.

Michal Kovac goes on to state in his open letter to the Slovak Television Council that, if these were individual and isolated instances of such an approach, he would not take any notice of them. In his view, though, at issue is a whole and long-term series of cases of defamation and provocative indifference to the activity of the head of state.

Slovakia: Foreign Criticism of Press Censorship

LD1005204296 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2000 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] As we said in our earlier reports, William Orme, the executive chairman of the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists [CPJ], has responded in a letter to President Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to a statement by the information section of the government office about the inclusion of Vladimir Meciar in a list of the 10 worst enemies of the press in the world.

The letter states that the CPJ is worried about the consequences of the press law and the penal code amendment. The committee says that this legislation will plunge Slovakia back to a pre-1989 atmosphere. William Orme says that there is censorship in Slovakia and he believes that the state controls the media. The existence of censorship can be proven by the fact that the draft press law introduces Culture Ministry supervision over its provisions. William Orme also regards as unacceptable the right of individuals to make public their views on information published about them in the press, as the draft press law stipulates. In his view, this means that the state can decide whether press reporting is balanced, and means intervention into independent editorial policy.

An obvious example of how criticism is being restricted is legislation which introduces punishment for spreading slander about the Slovak state, state symbols, and nationality. In addition, journalists are obliged to reveal their sources.

The CPJ acknowledges the fact that not a single case of persecution, imprisonment, or violent death of a journalist has been registered in Slovakia since 1989. However, as soon as the proposed legislation is passed, such cases will begin to emerge, Willian Orme said in the letter.

The independent media in Slovakia are under constant financial pressure. The PSIS investment company that provided financial backing for the opposition SME daily has lost its licence, and the private printing company Concordia has refused to print SME. Moreover, all newspapers are printed by the state-owned Danubiaprint printing company.

In Willian Orme's view, since 1989 the government has taken a great number of alarming measures. These include the dismissal of members of the Radio and Television Council; the dismissal of Slovak Television director Ivan Stadtrucker and his replacement by Jozef Darmo; the dismissal of TASR director Ivan Melichercik and his replacement by Dusan Kleiman; and the appointment of Erika Vincurekova as head of the Radiozurnal news and current affairs program.

William Orme concludes the letter by expressing his appreciation for having a chance to exchange views and hopes that this will continue in the future.

The following is a statement by the press and information section of the Slovak government office read by Magda Pospisilova, the section's director and the prime minister's spokeswoman.

[Begin Pospisilova recording] The letter of the executive chairman of the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists is a mixture of economic and political half-truths, assumptions, and downright rumors.

The Slovak prime minister is always willing to have a factual discussion about the freedom of the press in our country with competent partners. However, he will not respond to speculations about things that might never happen.

William Orme's letter to the prime minister is clear proof that he has incorrect, incomplete, and misleading information about Slovakia. [end recording]

Slovakia: Daily: Ministry Hiding Facts About Remias's Death

AU1005180296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 10 May 96 p 1

[Article by "pt": "Ministry of Interior Conceals the Fact That Robert Remias May Have Been Murdered"]

[FBIS Translated Except] Bratislava—The Ministry of Interior is concealing important circumstances related to the death of Robert Remias, which do not exclude the possibility that he may have been murdered and that his death was not accidental. This information was imparted to the SME editorial office by a well-informed source close to the government coalition that did not wish to be named. According to this source, the death of Robert Remias is supposed to have been caused by another person rather than by a defect in the car's fuel system. [passage omitted] Our editorial office also managed to obtain information to the effect that, at the time of the explosion, a red Mercedes 250D was observed in the vicinity, inside which two Slovak Information Service members were sitting. According to eyewitnesses, following the second explosion of Robert Remias's car, one of the secret police members stepped out of the car for a while and observed the burning wreckage. After a while, the red Mercedes 250D left the scene of the tragedy. Approximately three minutes after the explosion, unidentified persons appeared on the scene and were putting out the fire with fire extinguishers. Police members arrived on the scene about five minutes after the explosion and fire trucks needed about seven minutes to come. Witnesses of this incident do not want to report to the police and to testify because they are afraid of exposing themselves to danger and of jeopardizing their families.

During the search of the place of explosion, the police did not find a part of the car, on which are signs left by the explosion of a body, from which splinters came off. These splinters broke several holes in the auto body sheet. Our editorial office managed to get hold of this piece and to document it photographically. [A photograph showing a piece of metal with several holes in it is published on the same page]

On Monday, 13 May, at 1700, an act of mourning will be held at the place of Robert Remias's death in Bratislava-Karlova Ves, at which also several Catholic priests will be praying for the deceased.

[Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 10 May on page 8 carries a 250-word report by Vladimir Misauer, the paper's Bratislava correspondent, entitled "Remias Was Supposedly Murdered," which states, among other things: "According to LIDOVE NOVINY's information, the Christian Democratic Movement avails itself of the dead policeman's autopsy results, in which it is stated that, in the crotch, to the right of the genitals, there is a trace left by the projectile of a firearm. Slovak Interior Ministry spokesman Ondera said yesterday in this context that the Police do not have any evidence suggesting that Remias's death was caused by another person. But Ondera confirmed for the first time yesterday that remnants of 6.35mm projectiles were found in the vehicle. According to Ondera, however, these projectiles originated from Remias's own weapon, which was lying at the time of the explosion on the car's front seat next to him."]

Slovakia: Commentary on Background of Stalled Privatization

AU1005142896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 May 96 p 4

[Commentary by Vladimir Tvaroska: "The Privatization Machine Has Become Stuck"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the second half of last year, privatization was progressing at an incredibly fast pace. Everything seemed to indicate that the started pace would be sustained for a couple more months and that the coalition parties would divide national property according to plan—by mid-1996. However, now there appears to be a veritable hitch somewhere in relations among the three coalition partners. Since February, the National Property Fund [FNM] Presidium has not made a single privatization decision. This week, the prime minister was forced publicly to admit for the first time that his statements about the end of privatization in midyear were precipitate. According to Vladimir Meciar, political parties are engaged in intensive negotiations about the situation that has come about. It seems, however, that, in reality, they argue more than they negotiate.

The overwhelming majority of important Slovak companies are today under the influence of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. Representatives of the weaker coalition parties—the Slovak National Party and the Association of Workers of Slovakia—were looking forward to a bite from the privatization of financial institutions. But the coalition leader, naturally, wanted to keep as strong a position as possible in the financial institutions as well. And this is the nut that the government coalition has not been able to crack to this day. The coalition partners' struggle takes interesting forms. First, the prime minister publicly identified Stefan Gavornik, president of the FNM Presidium, as the culprit of the delayed bank privatization. Subsequently, information was published that would have been kept discretely secret until a short time ago. We learned that, besides his job in the FNM, Stefan Gavornik also has time to manage a subsidiary of Investicna a Rozvojova Banka [Investment and Development Bank, IRB] [reference to a report in Bratislava PRACA in Slovak on 3 May, according to which Gavornik is also director general of the LEAS fund, an IRB subsidiary, for which he receives a "guaranteed monthly salary" of 35,000 Slovak korunas (Sk), plus a performance-related annual maximum of Sk420,000]. About his rival in the FNM Milan Rehak, chairman of the FNM Executive Committee, who is from the HZDS, the public learned that he is driving a BMW that cost Sk3 million, although parliament had approved this sum for the purchase of several cars for FNM inspectors. There is no doubt that, in due course, further and, unquestionably, even more interesting practices from the privatization process will come to light. The prime minister himself, according to his own words, has registered some economic absurdities in privatization. For the time being, he is reluctant to name specific instances. But, who knows, one day he may do so gladly. It is therefore a pity that deputies are not interested in approving the 20-year statute of limitations for cases of privatization fraud.

The privatization of property, to which, until recently, one used to refer as property that belongs to all of us, now concerns only the selected few. The majority of the population is now interested in FNM bonds. It seems, however, that this problem is not very important for the present government. How else can it be explained that it is still not possible to carry out any transactions with the bonds. According to Finance Ministry statements, it has been working intensively on specific mechanisms for the bonds' use since the beginning of last August. Is this [delay] due to incompetence or lack of interest? Probably both. After letting a number of deadlines slip, the government approved the relevant decree in March but, for mysterious reasons, it still has not been published in the Legal Gazette [Zbirka Zakonov] and, therefore, has not come into effect. Someone has apparently discovered that no one would be able to concoct anything good from the so-called bond cookbook, since the government approved a document that provides broad scope for corruption. The three chiefs of the coalition parties have different problems today than some bonds.

Hungary: Army Wants IFOR Mandate Extended

LD1305112796 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 13 May 96

[From the "Chronicle" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Hungarian Army would like the mandate of the U.S. Implementation Force [IFOR] troops stationed in Hungary to be extended—at least that is what Defense Ministry State Secretary Istvan Fodor has said, giving the Ministry's opinion. Andras Vegh reports:

[Vegh] Istvan Fodor has told "Chronicle" that the U.S. troops' presence in Hungary has had important economic benefits and, what is even more important, it has been facilitating the modernization of the army.

Hungarian soldiers have so far learned a lot from the Americans, while the Americans have familiarized themselves with an army unknown to them and considered hostile in the past.

The state secretary denied, however, that Hungary would only support the extension of the mandate of the U.S. IFOR troops stationed in Kaposvar and Taszar in the hope of support for early NATO entry. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Keleti on Romanian Concerns About NATO Membership

LD1105183496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, there is no tension in Hungarian-Romanian military relations concerning the question of NATO membership. We referred earlier to Romanian press reports that quoted a very impassioned statement by Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca. According to the Romanian papers, he allegedly said that Hungary's admission to NATO before Romania's membership in the alliance could cause a kind of catastrophe in the region. [passage omitted]

According to the Hungarian defense minister, the statement by his Romanian colleague in the MAGYAR HIRLAP newspaper is a groundless assumption, because the Hungarian Republic will not start an arms race with its neighbors.

[Begin Keleti recording] We will not be the ones to foment negative developments should NATO decide not to admit both of us at the same time. By the way, we think that it will cause no harm—on the contrary, it will be definitely useful—if Romania is also admitted to NATO from this region. However, naturally, we do not want to link our admission to NATO with Romania's membership. [passage omitted]

Hungary has not made and will not make statements that might force the hands of NATO leaders. I think, therefore, that the statement in this form was addressed not to Hungary but to NATO. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Hungary: Medgyessy Assesses Country's Financial Situation

AU1305085796 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 10 May 96 p 11

[Article by Imre Tevan: "We Can Keep the Deficit at 4 Percent—According to Medgyessy, the Economy Has Absorbed the Bokros Package"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Judging from data from the first three to four months, Finance Minister Peter Medgyessy believes that, according to the plans, the central budget will get roughly the same amount of surplus from taxes this year as the planned deficit of social insurance. According to Medgyessy, the key figures of the state administration's deficit and the current account can be adhered to. However, in his view, it will only be possible to achieve the targeted 20 percent inflation by December, rather than as an annual average.

The 1996 deficit of state administration can be kept at 4 percent of GDP, and the current account deficit can be kept within the planned $2 billion, Medgyessy said at the parliamentary budget committee's 9 May session. The central budget closed April with a surplus, which reduced the first quarter's 50 billion forint deficit to 40 billion forints. However, the expenditure was higher than planned in some areas—for example, in the case of export support for agriculture and food industry and assistance for private house building.

The deficit of social insurance—mainly health insurance—is the real danger. The 17.8 billion forint target will probably be exceeded but it seems that this can be made up from the better than expected position of the budget—because the financial situation of the area local governments and the state funds is meeting the plans. The budget's better than expected position mainly results from the increased amount of company tax and customs revenue (warning of extra imports), but a higher than planned income is also expected from the increasing value added tax payments in the second half of the year, Administrative State Secretary Tibor Draskovics added. He also mentioned as a positive sign that, in spite of the 10 percent drop in fuel sales, the consumer tax income is in accordance with the plans.

Medgyessy committed himself to adhere to the 4 percent state administration deficit because this area—state overspending—is the biggest threat to the anti-inflation policy. The increase of consumer prices is getting gradually smaller, after the 125.6 percent in March, the index was only at 124 to 125 in April compared to the corresponding 1995 data. As wage costs in the first quarter exceeded the comparable figure of last year by 24 percent, a slight decrease of real wages seems to be achievable.

After the March 1995 stabilization package, industrial output seems to be improving much slower than the financial indicators. The economy needed some time to absorb the Bokros package, Medgyessy said, referring to the fact that after the December low, the first two months also showed weaker performance than in the same period in 1995. Industrial output increased somewhat in March.

The amount of the population's gross savings increased to 109 billion forints by the end of the first quarter which is a growth in real terms compared with the 87 billion forints in March 1995. Bela Kadar, Hungarian Democratic Forum member and chairman of the budget committee, warned of the interest tax, fearing precisely for the inclination to save—and for anti-inflation policy. In reply, Medgyessy said that nothing had yet been decided on this issue.

The expenses of the State Privatization and Asset Management Corporation might reach as much as 97 billion forints instead of the expected 59 billion because it lost a test case against the self-governments, Draskovics said. The budget law will probably have to be amended because of this, but this does not mean a supplementary budget, Draskovics said. He also spoke about the planned amendment of taxation in 1997. According to the plans, the collectors of taxes and rates will be almost automatically entitled to mortgage against nonpayers. It is also necessary to change the tax authority's control strategy and to concentrate on the major cases.

The committee also voted on some motions by the deputies. The opposition's motions—for example, in connection with state-supplied capital to the Budapest Bank—were not supported.

B-H: Izetbegovic, Muratovic Comment on Agreements With Croatia

LD1105221096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, and Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic held a news conference immediately after the return of Bosnia-Herzegovina's delegation from Zagreb, where the second session of the Council of the Federation was held. [name indistinct] has a report on the news conference.

[Correspondent] Addressing journalists, President Izetbegovic said that the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation had traveled to Zagreb aboard our own plane. Izetbegovic said that the one-day visit to Zagreb was successful and revealed some important details [words indistinct].

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] This was a working meeting and I think that certain results have been achieved. First of all, a temporary agreement on the use of the port of Ploce for Bosnia-Herzegovina's needs was signed. Today, we also signed the agreement on the use of a stretch of our territory near Neum for Croatia's needs.

We coordinated our stances completely on the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina's property rights in Croatia and vice versa.

We made some progress in changing visa requirements for our citizens who need to transit Croatia on the way to their final destination in the territory now under Serb control. This will interest many of our citizens, our refugees, from—for example—Prijedor, Bijeljina, Foca, and so on who have so far been unable to transit Croatia without a visa.

We also agreed to close down the camp in Kupljensko, where a number of our refugees from Velika Kladusa have found refuge. There are still between 4,000 and 5,000 refugees there. They will be invited to return to Kladusa. Those who refuse to return will be transferred to other camps or will go to third countries. We also decided to request an extension of the mandate of the tripartite police force—the Croatian-Bosnian-Turkish police force that is active in the Kladusa area, and whose mandate will soon expire. Its mandate will be extended.

We decided to invest further efforts in ensuring the implementation of the pilot projects agreed in Dayton. These projects refer to four towns; let me remind you that these towns are Stolac, Bugojno, Travnik, and Jajce. We decided to invest additional efforts to ensure the return of our people to Stolac and Jajce. As you know, the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] promised to repair 100 buildings, 100 houses in Stolac, but that project is making very slow progress, so the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government will give it financial support to ensure its completion.

Finally—an issue that will interest our compatriots in Croatia—the Croatian side, Croatian state representatives, promised that they will guarantee one seat in the Croatian Assembly for the Bosniak minority in Croatia. [end recording]

[Correspondent] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic spoke about the agreements reached with the Croatian Government. He mentioned the agreement on the utilization of water, telecommunications, and avoidance of double taxation.

At the news conference, Muratovic paid special attention to the agreement on the use of the port of Ploce.

[Begin Muratovic recording] The agreement covering the port of Ploce gives our goods the status they would have in a duty free zone. It means that no tax or customs will be due on goods nor will the Croatian Government set any limits.

As far as the transit of goods from the port of Ploce to the Bosnia-Herzegovina border is concerned, the goods will not be subject to any controls.

The goods to be transported by train will be in sealed containers destined for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and those to be transported by road will be escorted by the Croatian police to the Bosnia-Herzegovina border, without any stops or controls.

This agreement will stay in force until the agreement in full compliance with the Washington agreement is reached, at the latest 12 months from now. It means that, within 12 months, a permanent agreement will be signed, in line with the previous agreement. It will differ from the present one in the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina will receive a part of the port as a territory under the exclusive control of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In return, the agreement on transit of Croatian [words indistinct] was signed.

As far as the agreement on property rights is concerned, it guarantees absolute security to property owners from one of the states [who own property] in the other state. The agreement covers the property of individuals and companies. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H: Silajdzic Accuses Croatia of 'Undermining' Sovereignty

AU1305124396 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 13 May 96 p 5

[Report by O.D. on statement by Haris Silajdzic, chairman of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo; date not given: "Those Are Not Swindles but a Reason for War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 11 May—Haris Silajdzic, chairman of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, replied to attacks by Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] officials, saying they are working to divide the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"The statement by the chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ, Bozo Rajic, (at the panel organized by the HDZ in Sarajevo two days ago) that Silajdzic is a swindler aimed against the Croatian people, is a reflection of the HDZ policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and has a certain goal on the eve of important meetings dealing with the Federation," Silajdzic said at a news conference in Sarajevo. According to him, in Rajic's statement, Silajdzic is said "to embody something that certain circles in the HDZ dislike, which is the struggle for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its borders and normal relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, based on the mutual respect of the integrity and sovereignty of both states."

Zagreb Is Undermining Bosnia-Herzegovina's Sovereignty

"In Bosnia-Herzegovina, people can no longer be deceived in any way. After the Croatian curators of the soul and their actions, after what they did in Bosnia-Herzegovina, two thirds of the Croats have gone," Silajdzic said.

Commenting on Rajic's statement that "there is no federation of cantons," Silajdzic said that certain circles in the HDZ want a federation of two national territories that is not regulated by the Washington agreement on the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"The problem is that we are saying that the Federation is not made up of two national territories, because they do not exist. If they do, then it is a legalization of borders drawn with blood and it is an announcement of the division of the Federation into two parts and of the impossibility of the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina," Silajdzic said.

The chairman of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haris Silajdzic, accused Croatia of undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Features of the Neighboring State

"In one part of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the region under the authority of the self-proclaimed Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia), one finds all the features of the neighboring state. In Mostar, the Croat authorities have intruded upon the informative space of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the equipment already existing there. The authorities in Zagreb consider a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be their territory, and this is where the problem lies," Silajdzic said. According to him, on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, "a poster featuring the president (Franjo Tudjman) of a neighboring state and his party has been hung up," which does not even exist in that state [as published].

"It is unprecedented that a foreign state designates and transfers officers in the armed forces of another state," Silajdzic said, commenting on Croatia's recent decision to transfer and designate officers of the Croatian Defense Council, and added that those are not swindles, but "a reason for war."

B-H: Ganic Accuses Zagreb of Muslim-Croat Federation 'Problems'

LD1205175296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1213 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Travnik, 12 May (SRNA)—Ejup Ganic, the vice president of the Croat-Muslim Federation, told Muslim Travnik radio today that all problems in the implementation of Muslim-Croat Federation have been caused by the policy conducted by the Zagreb authorities and President Franjo Tudjman.

"It is sad that in Bosnia this policy is being carried out by the legally elected Croat representatives, who are harming their own people by pushing them deeper and deeper into the abyss of nationalism," Ganic said.

Commenting on the views of the extreme Croatian political parties and their statements announcing the definite establishment of Croatian authorities in a part of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ganic said that "Bosnia must remain integral or a new war will break out."

B-H: Muratovic Sees 'No Need' for Arbitration on Separation Lines

LD1205222196 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In tonight's news bulletin we are examining the issue of finalizing the separation line in the Sarajevo suburbs of Dobrinja I and IV. In spite of numerous meetings, agreement has not been reached.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina side is demanding compliance with the Dayton agreement.

[Correspondent Zvonko Maric] Let us remind you—the subcommission for changing the interentity boundary lines as set out by the peace agreement was set up in order to enable the sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina to reach agreement on small areas, for example, in areas where the line divides private property, buildings, or separates settlements from cemeteries. [passage omitted]

We have asked Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic for his comment on new developments in the conflict. He was explicit.

[Begin Muratovic recording] I see no need for any arbitration. There is the Dayton agreement. IFOR is here to implement the agreement consistently. If we can agree on any of the issues, IFOR is here to implement what we have agreed on. And if we cannot reach agreement on an issue that any of the sides has raised, there is the Dayton agreement. [end recording]

[Maric] Taking into account everything that had been said, it is more than clear that the final decision on this problem must be just and must be taken as soon as possible.

B-H: Serbs Arrest 7 Muslim 'Terrorists' From Srebrenica

LD1005221796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2057 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zvornik, 10 May (TANJUG)—A seven-member group of Muslim terrorists armed with mines, explosives, firearms, and knives was discovered and arrested in the village of Planinka, between Orahovac and Caparde in Zvornik municipality today, the Zvornik public security center has said.

The arrested individuals are: Ahmo and Enver Harbas, Behudin Husic, Nedzad Hasic, Vahdet Avdic, Mujo Mehic, and Muharem Hasanovic, all from Srebrenica.

According to statements that the arrested terrorists gave to investigators of the public security center in Zvornik, they were traveling from Krusevi Do toward Tuzla.

There is well-founded suspicion that the Muslim terrorists have committed several crimes against Serb civilians in the area of and around Srebrenica. One of these was when four Serb civilians, originally from Milici, disappeared in Krusev Do, 40 km east of Milici, on 2 May

B-H: Government Demands Release of 7 Handed Over to Serbs

LD1205213496 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prompted by events that took place in the vicinity of Zvornik two days ago, when seven men from Srebrenica surrendered to Implementation Force [IFOR] members, who then handed them over to Serb police, Presidency Member Ejup Ganic and Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic have had a meeting with IFOR Deputy Commander Jean Heinrich, at which the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government demanded the urgent release of these people. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Jadranko Katana] Mr. Ganic, what did the Bosnian side demand from Leighton Smith's deputy?

[Ganic] We demanded the immediate release of these unfortunate people, our citizens. Our understanding is that they surrendered to IFOR expecting their protection. We want IFOR to produce results and full information by tomorrow morning. [end recording]

[Katana] General Heinrich declined to make a statement today, on the grounds that he lacked sufficient information. However, he announced an urgent investigation.

B-H: IFOR Rejects Sarajevo Demand To Secure Release of Bosniaks

AU1305143596 Paris AFP in English 1413 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, May 13 (AFP)—The NATO-led Bosnia peace force rejected Monday a Bosnian Government demand that it secure the release of seven armed Moslems stopped by US troops in a Serb-run area and handed over to Serb police.

Bosnian Vice-President Ejup Ganic demanded the NATO-led force obtain the men's release at a meeting Sunday with General Jean Heinrich, the second-in-command of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR).

"We have demanded their immediate release. They placed themselves under IFOR protection," Ganic said in a press release.

But an IFOR officer who asked not to be named said Monday: "We have rejected the demand."

The seven armed Moslem soldiers gave themselves up to an IFOR unit near the Serb-held town of Zvornik in eastern Bosnia on Friday. IFOR then handed them over to the Serb police, who accused them of the murder of six Serbs.

IFOR said the Moslems were in the Republika Srpska—the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina—in breach of the Dayton peace accord, adding that Serb police had jurisdiction within that area.

IFOR spokesman Major Simon Haselock said the seven men, dressed in a variety of military fatigues but who were in fact civilians, were armed with grenades, handguns and a homemade bomb.

Alexander Ivanko, spokesman for the UN police here, said the international police force would try to follow the legal proceedings against the seven, but admitted previous attempts to do so had failed. [passage omitted]

B-H: Presidency's Pejanovic Condemns 'Nationalist Extremists'

AU1305142896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirko Pejanovic, [ethnic Serb] member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received Franz Bogen, former ambassador of the Republic of Austria to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and talked with him about the forthcoming elections in our country, the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the return of refugees.

Ambassador Bogen informed Pejanovic about the Austrian Government's decision to extend the stay of and aid for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Austria for another year, and the sum of 100 million Austrian schillings, which will be assigned as aid for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Pejanovic said that elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina represent the first test for democracy. To conduct them, it is necessary to ensure freedom of movement and political activity, and independent television and radio stations throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The prerequisite for that is the departure of nationalist extremists from the political scene and arrival of people with democratic and European political orientations.

B-H: Report Views Progress of 'Train and Equip' Program

AU1305150896 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 13 May 96 p 5

[Report by F.K.: "Preparations for 'Train and Equip' Program"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is known that the Pax Americana has brought with it a military program to set up a small but strong professional Bosnia-Herzegovina Army through Operation "Train and Equip," by which the United States has pledged to train soldiers and officers of the future professional army, which will be relatively small, but well-equipped with sophisticated arms, basically geared to defense. The operation requires about $800 million, and through donations from the United States and some Arab countries, approximately a quarter of this has already been provided.

Operation "Train and Equip" has already started in a way. A group from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is already in Turkey for training and now possibilities are being examined for others to be trained at U.S. military schools. Recently, a group of 2d Corps officers has been visiting some U.S. military bases in Germany. Colonel Osman Puskar of the 2d Corps Command told us that they had visited some military schools, had familiarized themselves with the training of soldiers and officers, and would be briefing their superiors on their impressions and views.

At the same time, following a proposal of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff, the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina has approved the criteria for the selection of professional soldiers and officers, while preparations for forming a Federation army are in progress.

B-H: Federation, 'Serb Entity' Exchange Military Information

LD1205162096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The delegation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the Serb entity have exchanged information on the structure and strength of their military forces. Taking part in the exchange were the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Croat Defense Council, and the Serb entity army.

Along with the exchange of information on confidence and security, as agreed in the Vienna accord, the sides have agreed voluntarily to proceed with an additional exchange of information after the demobilization of their forces, which began on 18 April of this year, as well as to inform each other and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] on the latest status of their forces, the press statement issued at the OSCE headquarters said.

B-H: Commentary Foresees Increased U.S. Cooperation With SDA

AU1005154496 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 4-5 May 96 p 3

[Commentary by Fadil Mandal: "The United States and the SDA"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The noticeable change of the political and marketing image of the ruling Party of Democratic Action [SDA] in recent times has not passed without an echo among observers in the Bosnian capital. While some people link those changes to the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and consider them to be nothing more than cosmetic, it is possible to discern the background to all this in the internal reorganization and better disposition of personnel in the strongest Bosniak party.

Although this latter opinion, according to serious assessments, is more likely to be the truth, one should not disregard the influence and effect of some totally media-marketing actions by the SDA, particularly on the so-called urban territory that, in view of some earlier established schemes, was predestined for the opposition, or as they like to put it, the civic parties.

Right Center

So nobody is no longer surprised at the SDA sponsorship of a rock concert on the occasion of the Bairam holidays, or, for instance, the participation in the organization of a classical music evening or guest performances by various theater groups in Sarajevo and other major centers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Another, and in the opinion of analysts of global developments in the Balkans, more important change happened in the treatment of the ruling Bosniak party by some very powerful factors in the world.

The recent visit by a high-profile delegation of the European Union of Christian Democrats [EUCD] to the central office of the SDA and the talks held on that occasion testify to this assessment. The two, in many respects different, political groups have recognized each other at a position of right center. So, the SDA seems to be entering, without any problems, the society of rather influential and, in some countries, ruling parties in West Europe. It is a pity that this gathering was not covered by the media in a more adequate way, which represents an unnecessary omission by the political marketing of SDA.

The second example, unknown to the general public so far, involves the first indications of a more open orientation by the U.S. Administration toward the party that won the greatest number of votes in the last elections.

That is, some well-informed sources claim that the meeting of the SDA Executive Board scheduled for Sunday (5 May) will be attended by the U.S. ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, John Menzies. Such a diplomatic-political move has been encouraged by both sides for several reasons.

New Messages

Menzies obviously has something to say to the top leadership of the ruling party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, on the other hand, he will get an opportunity to see for himself the way of thinking and planning of the leading people in the SDA.

What is the reason for the Clinton administration's sudden interest in finding a firmer political and military ally here in Bosnia? Because this is precisely what all that is about. The Americans, prone to pragmatism and a global view of regional problems, such as the one in former Yugoslavia, have probably assessed that Alija Izetbegovic's party is the force they can count on in the implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. As this is their priority, the winning formula has most probably turned out to be betting on the SDA.

The opposition can hardly be satisfied with such a development. It seems that the assessment that Haris Silajdzic is the sole U.S. player in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not hold water. It is interesting that the meeting between Menzies and the SDA Executive Board is to take place immediately after the return of the leader of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina [Silajdzic] from a lengthy tour of Western countries, including the United States.

A short while before Silajdzic, the same tour was undertaken by Selim Beslagic [mayor of Tuzla], Zlatko Lagumdzija [official of the Social Democratic Party] and Sejfudin Tokic [leader of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats]. Although they were spreading stories in domestic media upon their return about significant and fruitful talks with U.S. officials, they have never been explicitly confirmed by the other side.

Of course, jumping to conclusions is always a double-edged sword. Nevertheless, there are enough indications that certain rearrangements are underway. After all, if some strategic estimates by the Clinton administration speak for the victory of national parties in the forthcoming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is unrealistic to expect the Americans to behave any differently than they are at present.

It Is the SDA's Turn

On the other hand, the SDA is getting an opportunity to prove its democratic orientation to Western critics precisely through constructive political cooperation with the world's greatest power. Of course, without renouncing its stances at the same time.

What the Americans are demanding in return, or were demanding, is not too high a price on that path. Concrete financial aid and the beginning of the "Train and Equip" operation will further subdue the resistance to, conditionally speaking, such a pro-Western policy within the SDA itself.

The United States loves good organization and power. On the basis of this and the power structure on the ground, it is establishing its strategy. Obviously, it is the SDA's turn.

Therefore it will be very interesting and politically indicative to follow the future development of the situation, which, undoubtedly, represents a spectacular surprise for the public, while some better informed and more experienced circles see nothing that is not a logical result of the pragmatic U.S. policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Opposition To Form Electoral Coalition Against Izetbegovic

AU1205130396 Paris AFP in English
0928 GMT 12 May 96

[Report by Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, May 12 (AFP)—Bosnia's main opposition parties will form a coalition to defeat the ruling party of President Alija Izetbegovic in upcoming elections, an opposition leader said here.

In an interview with AFP this weekend, Selim Beslagic, leader of the opposition Union of Bosnian Social Democrats (UBSD) said the coalition would include the former-communist SDP and could include a new party set up recently by former Bosnian premier Haris Silajdzic.

Beslagic also said his UBSD party, acting on a request from the government in Sarajevo, had started work with opposition parties in the rebel Srpska Republika, the Serb entity that together with a Moslem-Croat Federation makes up post-war Bosnia, and would form a coalition against Serb hardliners there.

Asked when the coalition would be formally announced he said "soon."

Beslagic, considered a moderate by the West, won in the northern town of Tuzla in Bosnia's first democratic elections in 1991.

Including the UBSD, and the former-communist SDP, the coalition would comprise five "democratic, multiethnic" parties opposed to Izetbegovic's ruling Moslem-led Democratic Action Party (SDA).

The other would be the Moslem Bosnian Organisation (MBO), the Croat Peasants Party (HSS) and the Republican Party, Beslagic said.

The Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (SBIH), formed last month by Silajdzic, might also enter, he said, adding "that is what we want and what Mr Silajdzic also wants.

"The coalition that I have mentioned will do everything it can to show people the road out of the situation we are in. I don't think that the party that is in power now can do that," he added.

Under the terms of the Dayton peace agreement, which ended the Bosnian war last year, elections are scheduled here by September 14, preceded by municipal elections in the southern town of Mostar on May 31.

Beslagic said, meanwhile, his party had already contacted two opposition parties—the Social Liberals and the SDP—in Banja Luka, the main town of the western part of Serb-held Bosnia, and would form "a coalition."

Banja Luka, which is the largest Serb town in Bosnia, "is more moderate" than Serb towns in eastern Bosnia, he said.

"Banja Luka is deep in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are far from Serbia and they don't have the guarantee that Serbia will help them," Beslagic noted.

"But, unfortunately, we have not found any partners in the eastern part of Republika Srpska. That is a tragedy for the Serb people, for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for all the rest of us.

"According to information we are getting from Banja Luka, the hardliners have no chance. But I don't know," he added.

Beslagic, who seems genuinely popular in Tuzla but has long been treated with suspicion by Sarajevo, criticised the slow pace of the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton treaty.

"The world community is not doing anything to help" thousands of refugees return to their homes, he said, calling for "more resolute action by NATO-led troops."

He also called for the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) to arrest indicted war criminals.

Beslagic also said access for his party to state-controlled Bosnian televison had improved in recent weeks. "I was not satisfied, but in the last few weeks I have the feeling that they are opening up," he said.

B-H: Constitutional Court Head Criticizes Election Rules

AU1005093796 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 10 May 96 p 4

[ONASA report: "Conditions for Elections Have Not Been Secured"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Omer Ibrahimagic, head of the Constitutional Court of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, has stated that certain provisions of the election rules and regulations of the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) are bringing into question the essence of the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"No one is thinking about whether the conditions for the elections exist, whether there is freedom of movement, freedom of work of the political parties in the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as those under the control of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], freedom of media, etc. The conditions for the elections do not exist if IFOR [Implementation Force] has to secure them by force of arms or if the international community has to secure them through various forms of pressure," Ibrahimagic said yesterday at a meeting organized by the Association for Political Science and the College of Political Science in Sarajevo.

B-H: Izetbegovic Expects Changes in Mostar Election Rules

AU1105184296 Paris AFP in English 1821 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 11 (AFP)—Bosnia has asked the European administrator of Mostar, Ricardo Perez Casado, to change the rules for May 31 municipal elections, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said Saturday.

The rules currently state that only current residents of the divided southern city can vote, thus denying the franchise to refugees from Mostar who live outside the city.

"We are expecting Mr. Casado to change these rules...and in that respect I sent a letter to Madame Susanna Agnelli (the Italian foreign minister) several days ago asking her to enable refugees from Mostar to vote," Izetbegovic told a press conference in Sarajevo.

Italy currently holds the rotating chairmanship of the European Union, which has administered Mostar—divided into Moslem and Croat sectors since 1993—since July 1994.

On Friday, several Bosnian political parties threatened to boycott the elections unless the voting franchise rule is changed.

No party from the eastern, Moslem-held part of Mostar has presented a list of candidates, even though the deadline for nominations expired on Friday.

"We will not participate in elections in which all citizens would not be able to vote in embassies and consulates or by post," Izetbegovic said.

"We continue to insist that our citizens be able to vote by post and in embassies," he added.

Izetbegovic said the Bosnian side was thinking of asking the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to finance the travel costs of the voters coming from outside of Mostar.

The OSCE is involved in arranging elections to be held throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina by September 14 under the Dayton accords which ended the war in the former Yugoslavia.

B-H: Parties Demand 1991 Census as Basis for Mostar Elections

LD1005214996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of Democratic Action [SDA], the Liberal Party, the Liberal Bosniak Organization, the Social Democratic Party, the Serb Civic Council, and the initiative committee of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina from Mostar have sent a joint letter to Perez Casado, EU administrator for Mostar, in which they say:

Esteemed Mr. Casado, while believing that democratic elections are the best opportunity for the unification of the city of Mostar, we express our readiness to take part in the forthcoming local elections on the following conditions:

Either you or the EU Council of Ministers should adopt a decision whereby all citizens of Mostar listed in the 1991 census will have the right to vote, regardless of their whereabouts on the day of the elections.

The citizens of Mostar who are not in Mostar on the day of the elections should be allowed to vote in diplomatic and consular offices of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or in a similar way determined by you or the EU Council of Ministers.

We agree that—given the conditions necessary for holding the elections—the deadline should be extended in such a way so as not to threaten the EU mandate, the letter of the six political organizations and parties of Mostar says.

B-H: Bildt Notes 'Serious Doubts' on Mostar Election Timetable

AU1305103796 Paris AFP in English 0945 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, May 13 (AFP)—Elections in the divided city of Mostar, scheduled for May 31, now look as if they may have to be postponed in what would be a significant blow to the Bosnian peace process, EU diplomats warned on Monday.

"Everyone has serious doubts about whether we will be able to stick to the timetable," a source close to Bosnia High Representative Carl Bildt said.

The warning came as Bildt briefed EU foreign ministers here on the situation in the EU-administered town, whose reunification is seen as a key test of whether Bosnia has any future as a unitary state of Moslems, Serbs and Croats. Mostar was the scene of some of the fiercest ethnic clashes of the war in former Yugoslavia.

Doubts about the feasibility of elections being held in little over two weeks grew dramatically on Friday when the deadline for the presentation of lists for the vote passed without any party from the eastern, Moslem part of Mostar having put forward candidates.

The Moslems have boycotted election preparations in protest at rules which deny refugees who were forced to flee the city the right to vote.

The Bosnian Government has also intervened in the dispute, asking the EU administrator Richardo Perez Casado to change the rules to allow former residents to vote either by post or through embassies abroad.

Diplomats said two options were being considered: either putting the vote off until the fall when Bosnia-wide elections are due to take place, or having a two or three-week delay in the hope that the current problems can be resolved. Given the scale of the technical problems and the strength of Moslem feeling on the issue, this option is by no means certain to work.

A longer postponement would however create a serious dilemma for the EU, which has linked the continuation of its administration to the elections going ahead.

A failure to resolve the stand-off in Mostar would also cast doubt on the prospect of a successful Bosnia-wide vote which would involve all the same problems relating to the position of refugees, diplomats fear.

B-H: Abdic Reportedly Barred From Taking Part in Elections

LD1005181296 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1520 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 10 May (FONET)—Kasim Trnka, the ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Zagreb, has said that the Cazin [town in northwest Bosnia] leader Fikret Abdic, against whom the Sarajevo government has brought criminal charges, cannot take part in the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections nor can he register his party, according to a report by MOREL [independent Slovene news agency]. The ambassador made the statement at a roundtable meeting at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Cultural Center [in Zagreb].

Abdic had registered his party, the Democratic Popular Union, in the western part of Mostar, in Herzeg-Bosnia, which the Sarajevo government does not recognize, the Ljubljana agency reports. Trnka believes that the recent arrest of six Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens in Croatia, suspected of plotting Abdic's assassination, only serves to promote the once popular "Babo" [Abdic's nickname, meaning Daddy].

The Bosnian ambassador believes such moves by Zagreb do not contribute to good-neighborly relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to him, it is best to wait for the outcome of the trial against the six Muslims, in order to see on what grounds charges are based against them for international terrorism.

B-H: Central Bosnian Canton Passes Law on Government

AU1305155396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Deputies of the Central Bosnian Canton Assembly have passed the Law on the Cantonal Government and have established the level of ministry staffing [broj raspodjele ministarstava] in Travnik today. Although personnel issues have been adjourned for the next session on Friday [17 May], we may state that the Central Bosnian Canton has also formed executive authorities, that is, it has completely constituted the cantonal authorities within the Federation system. Refija Kulasin reports from Travnik:

[Kulasin] Although, before the assembly session, the deputy clubs of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], as well as members of the working group drafting the bill, had agreed on certain amendments to the law on government, once it was submitted to debate, the session was interrupted on two occasions for coordination over staffing the ministries and (?the seat) of government. [Words indistinct] to everybody's (?visible) pleasure, a constructive consensus was reached. The Government of the Central Bosnian Canton will have 12 ministries. Six are headed by Bosniaks: the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture, and Sports; the Health Ministry; the Ministry of Transport and Communications; the Ministry of Trade, Tourism, and Enterpreneurship; and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Resources. Croats head the following six: the Ministry of [word indistinct]; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development; the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining; the Ministry of Labor, Social Policy, and Refugees; and the Ministry of Urbanism, Zoning Policy, and Environmental Protection. It was also decided that the seat of the Government of the Central Bosnian Canton be in Travnik, albeit, with the possibility of certain (?ministries) [word indistinct] sessions. [passage omitted]

B-H: Odzak HVO Veterans Demand 'Due Rights' Be Fulfilled

AU1005170396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 10 May 96

[Report by Nadir Porobic from Odzak—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dissatisfied with the slow resolution of numerous essential problems in Odzak municipality, and particularly with their undefined personal status, the soldiers of the 102d Odzak Brigade of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] held their first public meeting today entitled "We Are Still Alive," and sent a clear message that they do not want power but want and demand the fulfillment of their due rights.

The soldiers' meeting was attended by the representatives of the Odzak civilian authorities and party representatives, however, only Slavo Bago, head of the Odzak Municipal Council, addressed the soldiers in [words indistinct] wishes and expectations of the soldiers.

The soldiers of the 102d Odzak Brigade HVO received the address by Colonel Tomislav Bozic, commander of this brigade, with special attention and approval.

Through their chosen representatives, the soldiers today defined 10 written demands to the civilian authorities and the party representatives in Odzak, which can, in short, be summed up as the right to work, the improvement of housing conditions, the improvement of soldiers' economic and social status, the faster repair of infrastructure, especially electricity and water, the adequate staffing of the health center, the preparation of the school capacities, the opening of shops, the prevention of war profiteering and black marketeering, the fair registration of public property, and a fair approach to property transformation and privatization, devoid of any speculations and machinations.

At the end of the meeting of the soldiers of the 102d Odzak Brigade HVO, they nevertheless agreed that the representatives of the civilian authorities would meet with the chosen soldiers' representatives next week and commence the realization of the demands set forth above.

B-H: Association Works Toward Refugees' Return From Abroad

AU1005161196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 10 May 96

[Report by Sanda [name indistinct]—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] plan, around 300,000 our refugees from [word indistinct] are supposed to return by the end of the year. This is a very complex and complicated program, and, in order to deal with it in the best possible way, the Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons held a meeting recently with (?nongovernmental) organizations in Copenhagen, at which 20 (?government) organizations, 18 NGO's from Denmark, and the Association of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens in Denmark took part.

In that country, 14,000 of our refugees have been granted permanent asylum, but without the possibility of employment. All of them live on welfare assistance amounting to 1,500 German marks [DM] on a monthly basis. [Words indistinct] of the Association of Refugees demand that all of them should be enabled to visit their homes in Bosnia-Herzegovina for up to three months without losing their refugee status in the country they are coming from. [Words indistinct] Komarica, chairwoman of the Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons, said the following at the conference:

[Komarica] After yesterday's tour of our refugees abroad and at home who want to return to their homes, we tried today to provide all the correspondents, both foreign and domestic, with information about voluntary returns of refugees and about the attitudes of certain countries that are playing host to our refugees. The most important thing is that we inform our refugees who are, at the moment, in a position to follow us that a joint operative group has been formed, tasked with organizing the return of refugees.

[Sanda] NGO's of the countries that are host to a great number of our refugees held a meeting in Stockholm, at which representatives of our (?refugees) also took part. According to the conclusions reached at the conference, refugees can return to Bosnia-Herzegovina for a period of one year. This is particularly important for professionals, who, in such a way, would be able to assist considerably in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For this program, DM5 millions will be allotted [words indistinct]. Majo (word indistinct), deputy chairman of the Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons, presented the example of Odzak municipality, where the provisions of the Dayton accords are being implemented. In this municipality, 4,000 displaced persons have returned so far, of whom 95 percent are [words indistinct]. As a particular novelty, Komarica pointed out (?the information) from the office of Carl Bildt [words indistinct]. On that occasion, he presented a plan on forming a body that would work on forming a branch of the Association of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Banja Luka.

B-H: Tadic's Lawyer Denies Serbs 'Solely Responsible' for War

AU1005191096 Paris AFP in English
1727 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, May 10 (AFP)—The defence team representing a Bosnian Serb standing trial in a UN war crimes court here hit back Friday at previous testimony which blamed the Serbs and Serbia for the Balkans conflict.

One of the defence lawyers for Dusan Tadic, who stands charged with the murder and torture of Moslem prisoners in Serb detention camps in Bosnia, denied that the Serbs were solely responsible for the Bosnian war, saying that Moslems and Croats should shoulder some of the blame as well.

Dutch lawyer Alphons Orie told the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that the "expansionist ideology" had not been the exclusive preserve of the Bosnian Serbs and of Serbia, as recounted earlier this week by a British expert on Yugoslav history.

Orie referred to several ultranationalist Croat and Moslem paramilitary groups in Bosnia, such as the HOS [Croatian Armed Forces] and the Green Berets, who he said had pushed for their own national ascendancy just as brutally as Serb militias.

Orie also said that the Serb bid for secession from both Bosnia and Croatia was motivated as much by a fear of becoming "second-class citizens" in their own country as by a desire to create a "Greater Serbia."

The defence lawyer was speaking a day after British historian Andrew Gow told the court that the Bosnian war had been plotted by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic in an efforts to set up a single Serb state comprising the minorities in Bosnia and Croatia.

Orie also countered the prosecution's depiction of the large-scale ethnic cleansing carried out by Bosnian Serbs of the Moslem population in northern and eastern Bosnia by stressing that Serbs too had been chased from their homes, particularly in central and northeastern Bosnia.

Orie has yet to broach the specific case of Tadic's own alleged involvement in atrocities. The former cafe owner is accused of killing four Moslems in the notorious Omarska camp in western Bosnia and nine others during an operation to drive Moslems out of a nearby village.

He is also accused of torturing 18 Moslems in another Serb-run camp.

Tadic is the first of 57 indictees to stand trial in The Hague in the first trial of its type since the Nuremberg trials of Nazi leaders after World War II.

The lawyer of another suspect being held in The Hague, Bosnian Croat Tihomir Blaskic, said the UN court had little credible evidence against his client.

"The ICTY has only gathered third-rate evidence so far against my client," Blaskic's lawyer Zvonimir Hodak was quoted Friday as saying by the Croatian daily Vjesnik.

"It's really just newspaper articles and interviews in which General Blaskic is only mentioned twice," Hodak said.

The case meanwhile of three other indictees who have yet to surrender to the ICTY is proving divisive within the ranks of the current rump Yugoslav military, corroborating sources in Belgrade said Friday.

The sources said the military hierarchy of rump Yugoslavia—Serbia and Montenegro—had examined the charges of crimes against humanity levelled at former federal Yugoslav officers Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic and Veselin Sljivancanin, and was divided over whether to hand them over to the ICTY.

The three stand accused of involvement in the massacre of 261 civilians in eastern Croatia in November 1991.

The United Nations and the ICTY have both repeatedly urged Belgrade to cooperate with the court and hand the suspects over.

B-H: Germany Hands Over Lajic to War Crimes Tribunal

AU1305110896 Paris AFP in English 1059 GMT 13 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, May 13 (AFP)—German authorities on Monday handed over to UN officials here Goran Lajic, a Bosnian Serb charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the court announced.

Lajic, 28, who has agreed to appear before the war crimes tribunal, was arrested on March 18 near Nuremberg.

Since his arrest, Lajic had been held in custody in Germany.

He appears on an extensive list of those suspected of crimes against humanity during the war in the former Yugoslavia, and is accused of torturing, beating and killing numerous Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat prisoners held in the Keraterm camp in 1992.

B-H: Muslims Attack Car With Serb Passengers

LD1105100796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0920 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 11 May (SRNA)—A group of Muslim youths last night at about 2000 [1800 GMT] opened fire—on the border between the Serb and Muslim parts of Sarajevo in the suburbs of Dobrinja I and Dobrinja IV—on a Mazda car carrying driver Neven Tusevljak and his passenger Slobodan Neskovic.

According to Cedo Nogo, Kula police station's deputy commander, the unidentified group of youths threw three hand grenades at the car just as it was crossing the bridge over the river Dobrinja.

"Windows on the right-hand side of the car were shattered and damage was caused to the bodywork by pieces of shrapnel," Nogo said in a statement to SRNA, and elaborated:

"Serb civilians arrived on the scene and then the same group of youths threw four more grenades, but no one was hurt. This terrorist attack led to chaos, and our side responded by firing with a pistol. After this, the group of Muslims fled towards Dobrinja III."

Nogo said members of IFOR [Implementation Force] and the international police have arrived on the scene and an investigation is under way.

B-H: Muslim Village Denies Reports of Clashes With Serbs

LD1205224196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Local and foreign media have recently filed a number of reports about alleged armed clashes in the village of Dugi Dio near Zvornik. Some linked the recent arrest of seven men from Srebrenica with the aforementioned alleged incidents and clashes in Dugi Dio. The leadership of the local community has issued a statement strongly denying reports on incidents in Dugi Dio. Hasan Hadzic reports.

[Hadzic] This evening's statement issued by the Presidency of the Dugi Dio local community expresses concern over the false reports on alleged armed clashes between Bosniaks and Serbs in the Dugi Dio area, IFOR [Implementation Force] interventions, arrests of armed persons, etc.

According to the statement, the situation in the village of Dugi Dio has been completely normal for around 15 days now. Serb civilians stopped their provocations a long time ago and Serb police patrols are now accompanied by international police officers.

What is most important, the statement says, is the fact that an increasing number of Bosniak families are returning to their homes. The agricultural works are in full swing and the state institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina are expected to help with the construction of the road and other infrastructure facilities.

By returning to their homes in the territory of the Serb entity, these people have contributed to the process of the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and they deserve all the aid they can get.

According to the statement, the goal of the aforementioned fabrications is to destabilize the situation in Dugi Dio and prevent the Bosniaks from returning to their homes in the Zvornik area. The statement also appeals to the media to be more cautious when dealing with sensitive issues.

B-H: UN's Ogata, Serb Republic Minister View Refugee Problems

LD1005172096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1447 GMT 10 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, May 10 (TANJUG)—The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and Republika Srpska Minister for Refugees and Displaced Persons Ljubisa Vladusic discussed Friday

[10 May] in Pale the problem of refugees and the principles regulating the freedom of movement in the future.

After touring both Bosnian entities—R.S. [Republika Srpska] and Muslim-Croat Federation—to find out the living conditions of refugees, Ogata said that the situation was improving and that people wanted to return to their homes.

Many problems remain pending, Ogata said, pointing to the need for more projects for rebuilding houses destroyed by war.

Freedom of movement must be ensured in line with the Dayton accord, Ogata said.

Vladusic requested Ogata's help in dismantling by the end of this year the inadequate accommodation where refugees are sheltered at present in order to find a lasting solution to the problem of their residence.

The UNHCR plan for repatriating about 800,000 refugees to Bosnia- Herzegovina in 1996 is deadlocked, it was noted at a recent consultative meeting in Kotor, town on the Adriatic coast.

UNHCR plans to repatriate about 200,000 refugees from Europe and about 170,000 from the former Yugoslav republics, as well as some 500,000 inside Bosnia.

B-H: RS's Kasagic Says Refugee Accommodation Issue Settled

AU1005205396 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 9 May 96 p 2

[Report by Sl. P.: "Legal Conditions for Accommodating All Refugees Met"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The law on the use of abandoned property has created a legal basis, in accordance with the Dayton agreement, for accommodating all refugees. Problems arise when the local population, who do not have the right to move into such property, nevertheless do so. The government reviewed this at its 2 May extraordinary session, at which it supported the republican president's decree on measures for solving the position of refugees. The officials responsible for implementing the measures are presidents of the municipal assembly, executive councils, and the interior minister. All citizens who were granted a temporary permit for using abandoned property by the municipal authorities must report this to the ministry's commission for refugees and displaced persons by 15 May so that it can be revised. If a person fails to do so, he or she will be considered an illegal tenant, and appropriate measures will be taken against them, Rajko Kasagic, Serb Republic [RS] prime minister, told Doboj ALTERNATIVA. [passage omitted]

Kasagic also said why he thought Radio Television Serbia's 1930 [1730 GMT] was no longer locally received.

As a lawyer, I have a different understanding of diplomacy, and I see media freedom as the possibility to publish something that might not be to everyone's taste. All this is directed at improving conditions in the RS. I do not understand why we in the RS cannot receive the RTS newscast. I do not understand the "News at Eight" broadcast at 2000. Perhaps I do not understand media independence, but in my opinion, the prime minister should be acquainted with the reasons.

B-H: Serb PM, IFOR's Smith Discuss Freedom of Movement

LD1005140996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1321 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 10 May (SRNA)—Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and Admiral Leighton Smith, commander of the IFOR [Implementation Force], had talks in Banja Luka today on freedom of movement and on the international forces' contribution to the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement.

"We discussed how we might achieve freedom of movement for people, goods, and capital as quickly and effectively as possible. The government will work toward removing all obstacles observed on the ground," Kasagic said after the meeting.

He said they also discussed the opening of Banja Luka airport: this issue is "very vital for the prosperity of the Serb Republic," and Admiral Smith promised that flights could begin in a few weeks.

Noting that IFOR "over the past four months has repaired about 150 bridges and carried out road repairs" in the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation, Smith said: "The time has come to secure freedom of movement for people and goods."

According to him, "there are places where freedom of movement is not permitted and, at today's meeting with the prime minister of the Serb Republic, consideration was given to how this situation might be ended."

B-H: Serb Republic PM: Pale Opening Up to the World

LD1205145596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1331 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac, 12 May (TANJUG)—The [Bosnian] Serb Republic government is investing huge efforts into opening up to the world and into leaving behind isolationism, in which it was stuck until recently. In doing this, it is receiving considerable assistance from Belgrade, or rather, Serbia and Montenegro, Serb Republic Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic said today.

Speaking on the Hallmark of Time program on Radio Kragujevac [in Serbia], he recalled that, until recently, the international community had applied different criteria to the entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina—one set of criteria for the federation, which has received more than $250 million in aid, and another for the Serb Republic, which has received a negligible amount of money for refugees.

"This is why we have opened up to the world and the international community, establishing contacts and informing them about the true situation," Kasagic said. He stressed that numerous meetings in Banja Luka and Pale last week—with, among others, Carl Bildt, John Kornblum, Sadako Ogata, and Elisabeth Rehn—"showed our commitment to the Dayton agreement and our readiness to implement both its military and civilian part, which met with a positive reaction on the part of our collocutors."

Kasagic stressed that businessmen from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] had been to the Serb Republic and established direct contacts, and that Serbian businessmen also made possible establishing contacts between the Serb Republic and businessmen from Italy, who will soon visit Banja Luka. In this way, the FRY helps the Serb Republic to join international trends, Kasagic said.

B-H: Kasagic Denies Rumors of Split in Serb Leadership

LD1005190896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1646 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 10 May (SRNA)—Rajko Kasagic, the prime minister of the Serb Republic, told SRNA that there were no divisions in the Republic's leadership on issues concerning its political development or over ways in which the donors' funds for reconstruction should be used.

Some of the world's media have reported that the international community has been banking on regional and political divisions within the Serb Republic, with the aim of splitting the western from the eastern part of the Republic, according to the well-known Tudjman map, in which Banja Luka Krajina would belong to Croatia. Commenting on these reports, Kasagic said:

"If someone wanted to join the western part of the Serb Republic with Croatia, he could have done [word indistinct] in September last year, and not now after the signing of the Dayton agreement. On the contrary, the western countries are more interested in the implementation of the agreement, not in it being breached."

Kasagic believes that the future of the Serb Republic was determined by the Dayton agreement when the authority of the joint institutions was outlined, giving a large degree of independence to the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation. He said that this, at the present moment, is a realistic policy.

The Serb prime minister said that the international community had an even-handed attitude toward the internal policy of the Serb Republic and the Federation, and he added that it "had made negative comments concerning the organized visits by the Muslims to the Serb Republic in groups of several hundred persons."

According to Kasagic, the way to overcome problems relating to Muslims entering Serb areas will be if the international mediators "agree on a joint statement on freedom of movement with both sides, after which a protocol would be signed."

B-H: Banja Luka Socialists Rally, Condemn Pale Leadership

AU1205143996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 May 96

[Report by Branislav Bozic from Banja Luka]

[FBIS Translated Text] The crowded hall of the local theater, modern video spots, and a good number of guests marked the atmosphere in which the electoral conference of the Banja Luka city organization of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic [SPRS] was held.

The war and freedom for the Serb Republic were carried out on the shoulders of the people, not by any parties or individuals, said Nebojsa Radmanovic, chairman of the Socialist Party city committee, stressing that Serbia and the FRY had also carried a great burden of this war, helped with large humanitarian aid, taken care of many wounded, and finally—with wise diplomatic policy—gave the decisive contribution for peace to be established in this region.

According to Radmanovic, the situation in the Serb Republic today is very grim, since—as he put it—those who are still ruling on behalf of the people are doing nothing to improve the situation in the devastated and ransacked country. Can the ones who did not want the war to stop lead the people in peace? The ones that sheltered their families while the best sons of this nation gave their lives for their hearths, the ones that got rich while the families of the killed heroes had nothing to eat, the ones that attacked their own army while it was rotting away in trenches, Radmanovic asked, and said that a great number of soldiers had joined the Socialist Party wishing to help establish a new political and economic environment for a normal life. He also stressed that Banja Luka was in every way the capital and most important city in the Serb Republic, but that the current leadership was doing everything in its power to prevent that.

Greeting the participants in the conference, Bosko Perosevic, deputy chairman of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], briefly recalled all the difficulties that marked the years of war. He then said that the most important tasks in the Serb Republic now were the consistent and persistent implementation of the peace agreement, with simultaneous opening toward the world so as to establish an economic and political environment for a better life. The SPRS has full support from the SPS, Perosevic said, for the establishment of a democratic society and a market economy.

Addressing the rally, SPRS chairman Drago Ilic said that this party was expanding every day, developing, and more and more people, particularly fighters, were becoming its members. He also said that democracy had to replace totalitarianism, and called on the current state leadership to halt the series of—as he stressed—terrorist attacks on the Socialist Party leadership, activists, and members.

He also informed the gathering about last night's bomb attacks on apartments and other facilities belonging to the Socialist Party leaders in Gacko. The current Serb Republic authorities believe that this is the way to stop the will of the people, but that is yet another illusion of theirs, Ilic concluded.

B-H: Socialists Rally in Sipovo, Mrkonjic Grad

AU1205192096 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 12 May 96

[Report by Predrag Sarac from Sipovo and Mrkonjic Grad]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the Sipovo people returned to their homes at the beginning of the year, thanks to the Dayton peace agreement, the first great gathering of the people at the town's main square was the Socialist Party [SP] rally. In a very emotional atmosphere, some 2,000 Socialists and sympathizers warmly greeted the delegation from Zrenjanin and the communal committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], and the delegation of the SP of the Serb Republic Main Committee, led by chairman Dragutin Ilic.

Although our main slogan in the times of reconstruction is to rely on our own strength, the help and strengthening of ties with Serbia and the FRY will make our optimism and faith for a better future in Sipovo become a reality, said Krsto Jandric, chairman of the municipal SP organization.

The electoral activities of the Serb Republic's SP have been completed in Mrkonjic Grad as well. The Socialists of Mrkonjic, this badly wounded town, have directed all their energy toward the reconstruction of the damage, optimistic that the people—who have almost all returned to the commune—will have conditions for a normal life, stressed Stevan Stojicic, chairman of the communal Socialist organization.

Since the economic infrastructure and accommodation facilities of Mrkonjic Grad have been badly damaged, the announcement of concrete ways of cooperation on the revitalization of this area by Tomo Krstic, chairman of the Mionica SPS communal committee, was greeted with open enthusiasm.

Sharply criticizing the behavior of and results achieved so far in Mrkonjic and the republic by the current authorities, Dragutin Ilic, chairman of the Serb Republic's SP, said that the Socialists were turned to the future but on realistic grounds.

The path to the new era, the path to normal life in the Serb Republic will be defined in the platform that the Socialists are preparing for the first party congress to be held on 1 June in Banja Luka.

B-H: Herzegovinian Card Played in Montenegrin Politics

96BA0252B Sarajevo SLOBODNA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Mar 96 pp 32-33

[Article by Esad Kocan: "The Battle for the Souls of the Voters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is a sad story. Bozidar Vucurovic (as an official) behaved altogether according to protocol when the humanitarian trailer-trucks and Montenegrin state officials arrived in Trebinje recently as part of the all-inclusive campaign "The People and Government of Montenegro to Serbian Herzegovina." He kissed the guests three times (as called for); he delivered a speech for the occasion, part in verse and part in prose, and it was altogether a festive popular occasion. And then in a feature-length report of Montenegrin state television both his picture and voice are missing. Only in the last issue of the Podgorica review ISTOK did the worried public here manage to learn that he was an active participant in that "humanism in action." On that same occasion, he paid all due respect to the experts at photomontage of state television who had so expertly touched up the scene so that even Vucurovic's shadow was gone.

The enthusiasm of the current regime and its media for the Dayton Agreement was only gathering steam when Bulatovic and his associates decided to establish yet another entity in internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serbian Herzegovina. That is how it is with Bosnia, which has ceased to be "the former Bosnia-Herzegovina" in the state media, and now there is "Serbian Herzegovina" (with a capital S), which has gotten the public here making hurried guesses about the real reason for putting this kind of new pressure on our brother Herzegovinians.

The entire affair has followed a pretty exciting course. Those who sent ideas, weapons, and warriors across the border are now sending flour and are preparing a campaign to build cemeteries. The government here knows what comes first: peace to the dead, a crust of bread to the living. There is nothing left for the Herzegovinians but to be eternally grateful and to distribute the inventories of charity properly. No joke, in the wave of humanism to this point, brother to brother, they have received "enough food for 15,000 households to live a month by world standards." The flour of the government and the people has also been assigned an important role on home ground: It is supposed to heal the damage done to the electorate as the final result of events from the fording of the Neretva to Dayton. Thanks to the Montenegrin opposition, though, people here have not altogether forgotten that just in advance of the beginning the Herzegovinians were promised an outlet to the sea, the valley of the Neretva, and at least half of Mostar. Unification of all the Serbs—it goes without saying. After all, they have remained alone on the stony ground, and for a long time too, but there are various signs from there that they are realizing who they have to thank for everything they have achieved in life. In order to anticipate this possibility, the All-Serb National Committee has assigned guardianship of Herzegovina to Montenegro. To that end, the Montenegrin government created a new entity—"Serbian Herzegovina"—after Dayton. In the face of the expansion of humanism in Podgorica, 100 or so Herzegovinians visited the Economic Chamber to plan the entire "mutual integration" with the authorities there.

Stone Resources

The hosts were not short on promises, and now there is only expectation that thanks to the powerful Montenegrin giant Herzegovina will grow to become another Switzerland. Everything has been arranged in principle for "us to become one"—details like the Dayton Accord represent no particular impediment when brothers are in agreement. Merging potential would be particularly profitable to Montenegro—its reserves of rock have become dangerously scant, and so the craggy peaks of Herzegovina would save that situation.

The Montenegrin government, with its civil rather than ethnic orientation, would teach humanism to all the opstinas in eastern Herzegovina, approach Foca, and it has been announced that it would soon go on crusades to Trnovo, which has also been promoted to a part of "Serbian Herzegovina." The fact that Trnovo is just outside Sarajevo is of no relevance to the government. The first trip to Ljubinje was led by President Bulatovic himself. Then everyone who has a high rank in the Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS] was assigned his respective location. The grateful hosts zealously clicked their glasses in a solemn toast with the hope that "the time has now come for brothers to become one." The generous guests again responded appropriately, as though from on high.

(A quotation for better illustration: "We came to fulfill the pledge of our ancestors and the commitment of today's generations, that Montenegro and Serbian Herzegovina always be together in good times and bad," was the inspiration that came to Minister Miladin Vukotic as the flour was being delivered and accepted in Cajnic.)

Niksic, the New Hope

A certain pause in fraternal love, the blocking of the border while the NATO bombers were hitting selected targets in Herzegovina, is not mentioned out of politeness. None of the guests remembered to ask the hosts where their neighbor Bosnjaks and Croats were. So as to not rock the boat, they also turned their heads away from the plowed-up foundations of devastated Aladza.

Here, every night on the TV news over state television the long list of the charitable became longer: pensioners, workers, fighters from all wars, conscious Pioneers, and the rest of the social community. From somewhere the enthusiasm returned from the beginning of the war, when Montenegrin reservists were given a send-off to go to the valley of the Neretva to help the empty-handed Serbs to regulate relations with their neighbors. While the fighters were straightening out the situation in "Serbian Mostar" and environs, there was a heroic competition in logistics in the background, in keeping with the ancient idyll ("Oh, maiden and comrade...."). God help anyone who was not forthcoming. Because now we have the result, it is not right to leave the glorious days to be forgotten. In the meantime, the Herzegovinian Serbs have been left without Mostar, and now they are looking at a site to build a new one. They have also lost the Dubrovnik market, but a new hope has arrived with the humanitarian convoys—Niksic!

It is not just a question of flour and canned goods: When Svetozar Marovic led the trip to Trebinje as president of the Republic Assembly, that guy Nikola Koljevic revealed another important activity planned in secret. "The Montenegrin government has taken upon itself the obligation to build a proper graveyard for the Serbian heroes who were killed around Sarajevo," Koljevic said in a slip in front of the cameras. Later, the statement was neatly deleted in the state-owned media, and the government is heroically silent about the entire project. It is an open question whether in Montenegro, the way it is, building a graveyard to those who gave their lives to murder Sarajevo would pay off for the authorities.

It is not the first time that the Montenegrin government and the Serb-oriented opposition have been making a sign across the border. In March '94, when it seemed that there was no remedy for Bosnia, a vulture was clearly cruising over Herzegovina after the congress of the incumbent Democratic Party of Socialists. The proposal of President Bulatovic that "this historic aspiration of ours and age-old destiny" be annexed to Montenegro met with an ovation. Sometime later, Novak Kilibarda, president of the People's Party, was still fuller of initiative on the question of geography: He proposed in a moment of inspiration that Montenegro be modestly given not only Herzegovina, but also Metohija. He even prescribed a democratic method: The Herzegovinians would voluntarily perform that act after a referendum, and no one would ask the Albanians anything, which is, of course, natural.

Metohija has for the present been left to Milosevic's care and concern, and because peace has come and the elections are getting closer and closer, the Democratic Party of Socialists truly has it in mind to turn Herzegovina into an election slogan. Because the leaders of the People's Party are not exactly "little children" as far as this matter is concerned, it is expected that these two parties, formerly comrades-in-arms, will on many other occasions get into a hot battle for the souls of the voters with Herzegovina on their lips. Bulatovic and his people have correctly calculated that the marches to the Danube and the Drina have done the most to shake the voters who believed that in cooperation with Milosevic they were the ones who would successfully achieve the "Serbian cause." Add and subtract, the DPS people do not have much to think about: This fall, they have to persuade precisely those voters of theirs who believed that efforts across the Drina are going according to plan and that sovereign Bosnia and Croatia are not such a bad outcome. Otherwise, the DPS loses its absolute majority, which, as Miodrag Vukovic, one of its ideologists, recently analyzed, would be an outright tragedy for Montenegro.

Patterned After Croatia

Which is why the incumbent Socialists have resorted to flour as an argument, and the members of the People's Party (who are much more consistent on questions of Serbism) have every day been cruelly reminding them "who led the people into war and left them in the lurch." The project was, of course, quite correct even to them; there was nothing wrong except those who were running the show. It is of interest that Dr. Novak Kilibarda, leader of the People's Party, has become more and more openly an admirer of the name and deeds of Franjo Tudjman. The other day, he proposed a specific measure which he took over from the Croatian president. The incumbent party, Kilibarda believes, "must find a way to satisfy the desire which those Montenegrins who live and work in Herzegovina have to vote." It is not difficult to guess which flock of Montenegrins are living and working in the devastated neighborhood: If the Herzegovinian Serbs and Montenegrins are "one," why, then, taking Croatia as a model, should they not have their own deputies in the Montenegrin parliament as a "diaspora"? Bulatovic's fraternal love, as far as we know, does not go quite that far, and he has no intention of checking which way the Herzegovinians are leaning.

The use of Herzegovina as an election slogan is in essence the old cruel game of playing on human fear. It is not easy for the hungry population there to admit today what it was that brought them to a pass where they are grateful hosts to humanitarian expeditions. Nor will it be easy for them to invite back home those neighbors whom they previously drove out and look them in the eye, nor to encounter the cities which thanks to the help of the defenders of the nation they so industriously turned into ruins. They face a simple choice: Until they touch those wounds of theirs, they will hold their hands outstretched and serve as a psychological crutch for someone else to settle accounts.

It is not difficult to understand why the Herzegovinians want to believe that Niksic can today replace Dubrovnik for them and that a new Mostar will spring up in some suitable place. Perhaps we should not even expect that amount of courage for such a quick confrontation of the truth. Almost all the responsibility for their new lives burdens the soul of the Montenegrin authorities—it does not matter whether the Herzegovinian operation was their invention or they did it under orders. Pragmatism is the great virtue of official Montenegro: As soon as the world exerts real pressure for them not to play the unifier, Bulatovic will once again, if need be, double the guards on the border.

Croatia: Croatia-Bosnian Federation Council Session Begins

LD1105092696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zoltan Kabok reporting from the presidential palace: The second session of the joint council for cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation began in the presidential palace at exactly 1000 [0800 GMT].

The session is being chaired by the president of the joint council, Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Joint Cooperation Council Signs Agreement on Ploce Port

LD1105124296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 11 May 96

[Report by Zoltan Kabok from the presidential palace]

[FBIS Translated Text] The second session of the joint council for cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, chaired by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, was held in the presidential palace today.

After the session and in the presence of Croatian President Tudjman; Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency; Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation; and members of the joint council, Croatian Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa; Izudin Kapetanovic, prime minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation; and Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, signed an agreement on the use of the port of Ploce and an agreement on passage through the municipality of Neum.

Hidajet Biscevic, secretary of the joint council and the assistant foreign minister of Croatia, then presented the assembled journalists with the most important conclusions of the session. He stated the following:

We have discussed extensively the current state of affairs in the implementation of the Washington and Dayton peace agreements. All open issues were resolved at today's session. Some of them, such as the regulations concerning property and legal matters, were discussed in more detail, and we expect to sign an agreement at our next session.

It is important to point out that the council proposed that the two governments establish a joint council for the reconstruction of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Biscevic said.

In the political sphere, we have reached an agreement on the stabilization of the federation, which is in the interest of peace and new world order in the region, Biscevic said.

This point was later emphasized by President Tudjman in his speech. He said that the 12 agreements signed so far in Sarajevo and the above two signed in Zagreb were a foundation for the future of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

Naturally, President Tudjman continued, there are still some open issues, but not of any great importance. Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, described the session as useful. He did not try to hide his satisfaction with it. He agreed entirely with President Tudjman and mentioned an additional issue: to ensure the presence of Bosniak deputies in the Croatian parliament. This was accepted in principle.

Finally, Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, said that despite all the difficulties, the federation was being built, which is a step forward towards stability.

Croatia: Tudjman, Izetbegovic To Clarify 3 Cooperation Protocols

AU1105133496 Paris AFP in English 1009 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, May 11 (AFP)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and his Bosnian counterpart Alija Izetbegovic opened talks here Saturday [11 May] to resolve fine points in Zagreb's cooperation with the Croat-Moslem Federation, one of the two components along with the Serb republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Izetbegovic arrived at the president's office, where the talks are taking place, with the Federation president, Croat Kresimir Zubak, the Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic and the Federation's vice-president, Ejup Ganic.

The meeting is to focus on three protocols, one on the Federation's use of the southern Croatian port of Ploce to give it an outlet to the sea. Prior to the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina's foreign trade was nearly all shipped through the port of Ploce. Continued access to the port is vital for the economy of the Moslem-Croat Federation.

The second protocol of agreement concerns free transit for Croatian vehicles and merchandise through the southern Bosnian coastal city of Neum, which lies on a strip of land only a few kilometers wide which cuts Croatia in two and is the sole Bosnian town on the Adriatic coast.

The final protocol is aimed at trying to resolve the thorny succession issue regarding the heritage of the former Yugoslav republic. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is now reduced to only Serbia and Montenegro, insists it alone should be the repository for all items concerning the heritage of ex-Yugoslavia though this is hotly contested by the rest of the former Yugoslav republics.

Croatia: Tudjman, Izetbegovic Agree on Returning Refugees

AU1105151296 Paris AFP in English
1437 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, May 11 (AFP)—Croatia and Bosnia have reached an agreement for the return of an initial batch of refugees displaced during the fierce 11-month, 1993-94 Moslem-Croat war, Bosnian and Croatian leaders said here Saturday.

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and his Croatian counterpart, Franjo Tudjman, said after talks that both sides had agreed to implement a pilot scheme to return refugees to central Bosnia, from where they fled during the conflict from April 1993 to March 1994.

"We have managed to establish a pilot project for the return of refugees" mainly to central Bosnia, Izetbegovic said after the talks, which were set up to improve Zagreb's cooperation with Bosnia's Moslem-Croat Federation.

Izetbegovic did not say how many people would be involved in the scheme, but the project is due to send refugees back to Bugojno and Travnik, under Bosnian government control, and Jajce and Stolac, Bosnian Croat-held towns.

"There are still some open questions, but despite all the obstacles, we are going to implement the accords which we concluded today," Tudjman said.

The president of the Moslem-Croat Federation, Kresimir Zubak, meanwhile said the refugee return, an integral part of the Dayton peace accords signed late last year, would be accompanied by full freedom of movement, another central theme of the peace.

"We insisted during these talks on the question of refugee return," Zubak said. "The Croats will guarantee total freedom of movement to Bosnian (Moslem) refugees in Stolac so they can repair their houses."

In all, 2.4 million persons were displaced by the 43-month Bosnian conflict. Croatia has been directly implicated in the resettlement programme, which has barely begun despite the provisions of the peace accord, as many Croats displaced sought refuge in Bosnia's northern neighbour.

The agreement on refugee return to central Bosnia could provide a timely boost not only for the flagging peace accords, but also for the Moslem-Croat Federation, a cornerstone of the peace and one of the two entities which now make up post-war Bosnia.

A further shot in the arm for the Federation came Saturday in the form of a temporary deal which will allow the alliance to use the southern Croatian port of Ploce to give it an outlet to the sea.

A second temporary accord will allow free transit for Croatian vehicles and merchandise through the southern Bosnian coastal city of Neum, which lies on a strip of land only a few kilometers wide which cuts Croatia in two and is the sole Bosnian town on the Adriatic coast.

Also at the talks with Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Zubak were Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic and the Federation's vice-president, Ejup Ganic.

Croatia: Tudjman, Izetbegovic, Zubak Comment on Joint Meeting

LD1105153396 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The second session of the joint council for cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, presided over by chairman of the joint council, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, has taken place in the presidential palace. Zoltan Kabok reports:

[Kabok] [Passage omitted] The president of the Croatian state and chairman of the joint council, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, spoke briefly to those present.

[Begin Tudjman recording] This second session of the council was very fruitful. At this session, we discussed all issues of interest for the cooperation between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the federation and also some important questions relating to the development of the federation. The talks took place in a spirit of general understanding and agreement on all important issues. The conclusions, as you have heard, indicate that the leaderships of both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are resolved to continue with the implementation of the Washington and Dayton Agreements in the interests of the preservation of peace and the consolidation of the new international order in this region.

We consider that what we achieved after the first session in Sarajevo, when 12 agreements were signed, together with the two agreements signed now and the conclusions we have reached, has already laid the foundations for permanent cooperation between the federation and Croatia.

Of course, some outstanding issues remain, but compared to what we have achieved, these are not significant. With the necessary efforts to remove all the misunderstandings or barriers which stand in our way, we believe we are not only realizing these agreements but are also, as we have done hitherto, continuing to offer constructive contributions to the international community, which under the leadership of the United States, has achieved peace and the agreements which guarantee it. [end recording]

[Kabok] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, addressing journalists, stressed the importance of the model project for the return of the population and particularly emphasized that it had been agreed that additional efforts would be made to ensure the return of all the people. Alija Izetbegovic went on to say:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] I raised a question that will perhaps particularly interest Bosniaks in Croatia, and that is, I called for ensuring the presence of a Bosniak representative in the Croatian Assembly. We have reached agreement here that this should be made possible at the earliest opportunity, at the time of the first census of the population or the first changes to the constitution or at the forthcoming elections. In this respect, we met with the full understanding of the Croatian Government headed by President Tudjman. Promises were made that this would be guaranteed.

That is what I would like to say and I would just add that I am very pleased with the constructive atmosphere that prevailed at this meeting. [end recording]

[Kabok] Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, had the following to say:

[Begin Zubak recording] Today's session of the council for cooperation was very fruitful and was held in a very positive atmosphere. As was expected, the main points we focused on were issues concerning the building of the federation, because the implementation of the Dayton agreement depends on it and so does the process of restoring peace, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but in the whole region.

We—the federal partners here who were signatories of the Washington and Dayton Agreements—have agreed that despite all difficulties and problems we face in the process of building the federation, we have made clear progress, especially if we analyze the situation retrospectively. As you know, since the signing of the Dayton Agreement we had several important meetings with the international community's mediation—in Rome, Geneva, Sarajevo, and Petersberg. When we analyzed the tasks we—the political and state leaders—set for ourselves in those meetings, we agreed that we have successfully overcome a number of problems and that we were on the best course to a successful resolution in practice of a number of outstanding issues. We hope that the session of the forum for the federation, which will be held on 14 May in Washington, will yield adequate results too. [end recording]

[Kabok] Winding up his statement, Federation President Kresimir Zubak stressed that some of the issues discussed concerned relations within the federation, especially the setting up of cantonal authorities in central Bosnia and in the Neretva Valley, as well as the revival of old and the creation of new municipalities. [passage omitted]

Croatia: HDSP Opposes Muslim Representative in Assembly

LD1205175496 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian Democratic Party of Right [HDSP] is resolutely opposed to the demand by Alija Izetbegovic, the Muslim leader in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that one seat in the Croatian state parliament be given to a member of the Muslim national minority. It is widely known that there have never been any people belonging to some Bosniak nation in Croatia, the HDSP said in a statement issued today. The statement added that Mr. Izetbegovic is trying to create a separate Bosniak nation in Croatia in an artificial way. The HDSP believes that Izetbegovic has no right to speak on behalf of Croatian Muslims.

Croatia: German Minister Discusses Return of Refugees

LD1105111896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Internal Affairs Minister Ivan Jarnjak has received Dr. Kurt Schelter, minister of state in the German Interior Ministry. They discussed the return of Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees from Germany.

The two ministers expressed satisfaction that the transit agreement among Germany, Croatia, Austria and Slovenia, which would allow visa-free transit for Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees provided they showed valid Bosnia-Herzegovina passports, will most probably be signed at the end of this month.

Croatia: Slavonian Serbs' Hadzic Talks With Russian Envoy

AU1005195096 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 8 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Goran Hadzic, president of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, talked to Russian Ambassador to Zagreb Leonid Kerestedzhiyants in Erdut today about the peace process implementation.

We talked about Russia's role in the implementation of the peace process in the area, said Hadzic, adding that in tomorrow's talks with Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, the Russian view of the solution to the problem will be presented. Hadzic pointed out that in today's talks with Ambassador Kerestedzhiyants, much time was devoted to Russian activities concerning creating the conditions for a safe and dignified life for the people in the province.

After the talks, Ambassador Kerestedzhiyants stated that today's visit was less important than tomorrow's, at which the Russian potentials and plans concerning the peaceful territorial and [word indistinct] resolution to the problem in the former Yugoslavia will be discussed.

The Russian delegation, headed by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, will visit the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. Russian Ambassador to Zagreb Leonid Kerestedzhiyants and representatives of the Russian contingent in the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] mission will also be part of the delegation that will visit the Russian cemetery in Ilok in the morning. According to Ambassador Kerestedzhiyants, one of the wreaths that will be laid on the graves of the Russian soldiers will be from Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

The Russian delegation will talk to administrator Klein and meet with President Goran Hadzic in Erdut at 1400 [1200 GMT].

Croatia: Serbs' Hadzic Protests to UNTAES

AU1005195896 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 8 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Goran Hadzic, president of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, registered a protest by telephone last night with transitional Administrator Jacques Klein concerning Jordanian UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] batallion members who prevented representatives of the Serb province from attending the opening ceremony for the Zagreb-Belgrade highway.

Transitional Administrator Jacques Klein stated that it had been a mistake made by the UNTAES soldiers that prevented the representatives of the Serb province from attending the opening ceremony. Mr. Hadzic was officially invited, said Klein, emphasizing that the misunderstanding occurred due to a lack of understanding on the part of the UNTAES members, who had recently arrived in the province and, as they did not understand the situation and had problems communicating, did not let the representatives of the Serb province through the checkpoint.

Croatia: Serb Official on UNTAES Deployment, Refugees

AU1005200896 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 8 May 96

[Interview with Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic, president of the Executive Council of the "Serb province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem," by Petko Koprivica; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Koprivica] The deployment of UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] is nearly complete. Now follows the demilitarization process. What is the Serbian view on this job, which is a great one and very important for peace in the area?

[Stanimirovic] It is true that (?the agreed) number of UNTAES soldiers have arrived in the area. The final work and preparations for their deployment are being carried out. Once this is complete, Mr. Klein must inform the Security Council. The Security Council must accept the report and provide guarantees that the people in this area, the Serb people, will be safe. When this is over—that is, when we have the guarantee of the Security Council—the demilitarization of our forces will begin, which means that we have to [words indistinct] carry out demilitarization.

We will not dispute this [word indistinct] guarantee of the Security Council, we will support the [words indistinct] agreement, and the demilitarization will be carried out completely in accordance with the agreements between UNTAES and our military forces. You know it is difficult for the Serb people to part with their weapons, and we will do our best to withdraw the weapons, which means not to hand them over to UNTAES or have them destroyed; (?they will be withdrawn from our territory).

[Koprivica] Will the 5,000 UNTAES troops be able to provide peace and security for the people of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem?

[Stanimirovic] I think that [words indistinct] if both sides (?are determined) to comply with the agreement as signed. If the intentions are not honorable, and if there is a [word indistinct] intention on the Croatian side, then the 5,000 soldiers will certainly not be able to protect the Serb people, but we all hope that this will not happen and that the international community will not allow it.

[Koprivica] In view of the Serbs' experiences with the Croatian authorities, including those in the western parts of the Krajina, and in view of the different interpretations of the Erdut agreement and the Dayton accord, many of them have recently left this territory. What is the situation with people moving out?

[Stanimirovic] There are practically no more such instances, though [words indistinct], involving taking out the material goods from this territory [words indistinct] the people from western Krajina who settled in this province, taught by the bitter experience [words indistinct], were in the situation in which they no longer believed the UN forces could defend this territory if [words indistinct] on the part of Croatia, and thus tried to achieve some degree of material security. It is fortunate, though, that they are returning to this area and not staying in the FRY, but are only [words indistinct] some elementary things in case of an undesirable epilogue to the events here.

[Koprivica] Considering that this is your first official interview with our television, I must ask you to say something to the people in the province.

[Stanimirovic] I would like to say to the people that they should by no means leave this territory. Staying here will guarantee our survival. Moreover, I would like to say to our people from the western parts of the Krajina who live in the collective centers in Yugoslavia that [words indistinct] no more accommodation capacities, to (?think about it). We could start some sort of humanitarian care [words indistinct] in our province, which would probably be a transitional solution. They could live there for (?24) months, during which time we will see if Croatia meets all the demands concerning the return of refugees to their homes, since we have the right in accordance with the Erdut agreement and the Dayton accord to demand parity in the return of refugees to their homes, which we will exercise. We will demand that if the Croatians insist that their refugees return to our province [words indistinct] the same thing be done for our refugees from the western parts of the Krajina. I do not think there should be any double standards and that this should be observed [word indistinct].

[Koprivica] Thank you, President Stanimirovic.

[Stanimirovic] Thank you.

Croatia: Serb Official Says Amnesty Law Good for Serbs

AU1005195496 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 8 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic, president of the Executive Council of the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, stated in Borovo that the Croatian Government's decision to accept the proposed bill on amnesty for Serbs from the province is very important. He said that this bill is very important for the Serbs, since it will guarantee that they will not be criminally prosecuted for taking part in the political or armed defense system.

When the bill is adopted in the Croatian parliament, the refugee Serbs from western Krajina will be able to settle in the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem without fear of being arrested and questioned.

Croatia: E. Slavonian Serb Police Appeal for Discipline

AU1005194996 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 8 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with its obligations, tasks, and authority, the provincial secretariat of internal affairs has issued the following appeal to the people of the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem:

With the signing of the basic agreement and the establishment of peace in the Serb province, it is necessary for the population to contribute to the preservation of public law and order and to abide by the law and all legal regulations.

We would like to point out that it is particularly necessary to change the habits and activities concerning the unauthorized use of firearms on various holidays and at parties and wedding receptions. When carrying a weapon, one must abide by the legal regulations and have the necessary documents. This also applies to official weapons.

The police have also announced that in the future, control measures will be intensified and that they will work more intensively towards [word indistinct] of those who violate the law.

In view of the complexity of the social situation and the obligations our province has taken on before the international community, we appeal to all people to fully support the police and the efforts toward preserving public law and order, as well as the personal and [word indistinct] of all the citizens.

Croatia: UN Official Calls For Respect for Human Rights

LD1005143796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1218 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 10 (TANJUG)—U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Jose Ayala-Lasso on Thursday asked Croatian leaders to observe a constructive policy of human rights that would help consolidate peace in former Yugoslavia.

Ayala-Lasso told a press conference in Zagreb after talks with Croatian leaders and human rights representatives that he had warned the authorities in Zagreb to observe a clear policy in human rights.

He asked the authorities to form non-governmental organizations for the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of ethnic minorities, news agencies report.

Disturbing reports have been submitted to Ayala-Lasso on human rights violations and a repressive political atmosphere under Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, said REUTERS.

Serbs living in Krajina have little legal and physical protection from persecution by vengeful Croats.

The regions, once populated by a Serb majority now number less than 3,000 Serbs, most of them elders.

The Croatian aggression on parts of Krajina put to flight 250,000 Serbs.

The Serbs also face daunting obstacles to obtain jobs, pensions or other documentation needed for their return to their homes in Croatia.

Serbs seeking financial aid to rebuild homes destroyed in the four-year war receive repair estimates significantly less that Croat-owned homes with the same amount of damage.

Other problems include loopholes in a new war amnesty bill for Serbs, lack of schools for Serb and Italian children, politically manipulated courts and renewed harassment of the free press, said REUTERS.

Croatia: Serbs Hail Opening of Belgrade-Zagreb Highway

LD1205171296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1647 GMT 12 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kragujevac, May 12 (TANJUG)—President of the Association of Serb Organizations in Croatia Milorad Pupovac said on Sunday that the reopening of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway and oil pipeline was an important step towards the normalization of the Yugoslav-Croatian relations.

This is a contribution to the resolution of the status of refugees and Serbs in Croatia, Pupovac told local radio in the Serbian town of Kragujevac.

Speaking about the recent renaming of Vrginmost, the Serb town in Croatia, into Gvozd, Pupovac said that this represented a 'negation of the Serb national identity and direct insult to the national feelings of Serbs in Croatia.'

Serb refugees are showing great interest in the return to their ancestral homes in Croatia and the association puts constant pressure on Croatian authorities to facilitate their return, Pupovac said.

Yugoslavia and Croatia should define preconditions for the return of refugees as soon as possible, Pupovac said and added that those who return should 'enjoy full security and equality in getting jobs and securing the protection of property and the possibility of preserving elements of national identity.'

According to unofficial estimates, about 500,000 Serbs left Croatia and Serb Krajina since 1991, when Croatia seceded from the former Yugoslav Federation.

Croatia: Zagreb, Srem-Baranja Region Restore Postal Traffic

AU1005140596 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 10 May 96

[Report by Bogdan Rkman from the Srem-Baranja region—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Postal traffic was restored today between the Srem-Baranja region and Croatia. Bogdan Rkman has the details:

[Rkman] The mediator for restoring traffic was Jaques Klein, transitional administrator and [word indistinct] of the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES]. Following the symbolic restoration of traffic, Administrator Klein told journalists that after the opening of the highway and the oil pipeline, today's event was another step toward reestablishing communication between people, and opening the area, which is the UN mission's task.

Goran Hadzic, the region's president, thanked the UNTAES mission and General Klein and briefly expressed hope that creating conditions for lasting peace would be the basic idea in future activities of all participants in the peace process.

Croatian delegation head Ivica Vrkic assessed today's event as a good sign that we are nearing the end of the war and stressed the UNTAES's activities and the cooperation of the Serb side, which allowed postal traffic to be restored. The Posavina postal traffic will include letters, magazines, and books weighing up to 2 kg.

Croatia: Article Rejects Serb Leader Hadzic as Negotiator

AU1205201696 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 May 96 p 4

[Article by Mirko Saijler: "Klein Is Looking for a Negotiator"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The information that the Amnesty Law does not apply to 15 persons—among them Goran Hadzic, the former and present leader of the rebel Serbs in the Croatian Danube region—was welcomed in Croatia. In 1991, Hadzic and Zeljko Raznjatovic-Arkan toured Croatia from Borovo Selo to Knin in order to organize the rebellion of the Serbs against the legally and democratically elected Croatian authorities.

Zagreb winked at Hadzic: One of the most influential members of the government of that time escorted him to Vukovar and gave him a revolver with an inscription. He was forgiven then. Soon after that, Hadzic became the leader of the rebel Serbs and took part in the genocide against the inhabitants of Vukovar and other occupied parts of Croatia. Therefore, he was twice sentenced for the genocide against Vukovar and other occupied Croatian Danube regions.

The UNTAES [United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia] plan provides for negotiations as the means of solving problems—that is, it expects the Croatian side to talk to the representatives of all the sides. This, then, is Hadzic's third political comeback. As a rule, he comes when somebody has to be removed from the political throne. We cannot doubt the fact that he is Belgrade's puppet.

The very fact that Hadzic has been accused of and sentenced for genocide should keep the Croatian side from negotiating with him. Anyway, why should we sit at the negotiating table with a man who still says: "Five years after the liberation of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem from the 'rule of ustashas'..." As we can see, Hadzic sees reintegration of that region as an occupation.

General Jacques Klein should therefore find another negotiator with the Croatian side to represent the interests of the rebel Serbs. Hadzic certainly cannot be the man.

Croatia: Muslim Party Complains of Police Harassment

LD1105145396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Rijeka branch of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] in Croatia reports continuing police terror tactics against Bosniaks living in Croatia, in particular against members of the Party of Democratic Action in Croatia.

Ibrahim [word indistinct], SDA chairman in Croatia—Rijeka branch, and Mustafa Kukuruzovic, the branch secretary, were taken to the police station.

They were interrogated about the party's organization and then about the activities of Fikret Abdic [former leader of breakaway Muslims].

After a three-hour interrogation Ibrahim [word indistinct] and Mustafa Kukuruzovic were released.

They were not maltreated physically, but they were not given any official record of the arrest with the explanation that it was a semiofficial talk only.

Croatia: Poll Institute Reportedly Used as HDZ Policy Tool

AU0905141896 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 3 May 96 pp 4-5, 32

[Article by Jasna Babic: "According to the Poll of the Institute for Applied Social Research, Which Is Controlled by the HIS and Miroslav Tudjman, 'The Unpopularity of the HDZ Already Surpasses the Unpopularity of the Serb National Party, and That Has Been Declared a Secret!'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At the beginning of February 1996, the Institute for Applied Social Research carried out an opinion poll of 1100 inhabitants of Zagreb, inquiring about their attitude toward the 'mayoral crisis' in the Croatian capital. One of the important questions was: "If, just like in the previous elections, opposition parties once again made an election alliance and put forward joint candidates, whom would you vote for?" Nearly 80 percent of the people answered that they would vote for—the joint opposition!

The questioned citizens of Zagreb did not know that the poll was taken for the internal needs of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. They were told that the questionnaires were "top secret," that the answers were anonymous, and that they were used "exclusively for scientific purposes."

However, as soon as they were statistically grouped and analyzed, the data, as a party top secret, were forwarded to the president's office. And then the HDZ strategists quickly invented a new technique to stay in power—the new electoral law. [passage omitted]

The poll that was carried out in February of this year by the Institute for Applied Social Research showed that the optimism of the HDZ was completely unrealistic. The citizens of Zagreb obviously did not see the stubborn refusal of President Tudjman to approve any of the four opposition mayors as a perfect example of conducting state policy. To the institute's poll question "For which party would you by no means vote," fully one quarter of the questioned people answered that they would give their votes to any other party but the HDZ. For the sake of comparison it should be mentioned that, in a similar poll in December 1994, even Djukic's Serb National Party [SNS] had a much better rating: Only one fifth of Croats would by no means vote for it.

That is why Vladimir Seks and Smiljko Sokol, the famous election mathematicians of the HDZ, quickly wrote a new proposal for the Electoral Law. And if the assembly adopts it—and the proposal will doubtlessly be adopted—at the next elections the citizens of Zagreb will vote according to the proportional election system.

First, that model breaks coalition alliances, and, second, it enables one party, even with only a relative majority, to control the legislative and the executive power. It is clear that, reading the latest report of the institute, those in the president's office reached the following conclusions: The election alliance of opposition parties is an ever bigger danger for the ruling party, because the HDZ, even in the most courageous predictions, cannot win more than one third of the mandates in the Zagreb City Assembly.

"Top Secret" Investigation

So, the public opinion poll in Zagreb was not used "exclusively for scientific purposes"—as the questioned citizens of Zagreb were guaranteed by the Institute for Applied Social Research. On the contrary, their answers were marked as "top secret" only because the poll was carried out on the orders of the ruling party, and only because it is not in the interest of the HDZ to publicize that its political rating has been falling hopelessly.

And as previous experiences show, the attribute "scientific" was mostly used to hide the fact that the poll was financed from the budget of the Ministry of Science and Technology. More precisely—that the reputed scientific institution has in an interesting way become an important service of the HDZ, and of one of its secret services.

Already at the beginning of 1992 the Ministry of Science and Technology approved the project of the so-called longitudinal investigation of public opinion about social and political processes in Croatia. In the name of the institute, the project was initiated by Vesna Kovacevic-Lamza, as the main researcher, with three of her colleagues. As is appropriate for a scientific institution financed by a state ministry, the indicators of the political disposition on the eve of the 1992 elections were presented to the interested public: They were published in specialized magazines and in daily papers. It turned out that in 1992 the institute predicted the composition of the Croatian Parliament rather precisely.

However, as the HDZ gradually lost the absolute support of the electorate, the activities of the institute became a business and a state secret, until finally the needs of the ruling party became enmeshed with the scientific project.

For example, in August 1995, right after "Operation Storm," the "longitudinal investigation of public opinion" was expanded with an additional investigation of the post-"Storm" political disposition of the nation.

"I believe that it is not necessary to repeat once again that the realization of the mentioned project would have been incomplete, if not altogether a failure, if it had not recorded the reactions of the public to the successful military action 'Storm.' In accordance with that, we appeal to you to consider the possibility of awarding additional means to the 'public opinion' project, for the purpose of the realization of the mentioned research," Vesna Kovacevic-Lamza, the main researcher of the Institute for Applied Social Research, wrote to the Ministry of Science and Technology on 14 August 1995.

On the same day, the ministry had to approve additional expenses of 211,328 kunas for the institute. Although the poll questionnaire allegedly referred to "Storm," the people were asked to say what they thought about the Croatian regime, the leaders of the HDZ, President Tudjman and, most important, possible early elections.

Reasons for Early Elections in 1995

True, NACIONAL's reporters did not see the results of the research from August 1995, but well-informed sources in the HDZ admit today that exactly those results were the reason the early elections were held in October 1995.

Namely, the evaluations of the institute were spectacular. After the triumphant military action, the institute came to the conclusion that the HDZ could get over 60 percent of the votes, which meant that the ruling party—after the combined representative model—would win two-thirds of the representative mandates in the assembly, that it would become the incontestable master of the parliament, and it could autonomously change even the Croatian Constitution.

The elections of 1995 showed that this time the Institute for Applied Social Research had made a serious mistake. Contrary to its predictions, the HDZ did not get the two-thirds majority in the assembly, and in Zagreb the ruling party was defeated by the union of seven opposition parties. [passage omitted]

Those who have some notion of the events in the Institute for Applied Social Research were convinced that Esad Cimic, former director of the institute, was blamed for the research failures. His departure from the director's post right after the elections of 1995 did not seem accidental. And, together with him, the members of the management board were also removed. [passage omitted]

Handing Over to HIS

But with the new director and the new management board the reputable scientific institution was, as it seems, definitely and irreversibly handed over to the HIS [Croatian intelligence agency]. In one of the protest letters of the dismissed Covic it can be read that the director of the HIS, Miroslav Tudjman, personally dictated the names of the new management of the institute: Ivan Rogic, Marin Sopta, Dragutin Pavlicevic, Zvonko Knezovic, Nevio Setic, Vlado Sakic, and, of course, Vesna Kovacevic-Lamza, who had in the meantime become Vesna Lamza-Posavec. [passage omitted] When it was founded in 1991, the Institute for Applied Social Research was intended to be a politically neutral scientific institution which should function like any institute in the world. If one can judge by the composition of the leading workers in it, beside the "fans" of the HDZ, there are some followers and members of other domestic parties too.

As its original scientific innovation, the institute founded the Center for Research on Public Opinion, which was intended to bring in some money. Its regular activities were to be financed by the Ministry of Science and Technology. But it was planned that the institute also do some commercial work, namely, at a suitable price, carry out private requests of various clients. According to the original plans, the same rules of the game should be applied to the HDZ as one of the parties among domestic political organizations.

The Founders of the Institute

Among the founders of the institute were Ante Covic, minister of science during the war, and Miomir Zuzul, current ambassador to Washington who was from the first day present in the institute as an associate and the leader of the project "Children in War." One of the founders was Miroslav Tudjman, who carried out his idea of establishing a multidisciplinary center for strategic research within the institute—an institution which would examine, predict, and control general world processes.

However, preoccupied with important political obligations, Zuzul and the president's older son for a while forgot about the institute and the importance of its Center for Research on Public Opinion. In the time of its foundation the institute worked under the control of the temporary management board and its acting director Ivan Rogic. When the institute got its final form, Rogic was succeeded by Vlado Sakic as the permanent manager, and Covic was appointed president of the management board. [passage omitted]

The Lobby From the IPD and MORH

The majority of people who eventually took over control of the Institute for Applied Social Research at the end of 1995 had earlier worked, or at least cooperated, with the IPD department of the Ministry of Defense. IPD is an abbreviation for informational-psychological activities. It existed in the course of 1991 as a special, professional service of MORH [expansion unknown] for the conduct of special war against the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] and Serbia. The main initial core of the IPD was formed by Miroslav Tudjman and Miomir Zuzul, former colleagues, professors from the the Zagreb philosophy faculty. [passage omitted]

Although the group for the conducting of special war was soon disbanded, the majority of its members continued functioning as a separate lobby. With the founding of the Institute for Applied Social Research, and soon of HIS as the sixth intelligence service, the lobby was distributed between one or the other institution.

What came out of that was a number of analyses which tried to find out why the results of public opinion research showed a drastic fall in the ruling party's popularity.

After all, NACIONAL has already written about the document which was created as a pioneer work of the joint forces of HIS and the Institute for Applied Social Research. In an interesting projection of Croatian reality, Miroslav Tudjman's scientific and intelligence analysts discovered four scenarios and six phases in the subversion of the HDZ, i.e. of the Croatian president. They identified as the main enemies not only the joint opposition, unions, neocommunism, and Croatian extremism, but, in the first place, Croatian independenand opposition media.

Since it was signed by seemingly serious and clever scientists, that political construction was transformed into a platform for the practical action of the ruling party.

However, that is not the only way in which the Institute for Applied Social Research serves the HDZ in its desperate struggle for leading positions.

Some believe that its Center for Research on Public Opinion is in fact the main actor responsible for President Tudjman's removal of the most popular Croatian prime minister. At the end of 1994, Vesna Kovacevic-Lamza's researchers discovered that Nikica Valentic was more popular than Franjo Tudjman. To the question: "What is your opinion about each of these persons?," 35.7 percent of Croats said "very favorable" about Franjo Tudjman, whereas three times as many said the same about Nikica Valentic.

And then somebody from the so-called right wing of the HDZ allegedly took care that this report of the Institute for Applied Research be read by the Croatian president personally.

Croatia: Commentary Views Izetbegovic's Electoral Messages

AU1105144696 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 9 May 96 p 1

[Commentary by Josip Vricko: "Izetbegovic in Uniform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The head of the Bosnian alleged common leadership of the state, Alija Izetbegovic, exerted himself on the preelection campaign after leaving his sickbed last week. Last month in Bihac, in front of soldiers who pleased him very much by addressing him as "Mr. Chief Commander" and in front of the inhabitants of Bihac, Izetbegovic stated that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be liberated from the Serbs and from the Croats, too. It is interesting that the reaction of the civilians to this war cry, just as of the soldiers whom the HV [Croatian Army] and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] helped liberate the town last year, was very enthusiastic. The streets of Bihac recently saw a parade of all the modern equipment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, under the supervision of the "Chief Commander".

As they would say in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic must have had enough of pity. He obviously enjoyed his messages in Bihac, so he repeated them in Gorazde and shocked General Michael Walker, commander of the land forces of the IFOR [Implementation Force]. "Our fight will not be over until the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina is free," the president with fresh military ambitions paraphrased himself.

On the occasion of the alleged national gathering in Zenica, having criticized Silajdzic by the way, Izetbegovic asked the people of Zenica to learn the meaning of the word reconciliation. Although the president had already been heard telling different stories to different people, his radically different choice of topics for those two towns is significant. Izetbegovic obviously knows what he is doing: Bosnia-Herzegovina does not have to be "liberated" in Zenica, where the Serbs left in the beginning of the war, and from where Croats were driven out during the war. Bosnia-Herzegovina is free there, in the SDA [the Party of Democratic Action] sense of the word. On the other side, Gorazde and Bihac—which were occupied and isolated from Sarajevo for a long time—are still to be prepared for the elections.

Izetbegovic is aware that Sarajevo owes much to those towns that suffered terribly during the war, and he can give them promises if nothing else. Finally, there is something that the IFOR commander has probably failed to pay attention to: In those alleged national gatherings, Izetbegovic spoke primarily as the party leader. As the party leader, he does not care much about the Dayton agreement that Walker is so concerned about.

Croatia: Commentary Examines Establishment of 'Rule by Fear'

AU1005150396 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 5 May 96 p 2

[Commentary by Jelena Lovric: "The Foundations of the Infrastructure of Fear"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian authorities are getting more and more nervous. Evidence of this are the statements made by the president during the past few days, as well as his actions and the actions of his officials.

Tudjman is trying to find his way to the hearts of the people again. That is why he appeared in Maksimir at the celebration on 1 May, wearing a red carnation and claiming he has always felt fine among the working class and the people of Zagreb. Having eaten his beans, he returned to the Presidential Mansion, which compares to Tito's Villa Zagorje as does the Esplanade Hotel to the central train station, as the experts say. The red carnation in Susak's lapel is the best sign of that unnatural, even farcical and counterproductive social demagogy. The minister, as we all know, prefers black, which made the expression on his face very crabby above the red carnation.

The next day, in Okucani, Tudjman showed that his warm mingling with the people was just a campaign trip. On the anniversary of "Bljesak" he reproached and threatened everyone who was not a member of his party. He claimed that the Zagreb case was evidence of the opposition being disrespectful of the constitutional order. He compared the crisis in and the present political situation in Zagreb to Hitler's rise to power. Claiming that the rise of Hitler was made possible by the weakness of the democratic regimes, and that the weakness of the strongest party in Croatia in 1941 enabled "the handful of communists and Pavelic's ustashas to gain power," the president of Croatia insisted that the order must be strict, and that the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] would allow no one to take their place. The Croatian leadership will not permit "the destruction of the HDZ," nor will they let "certain people who are not the majority, but who could still have a negative influence, as the communists and ustashas had in 1941," take over the leadership of Croatia.

Bugaboo Constructions

We have already heard all kinds of things from the Croatian president. Even foreigners could not help but notice his "very peculiar idea of democracy." Another very peculiar thing is his interpretation of the strengths and weaknesses of democratic regimes. According to him, the strongest systems are those without a change in power and with one man as leader. Moreover, he is unbelievably ready to make the worst possible accusations—from the way he had the HSP [Croatian Party of Right] leaders arrested at the beginning of the war, having previously publicly proclaimed they were counterrevolutionaries, to his recent estimation that one in every five Croatians is an enemy of Croatia. However, is it not a little too much to compare the opposition to Hitler? Surely it is a bit inappropriate, considering the company our president has gathered around him. Anyway, his preoccupation with the past leaves less and less room for the future. Is the president lost in history so deeply that he cannot see that we are in 1996, or does he scare the public with Hitlers in order to find excuses for his suspension of the democratic rules? When we remove all the bugaboo constructions, what the president really said was that he would not let go of power, regardless of the will of the people. He has already proved that in Zagreb. According to that, as Cacic said, the elections can only be of a counselling nature. If the results suit his choice—great, he will respect the will of the citizens. If the nation fails to guess what the president has chosen for them—sorry, democracy will have to wait in front of the door.

Tudjman's fans can say that his harsh words should not be taken literally; that the president might have become a bit carried away, but that it is not dangerous. I would not take the statements made by the chief of the state lightly, if only because of the peculiar atmosphere they create. The atmosphere recently created by our president chills me to my bones. His speeches build the foundation for an infrastructure of fear. He provides inspiration, he gives instructions. He rides in front of the file. Little Tudjmans hurry after him, their number tremendous. More and more people want to scare Croatia, they are doing their best to make Croatians tremble and shake with terror. So many things have happened recently that it just cannot be accidental.

Secret Security Service Agent From the Cradle

When VJESNIK published their "arrest warrant" for Cicak—accusing him of cooperation with the Yugoslav Secret Security Service while he was still in diapers—the Croatian public was absolutely astonished. Even those who ordinarily disagree expressed their solidarity with the chairman of the Helsinki Board this time. The reason for that was the professional disgrace of the politically disgusting article. However, there might be a more important reason: This journalistic-police homework established the rule that evidence is not necessary for heavy accusations. If you can accuse Cicak of being a Secret Security Service agent, you can accuse anyone, Iva Banac said—and that is what this "political assassination" explained to Cicak and everybody else. In the usual waving of suspicious files, this text displayed a new quality: It never even tried to provide evidence. Its primary task might be not to be convincing, but to scare people. The lesser the grounds for the accusation, the greater the fear. That means that anyone might be dragged through the mud.

In the meantime, there have been additional explanations of the message. Perhaps spontaneously, but not accidentally, on the same day that VJESNIK attacked Cicak, another member of the Helsinki Board was attacked—this time physically. Slobodan Budak, a respectable lawyer from Zagreb, was beaten up in the center of Zagreb by Mladen Naletilic-Tuta, the informal master of Herzegovina (and its surroundings, it seems), for no particular reason. Having the commander of the infamous Herzegovinian brigade showing his power in Zagreb is not pleasant, but it is even worse that the local police have done nothing—during the incident or later.

At approximately the same time, the editorial offices of the PANORAMA weekly were sealed up and the materials for their next issue confiscated. The cynical explanation that they did not satisfy environmental standards showed that the media hunters were not bothering to make up convincing excuses anymore. A little later, in Split, during an informative conversation in the police station, Viktor Ivancic, the editor in chief of FERAL, was informed that the state lawyer would apply to him the new law on protection of the person and the work of the chief of the state. The president himself demanded that Ivancic be first.

More and More Enemies

Therefore, we can conclude that President Tudjman is right—there are more and more enemies every day. However, things are not funny, although they might seem comical sometimes. The recent statement by Stracabosko, who was arrested, shows the utterly serious nature of things: He said he had killed Marcelo Popovic because he was told that Popovic was an enemy of Croatia. He did not check the allegation, he shot the man first. Obviously such allegations are taken very seriously by some people. Anyway, an execution or two is probably necessary in order to establish the infrastucture of a rule by fear. Threats alone are not convincing enough.

It is so sad and hopeless to watch the president do the things he is doing to himself. He is miserable and simultaneously dangerous, because he cannot accept reality. He cannot accept that his formula is not very efficient anymore, that it has lost efficiency. He feels that the will of the voters that makes up every power is relentlessly slipping through his fingers. In his attempts to stop the slipping, he makes the usual mistake—it does not help to make a fist and clench it. We know how it goes. Therefore, before things in Croatia get better, they might get much worse.

Croatia: Commentary Dismisses 'Euroslavia' Threat

AU1005103896 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 3 May 96 p 9

[Commentary by Silvia P. Stazic: "Euroslavia: A Danger or Only Utopia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Could it be that a single headline in an Italian newspaper, "Euroslavia Is Coming," and just a few, admittedly strange, international meetings on a similar theme organized by marginal political institutions were the reason for the Croatian leadership to start the orchestrated symphony about "the horror of a new Yugoslavia that is haunting Croatia?" Or is the reason much more serious? For a relatively long time, the Croatian public has been confronted with the official Croatian attitude that the danger of a new Yugoslavia is not over for Croatia and, apart from that, the idea has supporters in Croatia. Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia, warned in his latest interview of just such a possibility.

Ivo Sanadar, the chairman of the President's Office, dedicated a whole speech to that topic in a famous meeting of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] Main Committee. Quoting the above headline, he said that it confirmed that "this was no longer just a 'Yugonostalgic' idea, but a systematic approach to a solution to the future life in the area." As proof, Mr. Sanader mentioned that the word group "south of Slovenia and north of Greece" appeared in the EU after the Dayton agreement, which implied not only a common economic but also a political space of the former Yugoslavia.

A Grain of Truth

More or less "real" importance is being attached to this problem at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The initiatives started in this direction are being neither underestimated nor overestimated. It is generally considered that "this danger exists, but it is not a fire-breathing dragon." Initiatives to create a conglomeration in the space of the former Yugoslavia appear on various levels from time to time, but they are only a search for a way to organize this space. The Council of Europe only wants to establish peace and safety in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover "the resurrection of Yugoslavia on the old principles" has never been a topic of negotiations in bilateral meetings.

"Nor could it have been, since the official policy of no country, from Afghanistan to Zaire, supports the restoration of the former Yugoslavia," claims Stjepan Andrlic, acting head of the Administration for Multilateral Political Relations. Initiatives of a similar content can mainly be heard in multilateral meetings in which no decisions about international policy are made. This is, in other words, an internationally disseminated opinion rather than a real international policy. Since there must be a grain of truth in all propaganda, we must find where that grain is hidden regarding the thesis that there is the intention of returning Croatia to Yugoslavia, whereupon it will be clear how serious the danger is.

"There are initiatives for the creation of some kind of good neighborly relations or for a regional grouping in the former Yugoslavia, but they do not connote the restoration of the former state," Andrlic says. This does not mean, however, that Croatian diplomacy can "sleep soundly," since "once bitten, twice shy," which means that every such attempt should be responded to aggressively. What is the real problem? After the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and the former Yugoslavia collapsed, there appeared the need for a redefinition of the new order, that is the regional grouping. In that sense, there are already three regional organizations within the EU: the Central European Initiative, the Baltic States Council, and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Croatia, as well as other successors to the former Yugoslavia, is a member of the Central European Initiative, which was recently joined by Bulgaria and Romania. The EU has realized, however, that that integration is too big, so it wants to create a new union that would include Southeastern Europe, for the purpose of better work. This would enable it to solve two problems at once. The number of Central European EU countries would be reduced, since there are too many of them already and the problem of the southeast would be solved in that Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania would be gathered together in a regional organization that would interact collectively with the EU.

"This is the initiative that Carl Bildt called 'south of Slovenia and north of Greece,' which is increasingly declining, although no alternative has yet been offered," Andrlic recalled and added: "This idea need not be damned, especially because its intention was to organize the space on the basis of good-neighborly and civilized relations that would interact with the EU as an association."

"Impure Powers"

Can it be concluded from this that "impure powers" want to return Croatia to the outmoded state? Obviously not, since terms like "good-neighborly relations" are used, which Croatia also wants. It is our "bad luck," however, that from the geographical point of view we can be both Central and Southeastern Europe. It is clear that Croatia has no cultural or civilizational ties, and even fewer political and spiritual ties, with Albania or Romania, but it is a matter of Croatian domestic policy to force ourselves on Europe with our economy and democracy.

This is reflected in the attitude of the two strongest opposition parties, the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] and the SDP [Social Democratic Party]. HSLS Vice Chairman Jozo Rados says this: "Croatia is confronted with many dangers, two of which are that it is underdeveloped and undemocratic. Such is state is liable for every other kind of danger. If Croatia is strong enough, and the prerequisite for that is that it is democratic, it will succeed in pursuing an independent policy and avoiding that kind of danger."

Andrlic comments on the Euroslavia idea as an example of how "a noble idea can be misused." The Euroslavia project included only cooperation among towns, municipalities, and regions in southeastern Europe, but at the moment when it changed from an informal arrangement to a formal one, that is to the Council of Europe, it began, according to Andrlic, "being misused in the way that the unacceptable political connotation of a new brotherhood and unity [Titoist Pan-Yugoslav slogan] has been added to it." Andrlic says that permanent initiatives to keep Croatia in the Balkans and to link it to Yugoslavia can be seen in proposals that are coming for the establishment of guilds on the level of the whole region.

"Such an initiative came from the International Association of War Veterans, who suggested that a round table be organized, in which both the veterans from Serbia and Croatia would participate. Can you imagine what would happen if Arkan-followers and members of the Croatian Hvidra [not further specified; possibly humorous reference to Croatian Defense Council (HVO) members; 'vidra' is Serbo-Croatian for an otter] met at such a gathering? A similar idea was behind the preparation of a meeting of ministers of Balkan countries, which Croatia attended only as an observer, since it has no other interest," Andrlic says.

Are these examples, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also considers products of "old-fashioned diplomats," so important and serious that warnings must come from the highest level of the Croatian leadership about the Croatian national interests being at stake? Is the unofficial policy statement that the aim of all these initiatives is "to create pressure, with the aim of destroying Croatia, so that people can come to power who will not defend Croatian national interests so resolutely" not more appropriate for ordinary manipulation, that reminds one of the creation "of internal and external enemies" rather than being a real danger to Croatia?

Europe Denies

Tomac explains that "until last year there were circles in the world that were working on a confederation that would be established at the appropriate moment, which they called 'Adriatic' or 'Balkan' because of the aversion to Yugoslavia, but since most of the Croatian territory has been liberated, this danger does not exist any longer." Tomac considers that a maximum will be required from Croatia because of its position; it will be insisted that it establishes good-neighborly relations, thus securing a safe transit of people and commodities eastward. He adds that "Croatia has finally been recognized as an independent and sovereign country, which proves that the international factors have realized that a new Yugoslavia in this region is not possible any longer." So why is it official Croatian policy to point again, even more aggressively than before, to the danger of a new Yugoslavia?

The representatives of the two strongest opposition parties, Tomac and Rados, consider that the danger of

Yugoslavia is being exaggerated because of Croatian domestic policy. They also expect the rhetoric about a new Yugoslavia to intensify during election time. With a lack of tangible results in their reign, the HDZ will, according to Rados's predictions, project the fear of a new Yugoslavia and the political coalition that, if it comes to pass, it will destroy all the achievements and drag Croatia into a kind of Balkan association. This is already a well known technique, Rados claims, which boils down to creating fear and representing oneself as the savior.

Tomac thinks that by spreading the fear of a new Yugoslavia in Croatia, the HDZ wants to justify annulling the results of the latest election and insisting on its ruling position regardless of the democratic will of the citizens. Therefore, when a tentative Yugoslavia is discussed, it is always mentioned, Tomac explains, that a change in the ruling power could bring someone to power who wants a Balkan association. It is clear that this is only propaganda. Tomac claims that the opposition has all the time been harsher toward Belgrade and Milosevic than the HDZ, and Rados that the opposition parties are, according to their programs and working methods, "more European than the ruling movement." There are people in the ruling system who would like politics to be carried on in the Balkan way, since everything is possible with such a policy, no one is held responsible for his actions, and one can stay in power for as long as one wants to. The leaders of the two opposition parties hope that that option will not win through. The opposition considers that if the danger of Yugoslavia is already real or if it becomes real, the HDZ ought to be blamed for that more than any opposition party. It is also thought that the concept of a European order has not been completed yet and will not be soon. An ideal opportunity for Croatia to show where it belongs is its membership in the Council of Europe, which opens many doors. Apart from that, membership of it considerably hampers the intentions of the official Croatian leadership to convince citizens that "there are attempts to push us into Yugoslavia." Europe has done what should have been done, it has given Croatia the opportunity, and it is up to Croatia to make use of it and prove that it is a central European country.

FYROM: Gligorov Views Relations With France, Greece

AU1005191396 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1330 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Toni Glamcevski reports from Paris that the official visit of a high-ranking Macedonian delegation to Paris headed by President Kiro Gligorov and including Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski ended with Gligorov's speech at the Foreign Institute in Paris last night. This was Gligorov's second visit to this Institute, where he expressed the views of our country on current European trends, the situation in Europe and the Balkans, and our long-term aspirations and goals. Regarding the new European structure [as heard], President Gligorov reviewed the so-called question of the regionalization of Europe as a preparation for association with the European Union. Regionalization as an approach is justified, Gligorov said, but only if it is founded on real principles. According to Gligorov, the worst alternative would be a possible approach of imposed regional integrations and committee-designed models that would again create European backwaters. Regionalization—yes, but not instead of European integration, Gligorov underlined. In expressing the Macedonian views on the situation in the Balkans, he said that the solution should be searched for in the Europeanization of the Balkans. President Gligorov expressed optimism regarding the future in the Balkans, and he supported his optimism with the example of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

After his half-hour speech, the president was asked many questions, to which he gave full answers and emphasized that the economic relations with France are developing, that the Macedonian market is open to French products, and that there will soon begin a gradual realization of the Vardar Valley project, the study for which is already complete. As for cultural exchange, he said that this is another important question in the relations. At the beginning of next year, Macedonian culture will be exhibited in Paris, but it is also necessary to increase the presence of the French language in Macedonia, for which bilateral visits have been scheduled.

Regarding the name and the negotiations in New York, as well as Macedonian-Greek relations, President Gligorov said that he is satisfied with the realization of the accord that was reached in New York because it is of historical importance for us that Greece has recognized Macedonia as an independent country within its borders. The negotiations on the name must not affect the development of relations between the two countries. We are witnessing a rising exchange of goods and people between the two countries. He said that he told De Charette that it is easier to reach an agreement with Greek businessmen than with the politicians, to which De Charette replied that this was normal. In essence, there are no problems between Macedonia and Greece, Gligorov said. The problem of the name is a forced emotional issue, Gligorov said and concluded that the attitiudes of the current Greek Government are slowly evolving. Gligorov stressed that patience is needed for the negotiators to solve the question and that he is not too optimistic on this question.

As for the possibility of the creation of a new hotbed of crisis in the Balkans, Gligorov expressed his concern about the announced withdrawal of U.S. and other troops from Bosnia, as well as about the situation in Kosovo, which is only favorable for extremists.

FYROM: Albanians Condemn Gligorov Statement

AU1005162996 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 9 May 96 p 8

[Unattributed report: "The Expression 'Separatists'—An Atavism of Bygone Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Regarding President Gligorov's interview with the German newspaper FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, the Main Presidency of the Republican Party for People's Unity has concluded that the statement on Tetovo University is imprudent, irritating, and destabilizing. You, Mr. Chairman, know quite well that Tetovo University was founded by the Albanian political authorities. The act was signed by all the Albanian political parties, associations, deputies, and counselors of communal conventions, and it was supported by all the Albanian people and the intelligentsia in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

We are surprised at how you can consider a partner in a "coalition" when he has also signed in support of founding Tetovo University [sentence as published]. At the same time, Mr. Chairman, can you tell us where you got the idea that "Albanians consider Macedonia their homeland and that there are some separatists among them." The expression "separatists" is an atavism of bygone power, and we do not think that this was said casually, but was meant to have a dangerous political motive, which, at this time, does not contribute to peace and stability. Your interview is controversial. You declare that all the problems can be solved through tolerance and dialogue, whereas in your interview you come off as [probably not] tolerating the one thing that is most precious in contemporary civilization—the education of people with whom you want to live together—stresses the statement by the Republican Party for People's Unity.

FYROM: PDPA-NDP Deputies Meet OSCE Official

AU1005203996 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 10 May 96 p 8

[Report by "I.M.": "Need for a Serious Dialogue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 9 May—The parliamentary group of the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians [PDPA—PPDSh in Albanian] and the People's Democratic Party [NDP—PDP in Albanian] in the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Assembly today met with the chief of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Skopje, Ambassador Tore Bog, and his assistant Zhylien Jejts. [name as published]

The parliamentary group coordinator, Rrahmi Tuda, and Deputies Sali Ramadani, Sami Ibrahimi, and Hysni Shaqiri voiced their concerns regarding the current political situation. They stated that their demands are neglected by the Macedonian Assembly, stressing the vital issue—Tetovo University—and the institutionalization of this higher educational and scientific institution. They also discussed the aggravation of relations in parliament and with the government officials.

Rrahmi Tuda stressed the indispensability of establishing a serious dialogue between Albanians and the Macedonian authorities for a rational solution to Tetovo University and the open Albanian issue in Macedonia.

The ignoring, dragging, and disregarding of the Tetovo University issue by the officials and powerholders in Macedonia leaves room for the destabilization of Macedonia even beyond, something that would neither benefit the Albanians nor the Macedonians nor the national minorities in this binational state.

FYROM: Assembly To Dismiss PDPA Deputy Xhaferri

AU1005182096 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 10 May 96 p 4

[Article by "I.M.": "Arber Xhaferri Proposed To Be Dismissed From Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 9 May—The Nomination Committee of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] parliament today examined the proposal of Macedonian Assembly Chairman Tito Petkovski to dismiss Arben Xhaferri, deputy of the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia [PDPA—PPDSh in Albanian], for failing to attend sessions for six months, as envisaged in the regulation book. This proposal was approved by the deputies except for Mevlan Tahiri, who abstained from voting. The proposal is expected to be voted on at the next assembly meeting. If 81 deputies vote in favor, new elections will be announced for Constituency 73 in Tetovo.

FYROM: LP Chairman Andov Discusses Party's Views

AU0705122696 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 3 May 96 pp 23-26

[Interview with Stojan Andov, chairman of the Liberal Party and former assembly chairman, by Sinisa Stankovic; place and date not given: "The Vote of the Betrayed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stankovic] Is it true that the Alliance for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] had to be broken up? Who decided on "the breakup of the Alliance and on expelling the Liberals from Government?"

[Andov] From an objective and political point of view, the Alliance did not have to be broken up until the elections. It was a defined political grouping for which the citizens voted in the elections. If anybody had wished to break up the Alliance, he should first have defined his program and then run for the elections. I tried to explain how it was decided to break up the Alliance and expel the Liberals from Government, and I did not invent anything, all this could be read in your magazine. The interviews of the former minister of the interior and the minister of foreign affairs were published in your paper, and in these interviews they explicitly exposed their concept, and I dare say that they insisted on changing the government without reference to the elections at all. So, the way in which the whole operation was performed is clear and there is nothing that I can add to it, these are their own words.

[Stankovic] You attacked the concept about "a small group of people from the ranks of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance for Macedonia] that wants to take responsibility for the country." Is it true that the Alliance broke up because you and the Liberals obstructed this concept? Could you not agree with the "small group"? Is it not true that the Liberal Party [LP] was the first to break up the Alliance by accepting the policy of disharmony with the SDSM and its privileged position in the Government?

[Andov] I just indicated that it [the concept] exists and is now functioning. I did not invent this, it was signed by the people from the "small group." Their approach did not offer an opportunity for an agreement. We asked in LIBERAL [LP paper] for details about the investigation in the assassination attempt against the president and for exposing those responsible for all the slip-ups, and they were afraid of this. On the other hand, we have a different basic approach, because the Liberals cannot even conceive of participating in a government that may grab power against the will of the citizens. We start from the basic principle that says that power is in the hands of the citizens and that they decide about the results of the elections. If somebody wants to take power, as is the "small group," he must define a program, run for the elections, and then win. The allegations that the LP broke up the Alliance are ridiculous because when the "small group" realized that their concept would not be accepted by the citizens, they activated different people who were there to prove that the Alliance was not broken up by those who did not want it and actually broke it up, but by the Liberals. This story is meant for the voters and intended to befog the real situation.

[Stankovic] How do you assess Gligorov's position in the period after the breakup of the Alliance?

[Andov] I only insisted on the protection of the constitutional powers of President Gligorov and we in the LP believe that he has to fulfill his powers. I think that the action for the collection of signatures for new elections, as well as our initiatives in the Parliament, were not in favor of presidential, but parliamentary elections.

[Stankovic] Do you agree that, with the breakup of the Alliance, Mr. Gligorov was marginalized, and that this was a second "political assassination attempt" against him?

[Andov] We insist on the constitutional powers of the president for the sake of avoiding a chaotic seizure of power. We do not try to view anybody's intentions. Those who intended to marginalize the president said this in public, and to this we are generally opposed since we respect the legitimacy that he is given by the Constitution.

[Stankovic] After the first round of the 1994 elections, you said that in the Alliance "we are not very much concerned with the absence of a parliamentary opposition, because it came as a result of the citizens' will...." What is your present view on this question, as well as on the status of the parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition?

[Andov] I have the impression that you extracted a phrase from the whole text of my statement and that you are trying to emphasize this as my basic view. I have said many times that our system implies parliamentary opposition and that the democratic system can be complete only if this is true. You are just quoting my answer to the threat of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the DP [Democratic Party] that they would withdraw from the elections after the first round. I hoped that we would dissuade them and that they would not withdraw from the elections because it was my firm belief that they would have won at least 20 seats in parliament. The situation is specific because even those parties who won over 10 percent of the votes—that is, these parties have influence among the citizens—have now joined an extraparliamentary opposition, although the parliamentary system does not recognize an extraparliamentary opposition, only ruling parties and parties in opposition. So, our transitional situation, which emerges as a result of numerous ambiguities in political life, creates conditions for parties outside parliament.

[Stankovic] Parties that are certainly politically powerful....

[Andov] Parties with their own members, because ultimately, the parties exist if they have members.

[Stankovic] How does it feel to be in opposition? Your political opponents accuse you and say that you will not be able to live without the privileges, without your Mercedes. What do you think about the accusations of some extraparliamentary opposition parties that claim that you are not a real "opposition," that "Sadam's intimate feelings" do not guarantee the development of democratic processes?

[Andov] These allegations do not come from serious people, of course. The parliament itself proves what kind of an opposition we are, and a number of the people that are accusing us cannot even come near the parliament because they did not receive even 200 votes in the last elections. How can they judge somebody's behavior? I am simply not interested in privileges. As you know, I had the right to a residential house in Vodno [Skopje residential area], but I did not exercise this right. In my political life, which has been filled with different conditions, I have always acted according to my own political creed. This is what counted for me and not residential houses, armchairs, or a Mercedes.... I have proven this and the people have realized this. There have always been and there will always be people who think that they have the right to act as "supreme judges," who disqualify or praise other persons. The same "judges" who used to evaluate my attitude are today in the margins of history.

[Stankovic] Are the political life and underground [life] a product of our own mentality, or are the fabrication of affairs and serious accusations just a struggle in the period in which we live?

[Andov] Our political underground is headed by a monopoly, and you are aware of this. It has its system and mechanisms for spreading rumors, but I have never been concerned with this because this has also proven to be a fake. As a matter of fact, these are the remnants of another time, based on the loathing and underestimation that these people have for the citizens.

[Stankovic] Why do you believe that Macedonia's international position has deteriorated? In your opinion, what was the reason for the change in the draft agreement with the European Union?

[Andov] I spoke about this problem in my recent interview for NOVA MAKEDONIJA. I spoke about some fears and assessments that were based on some facts that I knew then. This is a very dynamic matter, and it needs great attention. There are some new announcements now. The visit of Mr. Jacques Santerre, president of the European Commission, as well as the visit of Ms. Susanna Agnelli, president of the EU Council of Ministers, which are to take place in May, are aimed at promoting the "regional approach." So, the EU is persistent and resolute in promoting this approach. They will also visit Zagreb, Belgrade, Tirana, and Skopje. This "region" will obviously encompass also Bosnia-Herzegovina later on. It is clear that this has nothing to do with some irreplaceable economic advantages, with the creation of a supernational economic optimum, but the reasons are of an internal political nature. As far as the FRY and Croatia are concerned, it is clear that the development of democratic processes in these countries is uncertain. How can we explain Albania's and our country's inclusion in this "region" of doubtful and precarious political future? The great possibility for a change in the Albanian government in the upcoming elections—in which the party that is now called socialist may win, but which is in fact a continuation of Enver Hoxha's party—is a sufficient reason for this country to be treated separately and to be placed in the "region." If, in our country, all the power is grabbed by the party that was in power before the multiparty system, and not by elections but by manipulations, is this not a sufficient reason for Europe to change its attitude toward the Republic of Macedonia?

[Stankovic] Do you mean to say that, as long as the government was composed in a different way, that is, while the Liberals participated in the government, they acted as a guarantor to the European Union?

[Andov] The presence of the Liberals in the government symbolized that the regime was not a simple continuity of the old system, that a party that did not exist in the old system was participating and that was the only party in Macedonia that was accepted by the European political associations. If this is not of importance for somebody here, it means that the old system is blocking his thoughts.

[Stankovic] You stated that something significant is taking place in the state and that they [European Union] had assessed that this country was entering a different situation and that they have to expose it [the country] to an additional test. Do you think that the European Union would respond to the internal political turmoil in Macedonia in such a way? Starting from the "mini Marshall Plan" to the TIR plates?

[Andov] If we do not become aware of this, we will face great lasting consequences. If we plunge our head in the sand, we will suffer and we will be the only ones to be blamed.

[Stankovic] When your initiative for creating a commission to investigate the assassination attempt against the President failed, you fiercely attacked the former minister of the interior, Mr. Frckovcki, Prime Minister Crvenkovski, and the entire SDSM parliamentary group—you said that "they refuse to discuss the investigation because they are hiding something!" In Mr. Frckovski's statements after the assassination attempt, many recognized your party as the one that was attacked, or its affiliates.... Is there a feeling of historical responsibility because of such mutual accusations?

[Andov] I did not attack anybody, I just gave facts. We wanted to form a commission to investigate these activities, but the SDSM prevented us. The facts had to be determined and presented in public. We informed the president of the Republic about our idea, but neither he, nor we, were interested in forming a commission as the one that was formed on the occasion of the events in Bit-Pazar, which never held a meeting, or another similar commission on the events in Kuklis.

The LP's parliamentary group informed Mr. Gligorov that they had proposed me for president of this commission because they believed that all questions would be reviewed and the facts determined. The president discussed this with Crvenkovski, Petkovski, and Popovski from the SDSM and they told him that I should not be the president but that it was up to the Liberals to decide. This is what we were told. However, the SDSM presidency had a later meeting at which it came to a different decision. We cannot understand how a party can decide on what another person from another party will be charged with. This possibility for the "Politbureau" of the SDSM to decide about state matters obstructed our intention to form a commission. Regarding the "fierce attacks," Minister Frckovski himself said that he had a moral responsibility, but he did not have the courage to submit his resignation, he only offered it. Nevertheless, he stated his feelings and nobody can release him from his personal feelings—he remains responsible for not preventing the assassination attempt and for not discovering the perpetrators. The prime minister did not accept his resignation; he explained that he wanted to give the minister more time to speed up and complete the investigation. The minister did neither the one nor the other, and the prime minister's responsibility has thus become greater, and he cannot be released from his personal responsibility either.

[Stankovic] The public feels that the most important matter is to speak about the assassination attempt after all. Is this not more important than whether you or Mr. Krstevski will head the commission?

[Andov] We are starting from this public interest. We did not want to have a commission like the one on Bit-Pazar and to cheat the public, but we wanted a commission that would really disclose matters. This is exactly why our party decided about who was to head this commission.

[Stankovic] What is your opinion about the "court games" after the assassination attempt, about the orders for closing down the president's cabinet, about the allegations that you tried to seize the moment to accomplish your own personal goals?

[Andov] After the president had undergone the operation, everybody knew that he was going to survive, and we also hoped that he would return to office. I believed that we had to act in accordance with the constitutional regulation for the temporary replacement of the president in order to prevent the application of another regulation according to which the president can be proclaimed incapable of performing his duties. I did not allow this regulation to be implemented, and we reached an agreement with Branko Crvenkovski, and after that we announced from the president's office that I was going to replace him. This is according to the Constitution. Some new games began at that time with the aim of creating a belief that the president would not go back to his office. The foreign mass media were the loudest, but it was fed from the "domestic kitchen." The parliament's offices were bombed by questions from journalists who did not present themselves but were simply trying to find out the reasons. There was pressure to evade the constitutional regulation on which we had agreed.

[Stankovic] Why did you not ask for an opinion of the Constitutional Court?

[Andov] It would have meant that, while the president was unconscious, we were asking someone, perhaps the doctors, whether he would return to his office. Who could have said such a thing at that time? I did not allow this to be done, and I prevented all such intentions. This resulted in attacks against me, although I did not seize power but only did what I was obliged to do according to the Constitution. As for closing down cabinets, I have never heard the prime minister say such a thing. If anything has been done without my approval, it was done unconstitutionally, and the prime minister does not have such power. My firm resolve was to avoid chaos, and this created some nervousness among some people who are now boasting of having closed down some things [president's cabinet].

[Stankovic] During the first dissociation of the LP from the government, in its 1993 platform, there were very strong remarks against the activities of the police: The police had never before influenced the creation of the political life and atmosphere in the country. The VMRO-DPMNE had a similar view at the same time, but the LP view was often interpreted as your personal animosity toward the Minister [of interior] at that time. What is your present view?

[Andov] I do not have any personal animosity against Mr. Frckovski. We have never had any personal disputes. I am always very tolerant. My views about the police are based on the great danger that it can hinder the development of democratic processes in the state. From police sources, and from the minister himself, there emerge characterizations about the political parties, and this is not allowed in any other state. The voters are the ones who judge the parties, and some party's individuals that may be working against the Constitution and the Laws should be brought to court. I believe that what Frckovski was doing as minister of the interior was a manipulation with the police because he was using this body of the state to enhance the power of his own party or of some individuals. This is a typical abuse of office. These things are impermissible in the democratic world and they are encountered only in authoritarian and police regimes. We cannot look like a western democratic country if we our leading personalities perform undemocratic activities.

[Stankovic] What is your present view about the car accident that you had four years ago, which was the subject of much speculation?

[Andov] First, a car certainly does not turn over if it is in order. The police car in front of us was driving at the same speed and under the same circumstances, but it did not have an accident. Second, whenever there is an accident, even a minor one, the police arrive on the scene. In my case, they did not come; they said the accident was unimportant. Third, it is a fact that three months before the accident, I was confronted at a meeting at the Chamber of Commerce, where I opposed the smuggling of oil to FRY and said that if this were important for the country, then it had to be done in agreement with the international community and under the control of the state, and not to be transformed into war profiteering that would disqualify and mark us as unscrupulous in the eyes of our northern neighbor. It seems that I threatened somebody's interests and then the car accident followed.

[Stankovic] Since this car accident has remained unsolved even now and it was followed by the assassination attempt against the president, are you frightened?

[Andov] First, nobody was interested in clearing up my car accident. Second, nothing has been discovered in the assassination attempt against the president. Third, am I afraid of being killed? No, I think that another car accident is possible, but it would be too great a risk for them to be discovered. I am 60 years old, and I have had a full and active life. I am not afraid of dying.

[Stankovic] All right, you are not afraid, but what about ordinary people?

[Andov] I believe that the citizens are exposed to great irresponsibility and insecurity. How can the ordinary people believe they are safe if the president of the state is not? These are big weaknesses in the state's security system. We wanted to discuss this in parliament, but we were obstructed. We wanted to discuss information about the citizens' security so as to create a climate that will arouse protest among the citizens against violence.

[Stankovic] In April 1994, you said that "for a safer perspective, for a stable democratic development, it is necessary to link some basic state interests with the president's authority. This is why we need stronger presidential power." What is your present view in this regard?

[Andov] I thought that, while we were rushing to adopt the Constitution in order to avoid a catastrophe in Macedonia because of the undefined situation in the country and the SFRY's dissolution, "some matters had not been evaluated properly." We do not have a government with broad legitimacy, and its members are not members of parliament, so their legitimacy is not derived from the votes of the electoral body. Some people who have never been in politics before, and even people who lost in the elections, have now become ministers, or deputy ministers; such is the case in this government. So, these people have great power, but lack the confidence of the citizens. If we want the executive power in Macedonia to have a stronger role, then the ministers must be elected from the ranks of the members of parliament, as is the usual practice in the world. When the ministers are not from the parliament, they are called as members of the administration, and they are appointed by the president; the parliament does not vote for them but can give a vote of no-confidence. I subsequently said that the government had a position that was unchecked by the citizens, and I believed that if the president had a stronger role, this could act as a counterbalance.

[Stankovic] It is true that a constitution cannot be drawn up in the interest of some people, and there were many allegations that you were preparing the ground for the time when you would act as a president.

[Andov] It is sad that some people see matters in such a way and that they are not interested in the real problems but only in personal relations. There is a great fear that something would be done for personal reasons, and people who come to power often see their personal opportunities in this. This is bad. I have neither acted in this way, nor have I thought so.

[Stankovic] You were accused of putting pressure on Mr. Gligorov to join your party at the time of the breakup of the Alliance for Macedonia. What is your opinion about the thesis that President Gligorov played a successful "two-timing game" with you and with Mr. Crvenkovski at the time of the pressure? What are your present relations with the president?

[Andov] I am an experienced man and I believe that I cannot be persuaded against my beliefs. It is an illusion for me to think that there is a possibility of Mr. Gligorov's being talked into something that he disagrees with. We have never tried to use his name or office for party goals. This is neither good for him, nor for the state, let alone the party. We do not need this because it creates additional obligations that are outside our party's program. Today I believe that the imbalance in the relations in the government leads to chaotic situations that are unfortunately long-lasting. Regarding Mr. Gligorov's so-called two-timing game, I do not believe that he had any intention of playing it with me. These are stories that are put forth by political entertainers. Our personal relations have always been correct.

[Stankovic] The SDSM newspaper DEMOKRATIJA in the period of the breakup of the Alliance tried to "defend" you from the "young lions" in the LP.

[Andov] The citizens of Macedonia would not easily understand why I left the position of assembly chairman. I tried to explain my views, and everybody can either accept it or give it another interpretation. This does not mean that Andov was chased or attacked because I was not chased; on the contrary, they were trying to persuade me to stay in office. At that time, some theses were launched about disputes and misunderstanding inside the LP itself as a result of the activities of some SDSM circles that are close to the police and who are inventing similar "theses" in connection with some other parties as well. You remember all the inventions around [former foreign minister] Stevo Crvenkovski at that time, and I can tell you that 11 of our members of parliament were pressured to change parties, but, in fact, nobody accepted such offers. These illusions are aimed at creating a one-party system. Unfortunately there are still some people who want to do this.

[Stankovic] Do you feel responsible for the subjugated position of the legislative branch vis-a-vis the executive branch in the recent past?

[Andov] During the time I headed it, the assembly had a different function in the state. I insisted on respecting constitutional regulations which said that power belongs to the citizens and that the parliament has legislative power because it has been elected by the citizens themselves. The constitution says that the executive branch is a real branch of government with special powers, but it does not originate from the will of the citizens. The government cannot envoke the will of the citizens during the presidential elections because it does not appoint the ministers. This is why I believed that when the "executive branch shows its teeth to the parliament," it denies the basic principle, that is that power belongs to the citizens.

[Stankovic] Yes, but the elected officials have the credibility of the party that has received the largest number of votes.

[Andov] In the West, in the period between elections, parties do not have sessions, and their presidents do not adopt any views. It is bad if the government is linked to any party or to the decisions of the party leadership because we will be turned back to the period before the multiparty system. In this case, no party received credibility: In the elections, all the candidates of the Alliance for Macedonia were candidates of the three parties, and therefore of the LP as well.

[Stankovic] Can the assembly fight for another relationship with the government?

[Andov] I thought it could. I believe that the assembly has had successes in this area. One of the disputes concerned the fact that the prime minister asked me to hold another session for the election of a new government, although this is contrary to the constitution. My refusal was interpreted in different ways, but I claim that the parliament could have opposed such "ambitions" of the government.

[Stankovic] What attitude will the LP and you have about the 200,000 signatures collected for a referendum on early elections. What is your comment on Gligorov's statement about this question in VECERNJI LIST?

[Andov] There is no need to comment on statements of the president because I do not think that it is favorable for the state. My opinion is that the fact that over 200,000 signatures were collected in four days, which is 11 percent of the total population or 16 percent of the voting body, shows that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the government. In France, in 1958, the ruling coalition had a majority in parliament, but there was great dissatisfaction among the citizens and that was respected by the parliament. A referendum was organized, and the parliament was dissolved, after which a new political force came to power headed by De Gaulle, who led France through the most difficult period of decolonization. In 1969, De Gaulle, who had the majority in parliament and full power, realized the dissatisfaction of the citizens and proposed a referendum that obliged him, if his proposals were rejected, to withdraw from power. This constitutes respect for the citizens' will as the basic measurement of democratic orientation and of the character of any power. The moment there is the feeling that those in government are not trusted by the citizens, new elections should be organized. It is not the time for justifications against elections because this is just a proof that there is a fear of the results of the elections.

[Stankovic] There is a difference between feelings and laws....

[Andov] These are not just feelings if 200,000 people sign with their ID number. This is a political determination. The laws that are adopted by the parliamentary majority in a rush, without the citizens' confidence, represent a kind of a pressure against the will of the citizens. However, I hope that there will not be any unrest, and this is the most important. If the people believe that their wishes are persistently denied, anything is possible. We, as a party, must do our best to prevent such an outcome. I am not interested in avoiding a referendum for new elections because it is logical that if there is such a dissatisfaction, the power must be abandoned. How can they rule?

[Stankovic] There is the fact that there are some political organizations in Macedonia which are able to collect a sufficient number of signatures for a referendum on new elections every six months. Then what?

[Andov] The SDSM should try to collect 220,000 signatures now. This is nothing but a pretext. The trade union, as a mass organization, did not succeed in collecting a sufficient number of signatures. Why?

Are you aware of the importance of collecting 220,000 signatures in four days? Who knows how many more would have been collected if the action had continued. A lot of people were afraid to sign.

[Stankovic] Is it not true that the dissatisfaction of these 200,000 people who signed has been piling up in the past period, that is in the period when you participated in the government? Has the LP not created dissatisfaction among the people as well?

[Andov] No. The dissatisfaction was created after the breakup of the Alliance for Macedonia which did not have the time to fulfill its program. That is because a party insisted on seizing power by manipulating the voters. I believe that not more than 30,000 signatures would have been collected before the collapse of the Alliance. The people are asking for a change in the government in which they have lost confidence.

[Stankovic] It seems, in your opinion, that the cheated voters who were for the Alliance are giving points to the DP and VMRO-DPMNE.

[Andov] In your opinion, does it seem that all those who are dissatisfied because of the unconstitutional rule of the SDSM and their manipulations would vote for VMRO-DPMNE and DP? And is this assumption sufficient ground for the SDSM to be in power for the next 50 years regardless of the will of the voters?

[Stankovic] What is your view about your party's chances at the next (regular or early) elections? Are you afraid of the assessment that there are possibilities for the LP to be politically marginalized because of its small membership and the small number of supporters?

[Andov] I cannot say anything about the local elections because I do not know when or how they are going to be organized, and I do not know what the new territorial division means or what tricks have been done in this field. I believe that the citizens respect our decision to pass into opposition and that a great number of them take us as a factor that is consistent and persistent in the struggle for democracy in the state. There are numerous forecasts saying that we will collapse and that we will disappear from the political scene. In spite of all these forecasts, our party is becoming stronger and more influential every day.

[Stankovic] What is the LP's view on possible coalitions with the extraparliamentary opposition? There is the impression that the VMRO-DPMNE is not closing its doors and that the DP is not in the mood to start a closer cooperation.

[Andov] In the DP, some people expect to be rewarded for their attacks against our party and thus become high-ranking officials in the ministries and so on. I think that the largest number of DP members do not abhor the LP, and that those who are trying to obtain something from the government are the ones that are usually attacking us. It is still early to speak of some coalitions because we adopt such decisions in relation to specific political events, but I believe that our party is becoming a clear and politically defined political factor. We hope to be the pioneers of a new era because all the previous ideas and proposals for reforms came from us. We believe that if the majority system is changed into proportional or mixed electoral system, there will be conditions allowing us to run in the elections independently.

[Stankovic] What are your assessments about the changes in Makedonija, the public enterprise for airport services?

[Andov] I believe that this has to do with a party purge and the attempts of a party to occupy the whole territory.

[Stankovic] Is it the Socialist Party?

[Andov] It is the more powerful party. What can the Socialist Party do here? The SDSM tried to introduce the same thing in the other parties as well, like: One state, one party. This is what is taking place right now. There will be pressures against companies which are headed by people who are not members of the SDSM, then against those who became members of the SDSM at a later stage, particularly those who are believed to be inclined to our party. Pressures have begun in the mass media, in the universities, and so on.

[Stankovic] Was the same not taking place in the past period in connection with the VMRO-DPMNE's supporters? Did the government in which your party participated not "cleanse" those who did not share its opinion?

[Andov] It did not happen to such an extent because we opposed such a practice. Let me recall the criticism that we expressed last year at our regular session. We then directly accused the SDSM's practice of "cleansing" in the administration. We were then accused of being the SDSM's opposition.

[Stankovic] I just wonder whether it is morally justified to react only when one becomes a victim.

[Andov] As a journalist, you must investigate whether somebody was involved in such showdowns, but you should not let such things happen today! Here is the story about the tomatoes. Tomatoes valued at 70,000 German marks were imported at the time Mr. Ivanov was the minister of economy. He was the only one who tried to discover the culprit, and after Ivanov did discover him, he was punished. Today five times more tomatoes are being imported and nobody reacts. The mass media are now keeping quiet, but at that time they campaigned against Ivanov, although then, and today, the same political center is involved in the same action. Do you intend to discount our every criticism only because we used to participate in the government once upon a time? We used to protest against such deeds at that time as well.

[Stankovic] Did the mass media not publish your protests?

[Andov] The mass media followed the work of the government through the spokesman who, for instance, never informed the public about the regulations on public supplies. The same happened with our protests.

[Stankovic] Do you not fear that the ordinary people, the voters, believe that today the Liberals are protesting only because they are faced with something that they themselves used to do to others while they were in power?

[Andov] This is absolutely not true. I meet ordinary people every day, in town and at the market. Only those who want to block our complete action and thus create a clean field for future abuses think so. This is why today the powerful LP parliamentary group is perhaps the only guarantee against the revitalization of a collapsed system that discredited our country on the international sphere for a long time.

Poland: High-Level Debate on NATO Membership

*96EP0054A Warsaw WARSAW VOICE in English
31 Mar 96 No 13, p 8*

[Article by Juliusz Urbanowicz in Warsaw, Zbigniew Krzysztyniak in Prague, and Krzysztof Pilawski in Moscow: "Don't 'Tease the Bear'"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The latest spate of diplomatic visits and events indicates that while the West is confirming its will to enlarge NATO, Russia is maintaining its opposition toward plans to bring the alliance's structures—especially its military structures—closer to Russia's borders. Both sides have sent signals about the possibility of "diluting" membership for new members.

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured the 12 foreign ministers of Central and Eastern European countries, gathered in Prague on March 20, that NATO will be enlarged regardless of Moscow's position on the matter, and regardless of the results of the Russian presidential elections scheduled for June. "NATO has made a commitment to take in new members, and it must not and will not keep the democracies in the waiting room forever. NATO enlargement is on track, and it will happen," he said.

Christopher added that in Russia—more markedly than in any other state—it is especially important for democracy to triumph, while describing Russian reforms as threatened and still far from success. Meanwhile, "there is new uncertainty about Russia's future relations with its neighbors," he said. This danger is demonstrated by the Duma's recent decision annulling the 1991 dissolution of the former Soviet Union.

Christopher denied that NATO expansion could isolate Russia, and warned Russia against isolating itself from the rest of Europe. He added that this primarily depends on the choices made by politicians and Russian society.

Christopher's emphatic words instilled new hope in the assembled representatives of former members of the Soviet bloc. Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zelenec, who hosted the meeting, said that U.S. involvement in Central and Eastern Europe is a guarantee of stability, freedom, democracy and peace in the entire region. Zelenec's Polish counterpart, Dariusz Rosati, was also satisfied with the tone of Christopher's statement, but remarked that the statement did not carry an assurance that the upcoming NATO summit in December will clearly determine the schedule for taking in new members (see interview on page 13 [not reproduced here]).

LIDOVE NOVINY, an influential Czech daily, commented that Christopher's visit shows that the U.S. administration's uncertainty "as to whether it's better to tease Moscow or frustrate new democracies" is slowly disappearing—in favor of the new democracies. The paper wrote that paradoxically, the recent Duma decision has contributed to this. "Stirring emotions with the prospect of a Soviet rebirth may accelerate admission of the first batch of Central European countries to NATO," the daily said.

"Those supporting the plan to extend NATO to include countries fearing the revival of an aggressive Soviet Union have gained an additional argument," commented Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. In his state of the nation address in February, President Boris Yeltsin called the prospect of NATO expansion the greatest single external threat to Russia. As the presidential elections draw near, the issue is gaining increasing importance for Yeltsin; in the last few weeks, Primakov has made intensive efforts to deal with this threat.

Before the Prague meeting, Central and East European diplomats dealt with Russian attempts to "soften" the NATO expansion concept. In early March, Primakov unsuccessfully proposed in Moscow to Czech and Hungarian officials that Central and Eastern European countries limit their future NATO status to political membership, without participating in the alliance's military structures. Primakov later visited Slovakia, and then Poland, where he suggested that Poland accept simultaneous guarantees of security from Russia and NATO, instead of seeking NATO membership—but he met with a decisive refusal.

Politicians from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were slightly alarmed by statements by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, who visited Moscow while they were at Christopher's lecture in Prague. In talks with Russian leaders, Solana stressed that NATO would expand—braving hard reactions from Yeltsin—but at the same time, Solana suggested "Diluting" new democracies' membership in NATO. In an article published in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, he suggested that the territories of new member countries might host neither troops from other NATO countries nor nuclear weapons. Solana said that the decision on who will be admitted to the alliance, and when, may not be made this year or even in 1997. Moreover, he assured the Russians that the procedure of enlarging NATO is protracted by its very nature, because it requires ratification by the parliaments of all 16 members.

Still, Russian politicians waited more eagerly for Christopher's arrival in Moscow; they believe that the decision about the mode and schedule of NATO enlargement will primarily be made in Washington. Christopher arrived on March 21, and in a talk with Yeltsin he avoided disputed points in Russian-U.S.

relations, including NATO enlargement. He discussed NATO with Primakov instead; statements issued after the meeting said both sides held firm.

On March 25, Yeltsin said that NATO enlargement is not at all a foregone conclusion. In April, when Group of Seven leaders meet to discuss nuclear safety, talks will be held in Moscow between Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton. At least until then, a "dialogue of the deaf" will continue, in which the U.S. administration repeats that it wants to reconcile NATO extension with preventing Russia's isolation, while the Kremlin insists that the ideas are irreconcilable. Meanwhile, NATO hopefuls remain in the waiting room.

Poland: Kwasniewski Views Concordat, Early Elections

WS1005121996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 May 96 p 2

[Article by K. Gr.: "President Kwasniewski in the United States on 8 July; [as published] the Concordat and Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"I note with satisfaction that the primary strategic goals of Polish foreign policy are in fact unquestionable," Aleksander Kwasniewski stated at a news conference yesterday after listening to the speech by Foreign Affairs Minister Dariusz Rosati and speeches made by representatives of parliamentary clubs. The president confirmed that letters on the Concordat had been exchanged between the Polish Government and the Vatican.*

Asked a few questions concerning the Concordat, the president replied that these issues require patience, and, for this reason, he asked the journalists not to ask him any more questions about them. He said that he realized that it would be very difficult to persuade the deputies who were against the Concordat to support it unless there are new developments that would decrease or dispel all doubts. He evaded the question of whether he shared the stand taken by the Democratic Left Alliance that adoption of the new constitution should come before the Concordat.

Asked whether he would like his electorate to know what his stand on the Concordat is, he replied: "As long as major doubts about the Concordat continue, I will understand those who have certain fears and who will vote against."

Kwasniewski confirmed that intensive talks are under way to establish a National Security Council. He refused to reveal any names.

He does not envision dissolution of the parliament. He recalled that its term expires in September 1997. He would be "very glad" if the Sejm decided to call early elections in the first half of 1997. He argued that this would be favorable due to the work on the budget.

Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych said after a talk with the president yesterday that he told Aleksander Kwasniewski that he was "very concerned about the situation in which some are saying that letters had been exchanged (between the Polish Government and the Vatican regarding the Concordat—K.Gr.), others are denying this, and still others are not saying anything on this subject."

Poland: Geremek Comments on Foreign Policy Debate

WS1005135896 Warsaw Radio RMF FM Network in Polish 0605 GMT 10 May 96

[Interview with Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Polish Sejm Commission for Foreign Affairs, by Konrad Piasecki in Warsaw on the "Guest of the RMF FM Morning Program"—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Piasecki] Professor Geremek, are you not perplexed, like ordinary mortals, by this puzzling correspondence between the Vatican and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Geremek] It is not puzzling at all. There is an exchange of letters between the foreign minister and the secretary of state of the Holy See. This is understandable because the treaty, which was signed three years ago, remains unratified. There is no mystery in this. [passage omitted]

[Piasecki] Anyway, what does this correspondence contain?

[Geremek] One can assume that the government wants to obtain additional instruments of persuasion with regard to parliament, with regard to those who do not want to ratify the treaty. As for the Holy See, it just confirms its stance: The treaty exists and waits for its ratification. The treaty does not require any additional explanations. As for the Polish Government, it might put a legal interpretation on the treaty, and, second, it might take legislative action. The government might propose to the Sejm that a resolution be pased or new laws signed. All of this is possible, but this depends solely on the Polish Government. The correspondence does not change anything in this matter.

[Piasecki] Yesterday, [Foreign Minister] Dariusz Rosati, in his address to the Sejm, devoted only one phrase to the Concordat. He said he expects that the Concordat will be ratified. In your opinion, did he shun the matter or make a good forecast for the future?

[Geremek] This is rather a realistic statement, that the matter does not depend on the government. I would like to hear this statement articulated more strongly. Governments may change, but the interest of the state remains the same. If one government assumes an obligation, another may either break this obligation or fulfill it. I would prefer to say this in this way. I think Minister Rosati had this intention in mind.

[Piasecki] Do you consider Dariusz Rosati a good foreign minister? How do you assess him in comparison with all the others?

[Geremek] Do not demand I should review ministers, I prefer to review books. However, Dariusz Rosati had his day yesterday in parliament and, to some extent, in the eyes of public opinion. This was the first time the new foreign minister had the possibility ofsuch a presentation of his concepts and theses.

[Piasecki] How did he come off?

[Geremek] In my opinion, very well. Both his first address, which inaugurated the debate about foreign policy, and the concluding speech, which was as long as the first one.... [changes thought] If I may allow myself a minor caustic remark directed to the media: The press lobby was empty and, for this reason, there were virtually no comprehensive reports on the debate and the minister's two addresses.

[Piasecki] The press lobby was empty, but the Sejm hall was not full to the brim, either.

[Geremek] Another caustic remark. It seems that both of them are justified. The empty Sejm hall was no credit to the Sejm. This was one of the most important debates.

[Piasecki] But you sat there for a very, very long time and in a very, very disciplined manner.

[Geremek] Indeed. But there were two matters I would like to stress. The minister's addresses were very good because they introduced two clear elements. There was such a substantial change in 1989 that foreign policy must change due to this. He said unambiguously that he wants continuity. Second, he said that it is in the Polish national interest to have both European and euro-atlantic aspirations, as well as sovereign, independent, and democratic states on our eastern border. This is what I would always like to hear from the foreign minister.

As for the debate, it testified for the first time—and I have an impression that this was not grasped by public opinion—to the existence of considerable threats. There is no accord among political parties with regard to foreign policy. For the first time, the coalition parties revealed some annoying aspects. I have in mind a sort of strange pro-Russian orientation on the part of Democratic Left Alliance representatives. What does this orientation mean? Is it critical with regard to the policy after 1989, or does it have some peculiar sympathy here? At any rate, this must be noted and said.

There were also annoying elements of aggression toward the opposition as well as a sort of boastfulness: it is we who will led Poland to the European Union and NATO. I would answer this with the following: Whoever does this, it is the Polish people who will decide, and this is the best way for the Polish people. [passage omitted]

Poland: Warsaw Press Reaction to Rosati Sejm Address

WS1005134196

[FBIS Report] On 10 May three major Warsaw vernacular dailies carry commentaries on Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati's foreign policy statement delivered at the Sejm on Thursday, 9 May.

RZECZPOSPOLITA, a centrist daily widely read in government circles, runs on page 5 a 400-word commentary by Kazimierz Dziewanowski under the title "Poland Has One Policy." "The statement deserves positive assessment," writes the author. "Claims that the system established in Europe after 1989 will exist for decades to come, that Poland is now part of the Western world once more, that we are no longer a country wedged between East and West but border a democratic Germany—and friendly relations with Germany and France are a priority—are widely approved. The same applies to practical issues: our resolve to enter NATO, the EU, and the OECD, along with distrust of the indeterminate concepts of the pan-European system of universal security based on the OSCE (which is just as effective as the League of Nations)," the commentary states. Dziewanowski adds that "equally correct, albeit imprecise, is the concept of the 'national strategy for integrating with the EU.' Regardless of political differences, we all agree that we should focus on developing the best possible relations with all of our nations, Russia included. Our aspirations to become members of the Western structures are unalterable, but they are not targeted against Russia."

TRYBUNA, a leftist daily supporting the government, carries a front-page, untitled 100-word commentary by Stanislaw Cwik. "It turns out that there are issues in Poland that do not dramatically split our political parties," writes the author. He goes on to say: "I wonder why Polish politicians find it so easy to define the country's foreign interests, while it is so difficult to agree on domestic interests."

ZYCIE WARSZAWY, an independent daily, carries a front-page, 300-word commentary by Andrzej

Kaniewski entitled "Whose Abroad?" "It is difficult to indicate the center responsible for policy. One example will suffice: Presidential staffers question a partnership with Germany, while Minister Rosati views it as a pillar of Poland's security," Kaniewski remarks. He goes on to point out that "a true test for the president will be his working visit to Washington, scheduled to take place barely three weeks after the Russian presidential elections, and whether he obtains unequivocal statements on NATO enlargement." "Unofficial sources say that just days earlier," Kaniewski continues, "Clinton is to receive Walesa. Mandatory photos with the Polish presidents will no doubt fit in well with the strategy of the U.S. President, who is to run in the elections in November." The commentary concludes: "From what is said in Washington, we will be able to tell who is in charge of Polish foreign policy—Kwasniewski, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or Walesa."

Poland: New Right-Wing Floor Group Formed in Parliament

LD1005132296 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1000 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Twenty deputies from the former KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] and the BBWR [Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms] floor groups have created a new KPN and BBWR federative parliamentary floor group.

Deputies from the BBWR and the KPN left their floor groups following conflicts that affected both groups. Ten deputies from the BBWR group have joined the new federative group, leaving five remaining in the BBWR group. Ten deputies have also left the KPN group, leaving six. We recognize that it is necessary to rise above divisions and to overcome the barrier of the inability to integrate. This is why we have created a new federative floor group, said Andrzej Gasienica-Makowski from the BBWR. Adam Slomka from the KPN stressed that in this way a certain division into floor groups would be clear in parliament: left-wing, center-right, and right-wing. The new floor group belongs to the third category. [passage omitted]

Poland: General Staff Objects to Defense System Reform

WS1005122096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 10 May 96 p 2

[Article by "PW": "Karkoszka Threatened To Resign; The Staff's Obstruction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In time of peace, the Armed Forces are commanded by the defense minister. Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters will be established. The General Staff will become a planning unit. Such are the basic points of a reform of the national defense system suggested by a team headed by Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka.

At a closed session of the Sejm Defense Commission held yesterday, Karkoszka presented results of work carried out by a team that is developing executive laws to the law on the office of the defense minister. They define, among other things, the future character of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] and the General Staff.

"We acknowledged the fact that the work of the team is delayed," said Commission Chairman Jerzy Szmajdzinski (of the Democratic Left Alliance). The reason for the delay is the staff's protest to the suggested solutions. Approving Karkoszka's proposals would mean an end to its independence.

We learned from unofficial sources that, having met with obstruction from the military, Karkoszka threatened to resign. When we asked him yesterday whether he was satisfied with cooperation with the General Staff, he only said: "You were the one who used the word 'satisfied.'"

The deputy minister stated that he would present a full concept of reform in two or three weeks. According to Szmajdzinski, the team wants to integrate the General Staff with MON. Staff directorates dealing with supplies for the Armed Forces will be dissolved. Institutions servicing the General Staff and MON will be reduced, thus causing a "considerable staff reduction."

Poland: Government To Seek Replacements for Official Aircraft

LD1105215196 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 1900 GMT 11 May 96

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] is very soon going to be forced to make a decision on the purchase of modern communications planes for the 36th Special Air Transport Regiment, which is responsible for conveying Polish VIP's—that is, the president, ministers, and high-ranking military men. The decision will with all certainty be accelerated by a recent in-flight incident at Visby, on the Swedish island of Gotland. A Yak-40 carrying Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Minister of Foreign Affairs Dariusz Rosati, who were returning from the Baltic states summit, was forced to make a landing in Sweden for technical reasons.

As we have unofficially discovered, adjustments are being made to introduce into the URM expenditure plan for next year provision for the purchase of modern communications aircraft. Most of the nine Yak-40 planes used at the moment must be retired as early as 1997. These fuel-guzzling and short-range machines are giving considerable trouble in usage. Polish official delegations have several times been late because of strong winds that have decreased still further the in-any-case low flying speed of the Yak-40 planes.

The two large, medium-distance Tu-154M (?Lux) planes, the presidential plane and that used by the government, which have undergone major overhauls in Kiev or in Moscow, may still serve until the year 2002.

URM intends to replace all of the planes in use hitherto by a single type of communications jet on economic grounds, albeit the plane is to come in several versions. Such a modern machine will be capable of transporting 12 to 30 people at a speed of over 900 km per hour and over a distance in excess of 6,000 km.

Apparently, it is the French Dassault Falcon 900B that has the greatest chance. It has the safest kind of triple-engine propulsion array. This is at the moment one of the most modern communications planes in the world. It costs over $20 million and is cheaper than the older design, twin-engined, American Gulfstream IV-B, which has also been offered to Poland. The third plane being taken into account is the Canadian Challenger 601. The Czechs have purchased this type of aircraft for their own VIP's but are nonetheless complaining at the considerable running costs of the Challenger.

High-ranking officials estimate that six planes such as the Falcon 900B can with ease meet the transport needs of the Presidential Chancellery, the government, and the military.

For short-range flights within Poland, URM intends to purchase Polish Mewa planes from Mielec and Sokol helicopters from Swidnik.

Poland: Bankruptcy of Gdansk Shipyard To Be Announced

WS1005134096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 May 96 p 2

[Article by "PAD" and M.J.J.: "Trade Unions To Stage Protests; Minister Kaczmarek in Favor of the Shipyard's Bankruptcy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On Thursday [9 May], Privatization Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek spoke in favor of announcing the bankruptcy of the Gdansk Shipyard SA. In line with unofficial information, the decision to declare the shipyard bankrupt has already been made. The morning of the same day, shipyard workers in two sections stopped working. The reason for the protest was the information that the government had refused to grant money for wages for the shipyard employees. Today the trade unions of the shipyard will stage a rally that, according to Solidarity, will turn into a street demonstration unless the government grants money for wages by 0900.

The Only Solution

"I am afraid that now that all f the possibilities of resolving the problems of the Gdansk Shipyard have been looked at, the only solution is to announce its bankruptcy," Kaczmarek said on Thursday afternoon in a statement for the Radio Information Agency.

According to the privatization minister, liquidation of the shipyard ought to involve separating the best production section of the company, which should be done by the bankruptcy trustee, and setting up a new Gdansk Shipyard with some of the employees. This will make it possible to achieve a couple of things, such as altering the contracts that are unfavorable to the shipyard.

"It is no longer feasible to cure this company by providing subsidies. This is impossible at this stage," said Kaczmarek, adding that the shipyard proved on several occasions already that it is not credible as far as its promises are concerned.

On 8 May the government declared that it would not come to the rescue of the shipyard by allocating money from the reserves of the Office of the Council of Ministers. In line with earlier information provided by the shipyard's representatives, it would have to be approximately 8 million zlotys.

When?

The Thursday statement by Minister Kaczmarek means that, during the general assembly of shareholders scheduled for the end of May and the beginning of June, the person acting on behalf of the State Treasury will vote for the shipyard's bankruptcy. The State Treasury controls 61 percent of the shares, which means that the decision will be approved.

Shipyard Director Ryszard Goluch commented for RZECZPOSPOLITA on Kaczmrek's statement. He said that in recent days both Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz and the minister received a document concerning the option of announcing bankruptcy. However, as recently as Wednesday this option was still not accepted. Earlier drafts of restructuring the shipyard envisioned limiting output in as much as 65 percent of the shipyard and employing between 4,000 and 4,200 people in a new company.

As early as several weeks ago, some members of the supervisory board believed that it was necessary to separate the best part of the shipyard's assets and establish a new company, and only then announce the bankruptcy of the old one. [passage omitted]

Poland: Minister: Gdansk Shipyard Needs To Submit Budget Plan

LD1105095996 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0800 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ownership Transformations Minister Wieslaw Kaczmarek said that the government would start looking for resources to help the Gdansk Shipyard if its board presented a company restructuring plan that would stand a chance of implementation.

In a conversation on Polish radio, Minister Kaczmarek stressed that the shipyard workers' demands for the government to provide money for wages were groundless because the shipyard was not a government budgetary unit. According to the rules of the Code of Trade, the Gdansk Shipyard was bankrupt, Minister Kaczmarek stressed.

[Begin Kaczmarek recording] It cannot be like this: Give us the money and we will do something about it. No, unfortunately, it now has to be the other way around. Please submit a plan, a credible one and one that has a chance for implementation, and then we will start looking for resources. We did have talks along these lines with the shipyard's board recently. Please carry out a reduction of obligations that stem from agreements that have already been signed for the supply of vessels or carry out a reduction of creditors' debts.

If the board does this, the government will set about finding the money for a bridging finance package for this company, so that the passage to a new structure can be a gentle one. [end recording]

Poland: Sejm Decides on Division of Trade Union Assets

LD1005172696 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Sejm has decided that Solidarity and the OPZZ [National Trade Union Alliance] will each get half of the assets of the former Central Trade Union Council.

The deputies adopted an amended bill on the return of the assets forfeited by trade unions and social organizations as a result of the imposition of martial law. In accordance with the bill, only real estate will be divided up. Compiling an inventory of this real estate is supposed to be completed by the middle of next year. After that, Solidarity and the OPZZ will divide this real estate equally among themselves. If one of the unions gets less than 50 percent, it will receive the difference in cash. [passage omitted]

Romania: Tinca Sees 'No Other Option' to NATO, West

AU1005201596 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Gheorghe Tinca, minister of national defense, accompanied by Lieutenant General Corneliu Mihai Lungu, Army general inspector, and Division General Dorin Gheorghiu, commander of the 4th Army Transylvania, visited Bihor County today on an inspection tour of the newly established units in the western part of the country. On this occasion, Mr. Gheorghe Tinca held a news conference at the National Military Museum, the Oradea branch. He tackled various aspects pertaining to the process of Army change and reform. Referring to the acquisition of modern equipment, the defense minister said, quote, we are turning our attention to the West, but this does not mean that Russia is excluded from our calculations.

Regarding speculations about the redeployment of military units in Satu Mare and Carei, Mr. Tinca said that each sovereign state is deciding on these matters, and that there are no threats to citizens of Hungarian origin. The Open Skies agreement between Romania and Hungary was assessed as an important contribution to the development of relations between the two countries. The issue of minorities is the only obstacle to the signing of the basic treaty between the two states.

Regarding integration into the NATO structures, Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca said that Romania can have no other option but the West. NATO's expansion will further strengthen stability in the region. He added that the North Atlantic Alliance is in turn also undergoing a process of reform, our correspondent reports.

Romania: 'Regime' Blamed for Exclusion From NATO

AU1105172096 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 6 May 96 pp 1, 9

[Editorial by Octavian Stireanu: "The Iliescu Rule Is Assuming Responsibility for a Historic Failure: Romania Remains Outside NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] For anyone who has ears to listen and brains enough to understand things, the visit of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to Romania confirms the skeptical forecast that our country will not belong to the first wave of countries accepted into the North Atlantic alliance. The echoes of Mr. Solana's visit are covered by a thick veil of diplomatic formulas and niceties, which cannot however conceal the dramatic and sad truth of the indefinite postponement of a favorable decision on Romania.

The Bucharest regime probably expected a favorable assessment, which Mr. Solana might have condescended to make, about the way in which Romania is fulfilling the five basic NATO principles on which the decision to accept new members depends. Instead, the NATO secretary general made only one positive observation, namely about the "broad consensus" he found with all political circles in Bucharest on the issue of NATO integration. But then, when he proceeded to concrete examples, Mr. Solana—as if he wanted to contradict himself—made direct references to three issues which are far from enjoying the consensus of the Romanian politicians.

First, Mr. Solana praised Romania's participation in the IFOR [Implementation Force] actions in Bosnia. However, as everybody knows, the participation of Romanian troops in these operations was a subject of dispute and vehement contestation in Romania's Parliament, mainly coming from certain parties that belong to the government coalition shepherded by Mr. Iliescu.

Second, Mr. Solana mentioned the fact that Romania was the first signatory of the Partnership for Peace [PFP] and suggested that our country's further participation in this Partnership is an opportune way of maintaining links with NATO. But, as is well known, the opinions of some of our politicians have recently reached some pretty unimaginable peaks of animosity toward this idea—I am primarily referring to the proposal of Mr. Petre Roman [president of the Democratic Party, PD, and presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Union, USD] at the NATO Defense Collegium in Rome to institutionalize the PFP so that the NATO candidate countries should have an organized framework which can ensure their own security, before the effective adherence takes place.

For the attentive politicians—who may also find the necessary time to read before they open their mouths—it must have been obvious that such an institutionalization of the PFP had been recommended by NATO itself in a "Study on NATO Expansion" presented to the candidate countries in September last year. In this study, which briefed all parties concerned on its intentions, the North Atlantic alliance clearly recommended that the candidate countries should first consolidate the framework and structure of their activities within the PFP.

However, it seems that some politicians in Bucharest had no idea about the existence of such a study, although it is available to everybody. That is why Mr. Petre Roman's proposal was attacked very harshly from both right and left. [passage omitted] One may understand the opinions of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD] on this issue, expressed at various news conferences of this party, because there is going to be an inevitable confrontation between Petre Roman and Emil Constantinescu [PNTCD leader and president of the Democratic Convention of Romania, CDR] in the forthcoming presidential elections, whereby the USD candidate has great chances of taking away votes from the electoral camp of the still PNTCD favorite. Therefore, any attack against Mr. Roman would supposedly serve Mr. Constantinescu—this is the "secret" reasoning behind the PNTCD attitude, which is both legitimate and erroneous at the same time.

Nevertheless, what one finds rather hard to understand—in view of the political orientation of the people involved—are the public attacks coming from the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] and the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] against this proposal. These two ruling parties gave in to their old impulse of enmity and even hatred toward Mr. Petre Roman, by attacking his proposal out of obviously personal and party interests, thus deliberately ignoring the broader national interest. These ruling parties—which have kept totally quiet until now, as Mr. Iliescu himself has done, about Russia's open hostility to NATO's expansion—might have noted, if they wanted to, that the PFP institutionalization is an alternative to what the former Soviet Union managed to accomplish with the famous Helsinki Conference, which was turned from a mere "meeting" into an international institution, namely the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], with self-dependent organizational structures. The latest diplomacy promoted by Russia wants to make this OSCE a counterweight to NATO and the PFP. These politicians ought to have heard of the recent Russian thesis that NATO, let alone the PFP, should no longer play any role in Europe, since the Warsaw Pact no longer exists and the role of guarantor of the European security must be taken over, in Mr. Primakov's opinion, by the very OSCE.

In this context, the option formulated by the NATO strategists in their study on NATO's expansion—which was taken over as a detailed and concrete proposal by Mr. Petre Roman—tacitly aimed at institutionalizing the PFP at a level at least comparable to the OSCE mechanism, so that one can proceed with preparing the ground for appropriately fulfilling the necessary conditions for an effective NATO expansion, while also ensuring the stronger crystallization of the Western security structures on the old continent.

These things were not understood by the rulers in Bucharest, and this ignorance will cost the whole country. It remains to be seen how the Iliescu government will answer for these political gestures, at the not too distant time when they will be called to account for their actions.

Coming back to Mr. Solana's statements, the third thing he did was to make direct references to Romania's relations with its neighbors, more specifically to the stage of the negotiations on the political treaty with Hungary. It is an axiom and absolutely elementary thing—which our rulers know for sure—that NATO's expansion will not extend to any countries which have not concluded treaties of good-neighborliness with each other. The Iliescu regime has refrained from signing the treaty with Hungary, by invoking the famous Recommendation 1201 of the Security Council. Since one wicked thing never comes alone, the suspicions invented by the Romanian politicians about the hidden motives of this recommendation were recently blown away by the interpretation given by the European Commission for Lawful Democracy of the Council of Europe—at its 1-2 May meeting this year—of each point, syntactic element, and phrase of the Articles 11, 13, and 14 of the aforementioned Recommendation, articles futilely incriminated by Iliescu's allied parties. This is a coup de grace given by the international bodies to political ignorance; consequently, we will also have to reexamine the responsibility devolving upon the Bucharest leadership for its refusal to sign the treaty with Hungary, thus proving its failure to grasp where our true national interests lie. In this respect, we are in the same boat with Slovakia. But there, at least, everybody knows that NATO's expansion will limit itself to their brothers in the Czech Republic, while the Slovak state is deliberately omitted from the integration process because of its similarly stubborn line on the issue of the treaty with Hungary. [passage omitted]

In making these three references—to IFOR, PFP, and the treaty with Hungary—Mr. Solana actually said more than he should have, namely that the Bucharest regime can consider itself fully responsible for Romania's noninclusion in the first wave of NATO expansion.

As a matter of fact, this theme was taken over by Mr. Teodor Melescanu, too, who said that NATO's expansion remains a "gradual, transparent, and deliberate process." Gradual, Mr. Melescanu explained, means the following: We are now in the phase of individual negotiations with NATO, a phase which started in Brussels last week, with Mr. Solana's recent visit being also a part of it; the second phase will begin next December, when NATO will specify what countries are going to be admitted to the alliance; the third phase, Mr. Melescanu said last Friday, would spill over into the next year, with steps being taken to observe the NATO principles of admission. [passage omitted]

When the signals for Romania's nonadmission to NATO are obvious, there is no use to deceive ourselves that maybe it is not true, after all. Therefore, the candidates to the future political power in Romania—that is those who aspire to take over such a good or bad legacy—are dutybound to turn the electoral campaign into a forum of public discussion (since more than 95 percent of the country's population are interested in this topic) of the responsibility which the presidency and government must assume for Romania's failure to be admitted to NATO and for the stage of fulfilling the required prerequisites for integration. Last, but not least, I would also include here the economic stage, or better said, the economic disaster in which the country finds itself. [passage omitted]. This economic situation has also been one of the breaks that blocked Romania's access to NATO.

Unfortunately for Romania's over 20 million inhabitants, the nonadmission to NATO is a tragic historical failure of the country's current political leadership. We are waiting with interest to see what kind of smoke screen the representatives of the current power are going to throw around our eyes on this topic in the coming electoral campaign, in the vain hope of succeeding to fool us once again for another period of four years.

Romania: Melescanu on Tinca's Warning of Arms Race

LD1105183196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to the Romanian defense minister, there would be tragic consequences if Hungary became a NATO member before Romania. Levente Sukosd recorded the following interview about this diplomatic complication:

[Sukosd] What is your opinion about the statement of your colleague, Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca, in MAGYAR HIRLAP? According to his statement, an arms race will be triggered between the countries wanting to join NATO—for example between Hungary and Romania—if one of them were admitted before the other. This was my question to Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu.

[Begin Melescanu recording, in Romanian with superimposed Hungarian translation] Mr. Tinca's duty as a minister responsible for security and military affairs is the duty of a soldier in general, that is, to calculate the consequences starting out from the worst possible scenario. Mr. Tinca has to reckon with the most severe consequences.

However, in my interpretation, this statement wished to express our intention and desire for Hungary and Romania to be admitted into all the European and euro-atlantic organizations together and as soon as possible. In our view, this will favorably influence both our bilateral relations and the stability of the region.

Every associate member ought to start with equal chances in the European integration process. However, we understand and accept the fact that certain countries might reach the finish line and join the European Union while others will need more time. The point is that everybody should be given the chance to participate in the process, nobody should be excluded right at the start, that is, no discriminatory conditions should be set during the integration. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Romania: Further on Melescanu Interview on Basic Treaty

LD1205123396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0705 GMT 12 May 96

[Interview with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu by correspondent Levente Sukosd for the "World Clock" program; place and date not given—recorded, Melescanu and Sukosd speak in Romanian fading into Sukosd's report in Hungarian]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty is becoming an everlasting subject. Everyone would like the treaty to be concluded, but it is repeatedly delayed. The interview conducted by Levente Sukosd with Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu covers this subject—the fate of the basic treaty—along with the Torgyan [chairman of the Hungarian opposition Independent Smallholders Party] affair and the Romanian defense minister's statement concerning NATO entry.

[Sukosd] Mr. Minister, I imagine you were somewhat surprised by the plans of Jozsef Torgyan, chairman of the Smallholders Party, to launch a lawsuit in the Bucharest court over your press statement in which you said that Mr Torgyan was of Romanian descent and that he was an extremist politician, I said to Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu.

[Melescanu] The truth is that I was surprised by the great vehemence of the chairman's reaction to something which I thought was not harmful at all and which was appropriate in the circumstances, said the Romanian foreign minister.

I was assessing the manifestations, statements linked to Mr. Torgyan in Budapest. I was thinking primarily of the criticism levelled at the Hungarian Government and only secondly of his statements concerning Romania. I, by the way, never said he was extremist. I said only that some of the views he expressed were extremist; at least, that is how they appeared to me. I immediately added that Hungarian colleagues in Budapest probably would be able to give a more precise interpretation of Torgyan's statements, since they concerned the Hungarian Government, said Teodor Melescanu. [passage omitted]

[Sukosd] Let us turn to more serious issues: What is your opinion about the statement of your colleague, Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca, in MAGYAR HIRLAP? According to his statement, an arms race would be triggered between the countries wanting to join NATO—for example between Hungary and Romania—if one of them were admitted before the other. This was my question to Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu.

[Melescanu] Mr. Tinca's duty as a minister responsible for security and military affairs is the duty of a soldier in general, that is, to calculate the consequences starting out from the worst possible scenario. Mr. Tinca has to reckon with the most severe consequences.

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[Sukosd] Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn said recently that it was almost certain that the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty would not be concluded or signed in the near future, because of the Romanian election campaign. Are you in agreement with this, I asked.

[Melescanu] In democratic states such as Romania and Hungary, I would not link the basic treaty negotiations with election considerations, Teodor Melescanu replied.

The basic treaty negotiations are a government responsibility, and these negotiations must continue under all conditions, irrespective of the considerations, the interests of the election campaign. We will continue to make efforts to work out, as soon as possible, a draft treaty that can be raised to government level and that is acceptable to both sides. I can assure you that we have no intention to slow down, hamper the basic treaty negotiations, said the foreign minister.

[Sukosd] I must say nonetheless that reality partly contradicts what you say, if only because—if I am correct—you said the other day that, for example, the Romanian-Russian basic treaty had fallen victim to Russian election campaign interests, I said, interrupting Mr. Melescanu.

[Melescanu] There was no such circumstance hampering the signing of the basic treaty, as you said, Melescanu replied. Signing is one thing and the process of working negotiations on the treaty documents is another. We have never confused these concepts. Both countries, Russia and Romania, are aware that we must make further preparations to finalize the treaty, to hold a signing ceremony that will close the negotiations, and it must take place in the form of a high-level meeting. We know that it will be—would have been—difficult to do this, said Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu.

Romania: Nastase Documents Bias in BBC Reporting

AU1305115296 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 8 May 96 p 12

[Article by Alina Ristea: "Adrian Nastase Requests a Ban on the BBC Newscasts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Adrian Nastase [executive president of the ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania—PDSR, and president of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies] has sent a letter to the CNA [National Audiovisual Council] requesting that they prohibit the BBC's involvement in the electoral campaign in Romania. Nastase believes that the reports broadcast by the BBC are biased against the PDSR and favor the opposition. According to calculations made by Nastase, out of 39 reports on the PDSR made by that radio, 32 are critical and the remaining seven neutral, whereas of the "only" 18 reports dedicated to the opposition 12 are positive, four neutral, and only two are critical. The PDSR executive president also presented some quotes he considered conclusive with regard to the BBC's stance on the PDSR: "The PDSR continues to dominate Romania's political life, although it does not represent any clear ideology"; "the PDSR representatives' meetings did not stir special enthusiasm anywhere"; and "the PDSR seems to be determined not to spare any money to reach its goal (win the elections.)" For the sake of comparison he also presented "some samples of the way in which the opposition is presented": "The arrival of the Convention [Democratic Convention of Romania] leaders was, one might say, an event. There were no adverse reactions whatsoever to Emil Constantinescu and his suite." Adrian Nastase considers such comments biased and subjective, and believes that their authors are not observing the moral rules of the journalistic profession. He also drew attention to the fact that the rebroadcasting of the BBC newscasts by Romanian radio stations "flagrantly violates the agreement concluded by the CNA and the political parties regarding air time during the electoral campaign."

During a meeting yesterday, the CNA members decided to summon next week Cristian Mititelu, the director of the BBC Romanian-language editorial staff. They thus complied with Adrian Nastase's request "to prohibit the BBC radio company's involvement in the political life and electoral campaign in Romania."

Romania: Human Rights League Worried About Elections

AU1305120296 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 8 May 96 p 12

[Article by Emil Berdeli: "The Observers Have Been Threatened With Firing If They Survey the Ballot Boxes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Attorney Nicolae Stefanescu-Draganesti, president of the League for the Protection of Human Rights [LADO], is very concerned about the clean execution and correctness of the local elections. LADO needs 12,000 observers for the Bucharest polling stations and a further 10,000 for those throughout the country. The league, however, is unable to find such a large number of people. The fact that this organization can merely send 2,000 observers out into the country gives reason for concern, stated Stefanescu-Draganesti. The reason for this is that many people among those who used to act as observers now refuse to do so because they are frightened. They have been threatened that if they survey the ballot boxes their employment contracts will be terminated or they will have to face other consequences. Mr. Stefanescu-Draganesti asserts that due to unknown reasons the Central Electoral Bureau [BEC] extended by 24 hours the 3 May deadline for the registration of candidates for the local elections. Despite the fact that LADO officially objected to this at the BEC, it has so far received no reply.

Slovenia: Drnovsek: Gore, Canadian PM for EU, NATO Entry

AU1005203896 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2000 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek, upon his return from a three-day visit to the United States and Canada, today said that both countries supported Slovenia's membership in the European Union and NATO. In their talks with Drnovsek, U.S. Vice President Al Gore and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien voiced their belief that Slovenia was a modern and economically developed country. In the opinion of U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, our country is an important element for security and stability in Europe.

Slovenia: Drnovsek 'Personality of the Month' in DELO Poll

AU1005194796 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 6 May 96 pp 1-2

[FBIS Summary] Ljubljana DELO in Slovene on 6 May on pages 1 and 2 carries the results of its monthly telephone opinion poll on the popularity of the Slovene parties and politicians. In the poll, which was carried out on 29 April, 682 out of 1100 randomly chosen subscribers participated.

As the author, S.P., writes, "the title of political personality of the month in May goes to Prime Minister Drnovsek, who was voted the most prominent personality on the domestic political scene last month, too. Lagging considerably behind," as he says, are Foreign Minister Thaler, President Kucan, and Social Democratic President Jansa. The next to come—Peoples' Party President Podobnik, Defense Minister Kacin, and Christian Democratic President Peterle—reportedly won 10 times fewer votes than Drnovsek.

Asked which party they would vote for if the elections were tomorrow, the pollees gave the following answers:

Pollees' Party Preferences

	Percent
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	18.2
Social Democratic Party	6.6
Slovene Peoples' Party	6.0
Slovene Christian Democrats	5.1
United List of Social Democrats	5.1
Democratic Party	4.0
Slovene National Party	2.1
Greens of Slovenia	1.9
Democratic Party of Retirees	1.5
None of them	9.6
Do not know	31.0
Would not vote	8.2

As the main characteristics of this poll, the author singles out the increased popularity of the Democratic Party as well the diminishing differences in the popularity of the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, and the Peoples' Party. He also notes that the United List reaped "considerably less trust" than usual in the May poll.

Slovenia: Parliament To Decide on Electoral Law Changes

AU0905070596 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 8 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The National Assembly deputies this afternoon broke off their regular session. They decided to discuss the amendments to the electoral legislation after the 14 May extraordinary session, which will be devoted to the vote on the referendum on a somewhat altered electoral system. The deputies passed the law on compensation of injustices in the second reading. Rudi Medved and Marjan Rogelj report:

[Medved] After the coordinating meeting held prior to the National Assembly session today, it transpired that some of the parliamentary parties still would not believe that the others were serious about the referendum on the changes to the electoral law and that the deputies would not withdraw their signatures from the referendum initiative at the last moment.

The parliament in principle favors a change in the electoral law. However, the United List favors immediate abolition of the national lists, which the Christian Democrats oppose although their deputies signed the demand, too. The United List would agree to the current parliamentary threshold while the Christian Democrats and the Peoples' Party favor a higher one. The Liberal Democrats were already willing to withdraw their signatures but then they changed their minds, and now they might perhaps again be willing to withdraw them if an agreement is reached within a week.

They are all counting on the fact that even if the referendum proposed by the deputies does not take place, the

National Council's demand [an alternative proposal for a referendum on electoral changes] could be bypassed on the grounds of the referendum questions being ambiguous, on there not being enough time, and similar. It might happen that the referendum would really be held before the elections—according to some estimates it would cost about 400 million tolars—however, the time for the actual change of the legislation will nevertheless run short. The initiators of the referendum are themselves increasingly less confident that they would not be overtaken by time. [passage omitted]

Slovenia: Investment Funds Threaten To Return Privatization Vouchers

AU1005205496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2000 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The investment funds are announcing that a portion of the privatization vouchers will be returned to their holders because of the discrepancy between the total value of vouchers and the social capital available. The discrepancy is assessed to be at least 150 billion tolars, Branko Pavlin, president of the association of investment funds, assessed.

The decision of the funds will be known next week—that is, after the deputies vote on the government amendment to the Law on Property Transformation of State Property, which would determine any possible additional assets for privatization.

Federal

FRY: Federal Government Says UN Human Rights Resolution 'Biased'

LD1305100696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0925 GMT 13 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 13 (TANJUG)—The following is the first part of the comments of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the draft resolution on the 'situation of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia', adopted by the U.N. human rights commission at the commission's 52nd session.

The comments were circulated as an official document at Le Palais Des Nations in Geneva on April 22, 1996.

'The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is addressing the 52nd session of the commission on human rights, desirous to emphasize its sustained efforts to honour the commission as the most prestigious United Nations body directly involved in the promotion and protection of human rights.

'The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has manifested its readiness to proceed with a most active and open cooperation with all those sincerely wishing to promote and ensure respect for human rights, as pointed out in the report of Ms. Elisabeth Rehn. However, we must again reiterate our stand concerning the inappropriate and biased draft resolution, primarily in view of the spirit prevailing in it, discerned in the positions it reflects.

'The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is profoundly concerned with the letter and spirit of the proposed draft resolution on the situation of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is far from reflecting and/or even taking into account the actual human rights situation in these territories.

'There is no mention of the positive developments and concrete results accomplished in inplementing the peace agreement. Instead of being future-oriented, and making a contribution of its own to the peace efforts (in particular concerning respect and promotion of human rights), the resolution renders support to the forces which oppose reconciliation and building of confidence in these territories, by its resorting to biased, partial and politically motivated conclusions and allegations, in contravention of the 'spirit of Dayton'.

'The Government of the FRY considers it inadmissible that the appraisals made by Ms. Elisabeth Rehn in her reports (A/50/727- S/1995/933 and E/CN.4/1996/63), and heard in the discussions held in the commission on this issue virtually are not taken into account. We deem it necessary that the authors of the resolution give specific explanations, along with the reasoning behind such attitude. Since, indirectly, the above-mentioned approach calls into question the need for pursuing activities of special rapporteurs, missions etc., whose task is to provide the commission with particular information.

'The fact that the resolution practically ignores massive, the most severe human rights violations committed against the Serbs is an evidence of the extent to which the above approach is totally inappropriate.

'The most severe violations of human rights against Serb civilans are being committed ever since Croatia's aggression on western Slavonia and Krajina (in May and August 1995). This fact is not at all mentioned in the draft, despite the United Nations official reports (secretary general, Security Council), as well as special rapporteur Ms. Elisabeth Rehn, the UNHCR, the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] and many other nongovernmental organizations. This time again, Croatia is protected from the justified international public condemnation by shifting the public attention towards the allegedly 'grave situation' of human rights in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

'Referring to alleged efforts aimed at favouring the rights of minorities, democratic freedoms etc. in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while ignoring mass killings of Serb civilians, setting ablaze of Serb houses, expelling 400,000 Serbs from Croatia, evicting them from their dwellings throughout Croatia, and bestowing with decorations the Croats for the crimes committed on Serbs, etc., is sheer cynicism.

'The resolution's double standards and partiality are also visible, on the one hand, by its reference to the unestablished evidence of mass graves in the places where, allegedly, Croats and Muslims have been buried (Srebrenica, Zepa, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Vukovar), and by its deliberate overlooking the mass graves of Serb civilians, discovered in Mrkonjic Grad (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Krajina, western Slavonia (Croatia) and elsewhere, on the other.'

FRY: Kontic Discusses Hague Tribunal With UN Rights Commissioner

LD1005142396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1313 GMT 10 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 10 May (TANJUG)—Dr. Radoje Kontic, Yugoslav prime minister, today received Jose Ayala Lasso, UN high commissioner for human rights, and colleagues, the Federal Secretariat for Information has announced. [passage omitted]

There was also discussion of cooperation with The Hague war crimes tribunal. Ayala expressed satisfaction that Yugoslavia is willing to cooperate with The Hague tribunal and provided information on his intention to advocate the setting up of a permanent tribunal, as distinct from The Hague tribunal, which has been set up only for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.

Kontic supported this initiative and recalled that Yugoslavia had reservations about The Hague tribunal precisely because it was not set up for crimes regardless of when and where they were committed, the statement from the Federal Secretariat for Information concludes.

FRY: Army Cabinet Chief Says Extradition 'Out of the Question'

AU1105163396 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 11 May 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Extradition Out of the Question"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The General Staff is not aware of the issues discussed and decisions made at the talks between John Kornblum and Slobodan Milosevic, since the talks took place behind closed doors," Colonel Sinisa Borovic, chief of cabinet of the Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff, has told the Belgrade press.

Borovic said that "for now, the arrest and extradition of the three officers to the international tribunal is out of the question."

"I do not know that there are any official charges for war crimes committed in November 1991. We here do not have any material that would indicate the possible guilt of Sljivancanin, Radic, and Mrksic," Borovic said.

FRY: Serbs Poised To Clash With OSCE Over Disarmament Rules

AU1205151596 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 11 May 96 p 11

[Report by D.S.: "Calm Before the Storm"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The penultimate and decisive round of negotiations on disarmament in Bosnia and the former SFRY should end on Friday [17 May]. Everything is quiet in the Vienna Hofburg, the headquarters of the OSCE, which is organizing the talks in accordance with the Dayton agreement. The interest of the public in the talks among the recently warring sides in Bosnia and the delegations of the FRY and Croatia has completely receded. However, "a storm" is supposed to hit the place as of Sunday [12 May], when the proposal for the text of the final document on the most important issues comes under scrutiny: Who is going to have how many tanks, artillery pieces, transporters, planes, and helicopters; how to get rid of the excess amounts; who will control the implementation of the agreement and how?

The biased organizers have already taken care that there will be excitement. For example, contrary to the solutions applied to Europe, they envisaged that the excess weapons are only to be "disabled," not "destroyed," and they cannot be sold. This means in practice that all that is required is that the gun or tank barrels be "cut"—the destruction has to be paid for. This seems to affect only the Yugoslav and Serb sides. The destruction of one tank costs up to 20,000 German marks. An even heavier clash is expected over the disagreement by the Serb Republic that it should be reduced to half the military force of the other side.

The organizers are trying to eliminate the Serb Republic as a signatory by proposing that the documents should be signed by "the countries participating in the talks" and not by the negotiating sides.

FRY: Officers Praise Efficiency of Army Counterintelligence

LD1105143996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1337 GMT 11 May 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, May 11 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Army counterintelligence has efficiently thwarted clandestine and illegal methods of underming its security, senior Yugoslav Army officials told TANJUG Saturday.

Heads of Yugoslav Army General Staff departments for security and information Lieutenant-General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic and Major-General Slavko Krivosija also revealed that the Yugoslav Army counterintelligence had uncovered about thirty cases of foreign agent activity within the Yugoslav Army and determined that around 60 intelligence centers had been involved.

In an interview on the occasion of the day of the intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Yugoslav Army senior officers said that all the uncovered cases had been fully documented and referred to military courts for prosection.

Only several persons are still in investigative custody pending trial, while others have already received sentences ranging from 7 to 15 years in prison, it was said.

In thwarting enemy activity against the Yugoslav Army, priority is given to fighting terrorism, it was said in the interview.

The war in neighbouring Bosnia that raged until recently, despite the peaceful, constructive policy pursued by the FRY leadership, had as a result that Yugoslavia and its army become targets of espionage-terrorist activity and media aggression, the generals said.

Terrorists, extremists, bigots and similar groups have, out of various reasons, accepted to collaborate with foreign intelligence services with a view to undermining the security of the Yugoslav Army.

They were trained in military-terrorist camps abroad and in Croatian and Muslim military, police and special units, but succeeded only in a few cases to carry out actions against Yugoslav Army border guards, the generals said.

Certain FRY citizens, Generals Dimitrijevic and Krivosije said, were forced, under duress and various forms of pressure, to undergo training in espionage centers and were collecting information about the Yugoslav Army.

The suspension of sanctions against FRY and the carrying out of the Dayton peace agreement resulted in a certain shift in enemy activity against the Yugoslav Army so that priority is now given to more insinuating and perfidious methods of operating.

FRY: Kontic Views Succession, Conflict With Bank Governor

AU1005193796 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 10 May 96

[Interview with FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic by RTS correspondent Sasa Barbulovic in Belgrade; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kontic] The normalization of relations with international financial and trade organizations is of strategic importance for the Federal Government. [Word indistinct] relations with international financial institutions, particularly with the IMF and the World Bank, is significant for our free access to the international capital market. Without capital, we cannot revive the economy and we cannot introduce the necessary structural changes. Without normalizing relations with the WTO, our economy cannot use preferential tariffs in the organization's international trade, and this makes our economy less competitive proportionate to the amount of these preferentials. That is why, immediately following the suspension of sanctions, we intensified contacts with the international monetary and trade organizations; we have already held initial talks with the WTO in Geneva, with the IMF and the World Bank in Paris; we have also had initial talks with the European Investment Bank and other international financial and trade organizations.

[Barbulovic] What would be a common feature of all these negotiations?

[Kontic] I would primarily stress that the conditions set by these international and trade organizations have been coordinated to a great extent. These conditions are the prerequisite for normalizing relations with the FRY. The other feature common to all negotiations would be the significant influence of political conditions for normalizing relations with the FRY. As far as economic conditions are concerned, the FRY has taken them into account, the differences are perhaps only in the modalities, but in regards to political conditions, the differences are essential. Namely, the international financial organization insist on succession, and the FRY insists on the continuity of its membership in the said organizations.

[Barbulovic] Why is the issue of continuity so important to the Federal Government, and why is it insisting on it to such a degree?

[Kontic] I believe that two groups of reasons can be listed that support our option. First of all, continuity is a constitutional category. The Preamble of our 1992 Constitution and the Declaration adopted at the same time reiterate the FRY's continuity as a state, international, legal, and political entity. Naturally, the Constitution is binding for us. Second, this is important for us from the practical point of view, because our swift and successful reintegration into the international community depends on continuity. For example, if we are not granted continuity, our reintegration into the OSCE can be stopped by a single country, a single member, due to the consensus in decisionmaking in the organization.

[Barbulovic] How can we overcome the problem in the context of continued negotiations with international financial institutions?

[Kontic] The FRY has a very pragmatic approach. We have tried to overcome the problem by separating succession from membership, that is, we would separate legal, property, and economic issues, all of which fall in the IMF's domain, from political legal issues which fall in the UN Security Council's domain. We have already submitted such a proposal to the IMF and the World Bank. I just want to say that we received the legal department's answer yesterday, and we are currently studying it; it is encouraging, however, that we shall soon be able to continue... [pauses] and a speedy normalization of relations with the IMF and the World Bank.

[Barbulovic] Reading the press, one can get the impression that there is a conflict between the Federal Government and the National Bank governor [Dragoslav Avramovic]. How would you, as prime minister, comment on this?

[Kontic] I would say there is no conflict; there can be no conflict, at least not from the legal aspect. Namely, according to the Constitution, the Federal Government creates and conducts domestic and foreign policy, cooperates with international organizations, therefore, the Federal Government is responsible for drafting platforms and stances, and appointing delegations. If someone happens not to agree with these stances, then it is no longer a conflict with the Federal Government, it is a private opinion. True, you are right, Governor Avramovic has been saying of late that he does not agree with the Federal Government's platform, that it is no binding on him. However, I would like to say that the differences between the governor and the Federal Government regarding economic issues are not essential. The differences only exist regarding succession because the governor advocates accepting the international financial organizations' proposals, that is, succession as a method of inheriting membership in the IMF, while the FRY, or rather, the Federal Government, insists on continuity for reasons which I have already stated. Nevertheless, I would like to say that regardless of certain dissonant tones heard in Paris negotiations, our delegation has not committed to any obligations that would be contrary to the stances drafted by the Federal Government.

FRY: Bank Governor To Defend Dinar Before Assembly 14 May

AU1305105996 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11-12 May 96 p 5

[Report by J. Kesic: "I Will Go to Assembly on 14 May"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "I have decided to appear before the Federal Assembly on 14 May and outline all the problems that have emerged in connection with the talks with the IMF, the World Bank, and other international financial organizations, as well as the talks with the national banks of the former SFRY republics. While I will probably take a beating there, I see no alternative because I do not have the police, the army, or the party, and so I must go to parliament. I will demand that the entire leadership in charge of the negotiations be reshuffled, and if the Assembly refuses, then it refuses. I must do this to defend the dinar exchange rate."

This is what National Bank [NBJ] Governor Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic stated in a conversation with domestic and foreign journalists yesterday. He added that he had appointed a new NBJ Governor's cabinet, which consists of Mihajlo Nikolic, Milan Gasic, Gradimir Kazetinac, and Ljubomir Subara, all general directors. "I have not replaced any of the NBJ officials yet because I do not wish to point out publicly which of them are no longer desirable and because I would like to give them time to resign themselves." [passage omitted]

Regarding the strike of the Independence trade unions outside the Federal Assembly on 14 May in support of the governor, Dr. Avramovic said only that he knew of it and that he hoped that "neither of the sides would use force."

To a journalist's question what will happen in a few months if his proposals are not accepted, Avramovic replied that he did not know, however, if we fail to obtain about $700 million ($300 for foreign currency reserves and $400 for working capital) quickly then the dinar exchange rate will fall and the debts, with their 15 percent monthly rate, will suffocate us. "There is a great chance that this is precisely what will happen because the incumbent people simply do not wish to do what is necessary."

Confirming that Mihajlo Nikolic had been replaced in the post of the chief of the negotiating team with the Chemical Bank in New York, Dr. Avramovic said Richard Levi, who represents NBJ but receives his instructions from Jovan Zebic, Kosta Mihajlovic, and Milos Bojovic, has been appointed in his place. "In less than a month this gentleman presented NBJ with a bill for $270,000 and the London attorney with a bill for another $200,000, and I am now supposed to pay about $450,000. I will forward this bill to Zebic, Mihajlovic, and Bojovic, and they can figure out what do with it." [passage omitted]

[Box, p 5]

With Workers Before Serbian Government

Governor Avramovic confirmed for NASA BORBA that he accepted the invitation of the IMT trade unions to go with them outside the Serbian Government building on Monday. "Five thousand workers from Rakovica will pick me up, then I will hold a speech, and then we will all go before the Serbian Government," Avramovic told NASA BORBA reporter.

[Box, p 5]

Opposition Demands That Governor Be Given Word

Regardless of the fact that there will be no live television relay, the deputies of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] will attend the session of the Federal parliament and demand the expansion of the agenda with the item: Address by Governor Avramovic to the deputies of the Federal Assembly. I have already consulted the presidents of the clubs of deputies of the Democratic Party, the Social Democratic Party of Srdjan Darmanovic, and the Peoples' Party of Novak Kilibarda. We will all attend to make it possible with our votes that this item be included on the agenda and that the governor addresses the federal deputies. If they refuse to expand the agenda and prevent the governor from speaking we will instantaneously leave the session and continue with the session outside the assembly building, where the trade unions have called a meeting of support to Governor Avramovic. I call on all SPO members and sympathizers to join us at 1000 [0800 GMT] outside the Federal Assembly, Vuk Draskovic said.

[Box, p 5]

What Is Trbojevic Waiting For?

First NBJ vice governor Zarko Trbojevic has not tendered his resignation yet although Governor Avramovic had demanded this of him, because, as NASA BORBA has learned unofficialy, he was advised to do so by the Federal Vice Premier Jovan Zebic. Zebic, alledgedly, said that a vice governor cannot be ousted for supporting the views of the Federal Government, even if he contradicts the governor's stance.

FRY: Kontic Explains Proposal for Ownership Transformation

AU1005144796 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 May 96 p 12

[Unattributed report: "Three Methods of Transformation"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade—Yugoslav companies will have discretion in deciding on the type of ownership transformation of social capital.

This is the underlying principle of the "Draft Law on the Foundations of Social Capital Transformation" recently approved by the federal government. The draft is on the agenda on the first regular spring session of the federal parliament at the beginning of May.

Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said that the draft provides for three methods of ownership transformation:

a) by the sale of social capital;

b) by the sale of shares with or without discount with the object of capital increase, i.e. increasing its value by transferring shares to funds, and;

c) by conversion—turning investments and claims into permanent stock.

Other methods of social capital transformation will be determined later by the republican legislatures. Whereas the foundations of ownership transformation are laid down at the federal level, concrete solutions are the prerogative of the republics, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro.

Besides having discretion to decide whether or not to embark on privatization, companies will have to determine the value and structure of their capital within a statutory period, Kontic said.

In other words, companies in possession of social capital will have to specify the proportions of social, cooperative, state and other kinds of capital, and to express its value in shares. The method of valuation will be determined by the competent federal ministry.

FRY: SPS Chairman Say Coalition Guarantees Country's Future

AU1205194196 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 12 May 96

[Interview with Branislav Ivkovic, chairman of the Belgrade City Committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia, by Spomenka Jovic in Belgrade—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Jovic] The guest of the Dnevnik newscast is Branislav Ivkovic, chairman of the Belgrade City Committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS]. Good evening.

[Ivkovic] Good evening. My respects.

[Jovic] The Belgrade Exhibition in Podgorica that went on for two days—between 10 and 12 May—has just ended. This was no ordinary exhibition and meeting between two cities and exchange of experience, since the representatives of Belgrade were truly greeted with utmost respect at the greatest state and party level.

[Ivkovic] The fact is that this was a desired exhibition, desired by both the Belgrade and Podgorica people. The Democratic Party of Socialists [DPS] and the SPS have been cooperating for a long time now—but that work somehow went on silently in the constructive sense—to overcome the problems that cropped up at times. We did not plan to have a public exhibition and thus show the closeness and ties between the two parties and the two cities. Simply, the recent events, which one can best assess from the type of questions asked at news conferences—about the existence of two systems, about possible differences, where the differences in views are emphasized—these events created the conditions for one such counterargument from us. There were 107 passengers on the plane, among whom there were many businessmen, which is very good. This plane landed in Podgorica on Friday, and we were welcomed by the Montenegrin president, prime minister, and assembly chairman on the one hand, and on the other, there were the DPS chairman, vice chairman, and my counterpart—DPS chairman for the city of Podgorica. They were our hosts. On every step of the way there was a display of closeness of views and good human relations, which is very good and important for cooperation. We discussed cooperation, particularly economic cooperation, and our presentation both in the country and particularly abroad.

[Jovic] Apart from the business aspect of things you have just mentioned, at the reception organized by Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, emphasis was laid on the importance of cooperation between the two democratic parties, the ruling parties in the two republics, the DPS and the SPS.

[Ivkovic] The DPS and the SPS without any doubt have identical views on a large percentage of issues. There might be some nuances in the differences, but that is what gives it special quality. In any case, the basic commitment, the fundamental commitment of both the parties is the FRY. The citizens of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro understand only too well that as long as the DPS has the majority and is in power in the Republic of Montenegro, and the SPS in Serbia, and they are coalition partners in the federal assembly, the FRY absolutely has a future. This is what we stressed. This is particularly important now, in 1996, that it is very well known that both the parties are fully behind their first and basic step—the FRY.

I am deeply convinced that the federal assembly, which is to start its session on 14 May, will adopt some fundamental laws, and that is what the two parties very much want. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Serbia: Metalworkers, Bank Governor To Demonstrate in Belgrade

AU1305084196 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 13 May 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "Avramovic Leading the Metalworkers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The workers of IMT [Industrija motora I traktora—the Engine and Tractor Factory] will gather outside the Serbian Government building at about 0900 [0700 GMT] today, where they will demand the payment of the due salaries and manifest support for National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic, Nebojsa Savic, president of the IMT Smelters' Trade Unions, told BETA agency.

The day before yesterday, Avramovic told a group of journalists that he had accepted the invitation of the IMT trade unions to go with the people outside the Serbian Government building on Monday. The protests within IMT itself will begin at 0700.

Nebojsa Savic told BETA that "those who chose Avramovic want to replace him now because a reform does not suit them, however, it suits the workers."

The workers of IMT will also demonstrate support for Governor Avramovic on Tuesday, 14 May, this time before the Federal Assembly building together with the members of the Independence trade unions.

The first Federal Assembly session this year will open on Tuesday, at which Avramovic's working group for privatization will, as it was announced, present its draft law on democratization of the ownership relations.

"Workers want real privatization as soon as possible and not the kind offered to us by the Federal Government, which leaves us at the mercy of the nomenclature," Savic said.

According to Savic, over the past five years, the workers have been "fobbed off by sanctions and the national interest," and these lies have pushed them so far that they "have now all become refugees in their own country." Savic said that the workers of IMT are in contact with their colleagues from Nis and that they will support them in their Monday demonstrations while "they will support us over there."

The president of the IMT Smelters' Trade Unions added that, in the Monday demonstrations outside the Serbian Government headquarters, the workers "will not provoke, but they will be ready for action in case of repression."

"There is no worse prospect than the current one, with salaries of 260 dinars that we have not received for four months," Savic concluded.

[Box, p 6]

Orders to Directors

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic held talks with "seven or eight directors" of the biggest metal enterprises of Serbia in Smederevo on Thursday and probably "tasked them with assignments," Nebojsa Savic, president of IMT Smelters' Trade Unions, said today.

"We, however, will give them different assignments," Savic said.

Serbia: Strikers Threaten To Blockade Key Services in Nis

LD1105161596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1505 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Nis, 11 May (TANJUG)—Stojan Randjelovic, chairman of the Nis city assembly, today said that the competent city and republican bodies are doing their best to resolve the problem of the poor financial situation of employees, which is the reason why employees at five Nis companies announced a general strike two days ago. [passage omitted]

Randjelovic warned that energetic measures will be taken against such attempts and pointed out that the blockade of the city transport, bakeries, dairies, and [Belgrade-Nis] highway, announced for 13 May, will not be permitted.

After a failed attempt yesterday to meet the leader of the city government, employees of the five companies from Nis said that they will blockade all important services in the city on 13 May. [passage omitted]

Serbia: Seselj Supports Nis Strikers, Criticizes Hague Trials

AU1305130296 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 10 May 96 p 4

[Report by "V.D.": "Nis Workers Driven Into the Street by Misery"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Support for the demands of the Nis workers and criticism of The Hague trial against Dusan Tadic were the main topics of yesterday's news conference by the Serbian Radical Party.

Assessing that the striking workers were "driven into the street by suffering and misery," party president Vojislav Seselj said that "the workers have a chance only if they stand united."

"This does not mean that we are opposed to political demands; however, they must be devoid of any party interests," the Radical leader said, and added that the workers should demand the government's resignation. Recommending that "this should serve as an example to workers in other industrial branches," the leader of the Radicals assessed that "this is the only way the authorities in Serbia can be changed."

Regarding the trial against Tadic, Seselj assessed that "the tribunal was established to put the Serbian nation as a whole on trial," as well as that this institution "does not have any evidence against one single Serb."

"They are trying Tadic, even accusing him of things that I allegedly did," Seselj said, adding that he has offered himself up to the tribunal for nearly two years but has not even succeeded in obtaining a visa for the Netherlands. He believes that Yugoslavia should not extradite any of its citizens to the tribunal because this would mean renouncing its sovereignty. "The Americans are now enforcing the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, which we must resist," Seselj said, and added that "the Americans will not leave us alone until they have strangled us completely."

Serbia: Draskovic Speaks at Ceremony Honoring Serb Nationalist

LD1105194296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1802 GMT 11 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ravna Gora, 11 May (TANJUG)—Several thousand people attended the 50th anniversary of the death of Dragoslav Draza Mihajlovic [Serb nationalist, chetnik leader in World War II] marked on Ravna Gora [mountain peak, and Mihajlovic's war headquarters] on the slopes of Suvobor mountain. At the same time, the consecration ceremony for the foundations of a church to be built on the mountain was held. Priests from Sabac-Valjevo and Zica eparchy officiated at the consecration service.

The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and the Belgrade-based humanitarian organization Spona are erecting a church at Ravna Gora,for the souls of all men from Ravna Gora, and above all for General Draza and all the Serb warriors who laid down their lives for the homeland since the Battle of Kosovo.

A requiem mass was held for Draza Mihajlovic on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of his death, as well as a requiem mass for all "warriors who have lost their lives for the homeland and freedom."

The usual paraphernalia were present at Ravna Gora—flags, Chetnik insignia, loud detonations, support for Vuk Draskovic...

Speaking to the participants in the gathering, SPO President Vuk Draskovic said that 55 years ago "it was through this mountain that the shots of freedom echoed" in an enslaved Europe and it was 50 years ago that "the man who led that uprising was killed, the man who was at the head of that great freedom movement, and to this day the site of his grave is unknown."

Draskovic devoted a large part of today's speech at Ravna Gora to the upcoming elections. According to Draskovic "the democratic forces will soon take control of Serbia's destiny, and that is why the first condition for progress in Serbia lies in the reconciliation of all people. Serbia has had enough hatred and suffering, and it has also had its share of misery."

Draskovic praised Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's idea of reconciliation between Croatian antifascists and fascists, calling it a wisdom "that Serbia is lacking."

Today, as usual, Draskovic did not miss the chance to bitterly attack the ruling party and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova: Opening of U.S. Office in Pristina 'Very Important'

AU1105195296 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 11 May 96

[Telephone report by Mehmet Haziri from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosovo, held a meeting with the Democratic League of Kosovo [LDK] branch representatives today, in which he once again assessed as very important for the moment the assurance by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher that the permanent U.S. representation office would be opened in Prishtina this month. The permanent representation of the U.S. diplomatic mission in the Kosovo capital is of special importance and testifies to the interest and continuous support of the U.S. Administration for our peaceful resistance, President Rugova pointed out.

After reminding that U.S. diplomatic representatives have always been present in Kosovo, particularly after the latest tensions, President Rugova assessed that the opening of the office confirms a permanent U.S. presence in Prishtina. This will guarantee that the situation in Kosovo is followed closely and in a permanent way.

The Kosovo Information Center reports that President Rugova also briefed the LDK branch representatives on the meetings and contacts he recently held with foreign diplomats and delegations who visited Prishtina. Considering the tragic incidents over the past days and the increased Serbian police provocations, Rugova said that we have asked these delegations to increase their pressure on Belgrade to stop the provocations and systematic repression in Kosovo.

President Rugova also demanded a larger international presence in Kosovo with preventive aims, as well as creating preliminary conditions for a fair solution of the Kosovo issue through peaceful means.

Another topic of the meeting with the LDK representatives was the issue of financing in Kosovo. Mr. Ismail Kastrati, chairman of the Finance Council, briefed those present on the work done during the first quarter of this year.

Kosovo: Belgrade TV Praises State's Attitude Toward Albanians

AU1105194096 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 11 May 96

[Report by Vladimir Nikolic from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] The normalization of relations between the Serbian state and the Albanian ethnic minority in Kosovo and Metohija is obviously going against the interests of the extreme wing of the Albanian ethnic leaders.

The situation has been developing recently in the direction of normalization, primarily because of the correct attitude of the state toward all the citizens of the southern province and its permanent openness to dialogue with the representatives of the Albanian ethnic minority.

[Begin Jovo Popovic, Pec regional chief, recording] When it comes to coexistence, perhaps a step forward should be made. Perhaps this is a question of education, or something else, a question of sport, of culture, since something should really be done but only within the framework of the Republic of Serbia. Therefore, we are ready to accept any dialogue. [end recording]

There are many examples that the Albanian citizens have understood properly the correctness and openness of Serbia. Recently the members of the Albanian ethnic minority have been exercising their rights en masse in the offices of the state bodies. They have been receiving medical care in state medical institutions since the private ones held by their compatriots are charging considerable amounts in foreign currency for their services.

True, they are not registering en masse yet into the state schools and universities but they have realized that they have no future with the degrees issued by Albanian alternate schools and universities.

[Begin Branislava Furijanovic, Prizren regional chief, recording] When the leaders of the Albanian ethnic minority and their political parties realize that dialogue cannot be to the detriment of the constitutional and territorial integrity of Serbia, I believe they will accept dialogue. [end recording]

Such developments have been brought about by the latest confirmation by all relevant centers of the international community that Kosmet is an integral part of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Respect for this fact could lead to the dialogue that Serbia has always been committed to.

Kosovo: Article Alleges CIA, DIA Support for 'Separatists'

AU1005165996 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 8 May 96 p 5

[Report by Tomislav Kresovic: "The Crisis Scenario"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Noam Chomsky, the well-known U.S. political sociologist and author of the controversial book *What America Really Wants* said: "As early as 1981, a State Department official boasted that we would turn Nicaragua into the Albania of Central America, that is, an impoverished, isolated, and politically radical country." The Nicaraguan crisis was politically influenced through CIA connections, the narcomafia, the army, and diplomacy. In connection to this, Chomsky goes on to say: "The secret war against Nicaragua influenced the boom in the drug trade in that part of the world, as the planes that the CIA used to illegally ship arms to U.S. mercenaries made easy the transport of drugs into the United States, occasionally even through U.S. Army military bases."

Chomsky's analysis can be used to forecast U.S. policy in Southeastern Europe, in Albania, but also its general attitude toward the Balkans, Albania, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], and a part of Serbia, namely, Kosovo and Metohija, which should become a European Nicaragua and Columbia, and, therefore, an area for money laundering, drug trafficking, and organized drug dealing, which will cause political crises and criminalize society.

Parallel Policy

Regarding Kosovo and Metohija, the U.S. Administration's official stance toward Serbia is embodied in the "outside wall of sanctions" [spoljasnji zid sankcija], which complicates the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's international political position, and its reintegration into the United Nations, the OSCE, and the IMF. The United States also maintains a dual policy in Kosovo and Metohija regarding solving the position of the Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia. One segment of political activity is linked to the Albanian lobby in the Senate and Congress led by the Republicans, which influences the passing of political and diplomatic decisions like the "outside wall of sanctions," while the other segment involves DIA (military intelligence service) and CIA influence on solutions to Kosovo and the general Albanian situation in the Balkans.

There can be no doubt about the CIA's perfidious influence in defining the Kosovo Albanians' strategic intentions and plans in Kosovo and Macedonia, including a radicalization of the crisis in terms of terrorism and the separatist movement's selective violence. The CIA is based in Albania and Macedonia, and that is where they carefully analyze the political and military situation and conduct their parallel Balkan policy through NATO; that is, the U.S. and UN military forces. The CIA's main support comes from Albanian drug traffickers, who "take care" of 20 to 40 percent of the U.S. heroin market. The United States is using powerful AWACS to film and analyze intelligence data on the movement and location of Yugoslav Army and police forces for the political and other requirements of the Albanian Government and the separatist movement supported by Tirana.

The United States has several projects and plans connected to Kosovo and Metohija. We shall mention the most important ones. In May 1993, the "Federation of U.S. Scientists" project was publicly launched. It contains four options. The first option is a division of Kosovo and Metohija between the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians [Siptari], on the basis of a demographic and political projection. The second option is the so-called CONDOMINIUM [preceding word all uppercase as published] or rent that the Albanian would pay the Serbs. On the one hand, this would be a confirmation of Serbian property in Kosovo and would yield funds for moving Serbs out of Kosovo, while, on the other hand, it would create the conditions for a maximal autonomy that would later turn into an ethnic Albanian self-administration. The third option involves a UN protectorate over Kosovo and Metohija, while the fourth envisages redefining the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's borders and a new state position of Kosovo [nova drzavna pozicija Kosova].

The "Minnesota Plan" was launched by U.S. lawyers, and it advocates pressuring Serbia for human and minority rights abuse and insists on giving Kosovo back its 1974 autonomy status.

The "Virginia Plan" involves forcing Serbia and the FRY under the military and political protectorate of the NATO mission or the United States in the name of the alliance or military forces of the European course. [sentence as published] In order to put the "Virginia Plan" into action, you would need to incite border conflicts between the FRY and Albania or on the Serbian-Albanian-Macedonian border.

Pressure on Serbia

Another project involves a proposal drafted by a group of congressmen (Susan Molinari, Eliot Engel, Bill Paxon, Peter King), which advocates establishing a special UN mission in Kosovo as a means of preventing a Balkan war. The congressmen believe that Kosovo and Metohija was and still is a constituent part of the federation according to the 1974 constitution, so it is logical that the Albanians' ethnic authorities in Kosovo and Metohija and their illegal government have the right to request international protection. The congressmen are also urging international pressure on and the isolation of Serbia as a means of solving the ethnic Albanians' ethnic rights, and they insist on supporting the Albanians militarily in their struggle for sovereignty and human rights.

Therefore, it is more than clear that the United States has several goals in Kosovo and Metohija and in solving the Pan-Albanian issue in the Balkans. These projects have the least interest in diplomatically deterring the separatists from their strategic goals, that is, Kosovo and Metohija's independence. It is obvious that the White House and the State Department are urging a dialogue of Serbs and Albanians, while the CIA and the DIA are supporting the separatists' radical goals. We now need to see what the U.S.'s true Balkan policy toward Kosovo and Metohija and Serbia really is.

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